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Abstract
This is a comprehensive study of farm management performance. The rapid growth of farm income
and production costs has raised both new questions and warranted revising old questions; these in-
clude the existence of persistent management skill, the management strategies and profitability,
farm growth and the land investing behavior associated with farm wealth. To address these ques-
tions, farm management performance is analyzed based on yearly Illinois Farm Business Farm
Management (FBFM) panel data across 9,831 farms from 1996 through 2014.
Agricultural producers operate in a volatile environment, facing a number of sources of risk.
A key question is whether farmers who are more highly skilled can better mitigate these risks and
consistently earn higher returns than their lower skilled peers. Two out-of-sample tests of skill
persistence are used to analyze the ability of farm managers that consistently perform well over
yearly and longer time horizons. The results suggest that the most skilled managers often generate
better financial results and that management skills are consistent and predictable. Furthermore, the
top 10% of farmers have substantial ability to persistently perform.
The alpha scores (or skill estimates) for farm managers are analyzed to determine if most prof-
itable farmers possess specific skills or knowledge against adverse events in a volatile environment.
This study emphasizes the strategic and operations aspects of managing a farm. Farms are eval-
uated under different scenarios of management skill portfolios. Fundamental farm management
basics are discussed in this study, including budgeting, production planning, financial analysis,
financial management, investment analysis, and control management. Farm managers will want to
consult it to improve the effectiveness, objectivity, and success of their decisions.
For decades, the dominant trend in US agriculture at the farm level has been towards greater
ii
concentration. The study analyzes the factors underpinning this prominent trend. It has crucial
policy implications because theory would suggest high profit farms should capture the resources
over time. Two important hypotheses are derived and tested using dynamic growth model and
choice behavior model: 1) farms that expand the most are more profitable; 2) returns have systemic
influence on the rental and accumulation decision and hence upon the land tenure. Results suggest
that high profit is often touted as a motivation factor for land investing. An innovative aspect of
this study is that it brings together qualitative, quantitative, and institutional sources of information
to paint a more complete picture of farm growth in the United States.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Good management is a crucial factor in the success of any business. Farms are no exception. To
be successful, farm managers will make and execute the accurate decisions. The long-term di-
rection of a farm is determined through strategic planing. This is because production agriculture
in the United States and other countries is changing along the following lines: more mechaniza-
tion, increasing farm size, continued adoption of new technologies, growing capital investment per
worker, more borrowed or leased capital, new marketing alternatives, and increased business risk.
These factors create new management problems, but also present new opportunities for managers
with the right skills.
The complex issues agriculture is facing today, such as climate change, food and energy sup-
ply, globalisation of markets, population and economic growth and scarcity of natural resources,
have drawn much deserved public attention to farm-related behavior and risk factors. For in-
stance, after softening in the recent recession, surging farm revenues fueled a sharp rebound in
U.S. farmland values. Stronger economic activity in emerging countries, especially China, led
to stronger-than-expected global export activity. All of these new issues call for approaches that
integrate knowledge of farm management decisions across a wide range of fields, including land
allocation, size adjustments and intensity of production subject to available technologies as well as
farm resources. These decisions occur regularly and are highly relevant for the overall impact of
policies on the agricultural system, because the implied change in the distribution of farm structure
not only affects the farm incomes and farm asset values, but also changes aggregate production at
market level. Therefore, by taking a closer look at today’s farm performance, an assessment ex-
ercise may improve the validity of the calculated social policy impacts from the relevance for
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economic indicators.
For decades, the dominant trend in U.S. agriculture at the farm level has been towards greater
concentration. The large farms and contract operations have grown in numbers while the number of
mid-sized independent family farms has shrunk. The changing structure of farmland ownership has
important consequences for equity within agriculture and thus has been the subject of considerable
interest among agricultural economists and policy makers.
In recent years increasing attention has been paid to the rising land values, cash rents, and the
other costs of production, which could limit profits and raise risk profiles. With soaring farmland
values, questions naturally arise about the capacity of current farm income to support such high
land costs. Farmland occupies a uniquely important role in the performance of the agricultural sec-
tor. Agricultural uses large areas of land, distinguishing it from most other industries. Specifically,
farm real estate accounts for 85% of the total value of all farm assets and serves as the primary
source of collateral in production loans. Motivated by this increased role of farmland market and
interactions with other existing uncertainties in farm operations, this dissertation considers the im-
portant decisions of how much land to control and how to acquire it, in relation to identifying
effective and persistent farm management skills.
Two factors driving farm performance can be distinguished: agri-environmental conditions
and farm management strategies. The probably implicit choice for adoption of a strategy may be
governed by agri-environmental conditions (e.g., soil quality, altitude, climate, rainfall and access
to water) beyond the farmer’s skills and objectives. An interesting question is raised whether agri-
environmental factors are a curse or a blessing to a farm manager. Environmental factors have been
seen as the unobservable variables from assessments of economic efficiency. However, to increase
the value of farm output, productive and effective management strategies are still largely required.
For instance, regarding soil fertility, farmers need to increase high quality nutrient inputs at low
cash and labor costs to the farmer. Although most research determine that natural endowment or
weather conditions can have direct influence on farm performance, they do not directly calculate
if farm managers successfully profit from their farming skills or natural resource endowment.
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Moreover, while numerous studies have presumed that skill does lead to better performance
and higher returns, the measurement of intrinsic skill has been conspicuously absent. The lack
of attention in the literature to date is due in part to difficulties in developing suitable data series
for farmers’ financial performances in which measures of skill effects could likely be detected,
and in controlling for non-operator influences, such as farm characteristics, in farm returns. The
aim of this dissertation is to fill this gap in the empirical analysis of persistent management skills
by simultaneously investigating management strategies, farm growth, and structural change for a
panel of 9,831 farm households in Illinois for the period from 1996 to 2014.
This dissertation is composed of three essays (chapters) and derives its motivation specifically
from financial performance and management skills in agricultural sector. The theme of the papers
is focused on the examination of farm management skill persistence and critical land accumulation
decision related to farm income growth. The relationships among the three essays are as follows.
The first essay answers the question “if there are persistently skilled farm managers”, while the
second essay studies the means and patterns of how these managers operating the farm by applying
alpha scores (skill estimates) to decoding farm management patterns. The third essay sheds light
on the implications of the first two essays for the role of land accumulation decisions. Specifically,
this essay analyzes farm income concentration that restrain small farm operators from making high
incomes and focuses on farmer’s land control and use.
An underlying assumption by many in a number of studies of farm performance is that the best
have different management styles and strategies. The goal of the first essay (chapter 2) is to explore
if there are farmers who outperform their peer group on a persistent basis. Getting a fundamental
understanding of persistence-based management behavior is important because agricultural pro-
ducers are crucial to the fundamental economy of the U.S., contributing to major production and
employing more than one sixth of the work force in the U.S.1 In addition, production agriculture
has certainly not been immune to crises - the farm crisis in the 1920s and later in the 1980s, and
1U.S. USDA. National Agricultural Statistics Service. 2007 Census of Agriculture. N.p., 15 March
2011. Web. http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Online_Highlights/Fact_
Sheets/Economics/farm_labor.pdf.
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the most recently 2008 financial crisis among others. Every year, the U.S. government spends
billions of dollars on funding to provide safety nets for agricultural producers, since these pro-
ducers operate in a volatile environment, facing a number of sources of risk. Some risks, such
as commodity and input price volatility, can be more easily managed than others through finan-
cial instruments. However, certain supply-and-demand dynamics are truly driven by exogenous
forces such as weather, disease, and macroeconomic conditions. It is implausible and impractical
to provide a hedge against these types of risk. The above issues underscore the need for a long-run
perspective on farm management skills, as managers whose financial performance was superior in
one economic environment could experience difficulties in another.
While it is easily accepted that better farm management styles with higher revenue are distinct
from those with poor performance, little effort has been made in the empirical literature to incorpo-
rate managerial skill persistence into analysis of farm performance. Since little formal research has
addressed this crucial issue in terms of skill persistence, the first paper focus on the key question
“whether farmers who are more highly skilled can better mitigate multiple risks and consistently
earn higher returns than their lower skilled peers”. This paper is the first, among the existing lit-
erature on the management skill, to look into this gap. Different than the previous literature, the
sample uses long-term farm-level survey records. Persistence is the key feature, because anyone
could have large returns over short horizons only due to luck. A common approach to separate
out luck from skill is to test for persistence. Persistent performance over time should be the real
measure of whether or not management skills matter in agriculture. The testing approach applies
well known methods used in financial literature. Overall results provide compelling evidence that
the superior managers survive and are not an artifact of luck.
The second essay is provided in chapter 3 and expands the first essay in management per-
sistence by documenting explanations for strategic planing and decisions to generate high farm
income. The approach implemented in this chapter provides a standard empirical framework for
investigating the systematic relationship between management skills and profit. This study con-
tribute to the farm performance literature in two ways. First, to examine the question whether most
4
skilled farms have different management strategies and characteristics, the analysis constructs a
comparative statistical way to compare individual farm alphas (or skill estimates). Statistical pro-
cedures are used to test for strategy difference and economic efficiency in farm performance using
individual farm alphas over long-term horizons. Therefore, productive and effective management
skills are not an unrevealed innate quality anymore; good management skills can be cultivated,
developed and learned through farm performance investigations. Second, the study also provides
statistical analysis to address the question of whether the economic efficiency of top managers is
on the cost side, the revenue side, or both. Fundamental farm management basics are discussed,
including budgeting, production planning, financial analysis, financial management, investment
analysis, and control management. Farm managers will want to consult it to improve the effective-
ness, objectivity, and success of their decisions.
The third essay (chapter 4) specifically focuses on land accumulation decision. Compared
with other production inputs, land is purchased infrequently and usually involves a large, long-
term financial obligation. How much land to control and how to acquire it can be two of the
most difficult decisions confronting farm operators. Errors made at this point may plague the
business for many years. They must evaluate investments and make decisions based on present
conditions with appropriate allowances for future anticipation. Land control means undoubtedly
relates to farm growth and profit persistence, as rising land values, cash rents, and the other costs
of production could limit profits and raise risk profiles. The land control decision is especially
critical today, when many are questioning the ability of farm income to support current land values
at relatively “normal” commodity prices.
A farmer’s decision model is used to show if the relationship between profits and farm size
prevails. Specific case situations are analyzed by comparing profitable farms and their peer group.
Since funding issues for major lenders and the emerging regulatory design arise from commod-
ity and farm-related credit market activity during the recent financial crisis, lenders and investors
will be interested in the degree to which farm profitability influence tenure and investment behav-
ior. Thus, potential profit growth and land accumulation dynamics need to be recognized in risk
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management activities.
The dissertation contributes to the agricultural literature by providing a unique insight into
the management skill and a comprehensive assessment of profitability and skills. The results
are interesting to regulators who are concerned about farm leasing systems and farmland market,
which helps to determine the ability of farms to invest and grow, with effects on boom/bust cycles
in farmland market and total production levels. Understanding the links between farm profitability,
management patterns, and land accumulation will help government to better evaluate the effects of
its policies on farmland, government programs and economic growth. The theoretical framework,
data, methods to be employed, and results for each of the three dissertation essays follow.
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Chapter 2
Is Farm Management Skill Persistent?
2.1 Introduction
Agricultural producers operate in a volatile environment, facing a number of sources of risk. Due to
the recent increase of commodity price volatility, U.S. net farm income was estimated to decline 36
percent in 2015 which could be the largest drop since 1983 (USDA, Economic Research Service)1.
In addition, production agriculture has certainly not been immune to crises. The recent financial
crisis has had a direct impact on the growth of farm income and farmland values (Paulson &
Sherrick, 2009; Ellinger & Tirupattur, 2009). Furthermore, new farmers are in short supply, and
this problem constitutes a threat to U.S. agriculture and the food supply (Gale, 2003; Hoppe et al.
, 2007). Some risks, such as commodity and input price volatility, can be more easily managed
than others through financial instruments. However, certain supply-and-demand dynamics are
truly driven by exogenous forces such as weather, disease, and macroeconomic conditions. It
is implausible and impractical to provide a hedge against these types of risk. The above issues
underscore the need for a long-run perspective on farm management skills, as managers whose
financial performance was superior in one economic environment could experience difficulties in
another.
A key question is whether farmers who are more highly skilled can better mitigate these risks
and consistently earn higher returns than their lower skilled peers. While numerous studies have
presumed that skill does lead to better performance and higher returns (Sonka et al. , 1989; Plumley
12015 Farm Sector Income Forecast (USDA, Economic Research Service) http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-
economy/farm-sector-income-finances/farm-business-income.aspx
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& Hornbaker, 1991; Mishra et al. , 1999), the measurement of intrinsic skill has been conspicu-
ously absent. The lack of attention in the literature to date is due in part to difficulties in developing
suitable data series for farmers’ financial performances in which measures of skill effects could
likely be detected, and in controlling for non-operator influences, such as farm characteristics, in
farm returns. Only Urcola et al. (2004) use corn yield data from McLean County, Illinois to
test whether farming skills influence yields with a focus on short-term performance. Their results
support the hypothesis that farmer skill influences yields. The prior research’s sample however, is
limited to only one county in Illinois, which does not consider different regions of the state.
Since little formal research has addressed this issue in terms of skill persistence, this article
explores that if there are farmers who outperform their peer group on a consistent basis. Persistence
is the key feature in this study, because anyone could have large returns over short horizons only
due to luck. A common approach to separate out luck from skill is to test for persistence. Persistent
performance over time should be the real measure of whether or not management skills matter in
agriculture. The testing approach for this research applies well known methods used in financial
literature (Elton et al. , 1987; Malkiel, 1995; Carhart, 1997; Aulerich et al. , 2013) to see if some
managers consistently outperform other managers.
Management skill persistence is well documented in the finance and marketing service litera-
ture with mixed results. For instance, Carhart (1997) finds persistence in mutual fund performance
does not reflect superior stock-picking skill. Rather, common factors in stock returns and persistent
differences in mutual fund expenses and transaction costs explain almost all of the predictability in
mutual fund return. Grinblatt et al. (1995) find that momentum strategies generate better perfor-
mance persistence. This is in contrast to Carhart (1997), who finds that transaction costs consume
the gains from following a momentum strategy in stocks. These results are sensitive to model
specification. Extensive literature also exists on investment performance in the mutual fund and
hedge fund industries (Grinblatt & Titman, 1992; Kosowski et al. , 2006). This literature focuses
on the performance of an entire portfolio relative to market benchmarks. Although the results are
not easily compared to this analysis, similar methods in measuring performance persistence can
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be used in the agricultural context. The research by Irwin et al. (2006) and Cunningham et al.
(2007), suggest that pricing performance of agricultural market advisory services is unpredictable.
While it is easily accepted that better farm management styles with higher revenue are distinct
from those with poor performance, little effort has been made in the empirical literature to incor-
porate managerial skill persistence into analysis of farm performance. There are two purposes for
investigating longer-run farm performance across a large pool of data: first, to find evidence of per-
sistent managerial skill explained by readily observable data and proxies for managerial attributes;
second, to ascertain if significant differences in performance can be documented for a large group
of relatively homogeneous farms by considering performance over time.
This study expands the existing literature in farm management by controlling for survivor bias,
and by documenting common-factor explanations for farm performance persistence. Section 2
presents models of performance measurement on the appropriate benchmark. Section 3 discusses
the data set corrected for survivor bias. Section 4 documents and explains the persistence in man-
agement skill and further examines and explains performance for top and bottom managers. Sec-
tion 5 provides summary and conclusions.
2.2 Theoretical Model
2.2.1 Performance Measurement
The first step is to find the absolute dollar value for operating profit. Operator and land returns
represent a return to both owning and operating the farmland (Schnitkey, 2010). I define operator
and land return as follows:
OpRetit($/acre) =
P × Yit − Cit + LCit
Acrtili
=
Revit − Cit + LCit
Acrtili
,
where OpRetit is operator and land return per acre ($/acre) on farm i for time period t, P is
the output price, Yit is the total yield; Revit is the total revenue (the sum of all operator’s share of
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gross sales plus net change in inventory and capital accounts); Cit is the total cost (all expenses for
items purchased, payments to supplies for feed, seed, fuel, rent to owner for rented land, interest
paid, unpaid labor and the value of family labor, annual depreciation, etc.); LCit is the total land
cost; Acrtili is the farm size measured by tillable acre.
Land cost is added back to net farm income from operations to eliminate the effect of land
cost on operating profit. This allows the operating profit to focus strictly on the profit made from
producing crops without regard to the amount of land cost, which can vary substantially from farm
to farm. Eliminating this variable permits a valid comparison of this return across different farms.
To recognize the unpaid labor and the value of family labor contributed to earning the profit, their
opportunity costs are subtracted. This makes the results comparable to those from business where
all labor is hired, as these expenses have already been deducted in the computation of net farm
income from operations. Management is therefore considered the residual claimant to net farm
income.
Some managers are able to generate more production or use fewer resources than their peers
because they use their resource more efficiently. A general definition for efficiency is the quantity
or value of production achieved per unit of resource employed. The use of OpRetit as a sole
accounting performance measure, however, is a dollar amount and does not accurately reflect use
of inputs. Management on the farm can be measured by the ability of the farmer to optimize the
use of natural endowments and inputs to obtain an output. Therefore, the management dimension
can be embodied by input expenditures. Farm managers have direct control of these expenses
and finding which critical input to manage more effectively is of interest to understanding the
persistence of performance. Consequently, input variables are used as determinant variables of
persistence. Also, the form of farm business (family owned/enterprise) can cause problems for
interpretation of the performance measurement. To take the heterogeneity of the costs of different
farms into consideration, I use a ratio to measure the percentage return with respect to the total
cost per acre:
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Ratioit(%) =
(Revit − Cit + LCit)/Acrtili
Cit/Acrtili
× 100 = OpRetit(per acre)
Cit(per acre)
× 100.
This ratio of performance measure is used to evaluate the efficiency of managerial skill or to
compare the efficiency of a number of different managers. Farms with low ratio should concentrate
on improving this ratio before expanding production.
2.2.2 The “Hot Hand” Phenomenon
The key questions in this research are whether some farmers are more skilled at making man-
agement decisions than others, and does this result in highly skilled managers financially outper-
forming their lower skilled peers consistently? To conduct the persistence test, I apply the same
procedure to returns using the models of performance proposed by past literature. These include
the simple one-factor model of Jensen (1968), the three-factor model of Fama & French (1993),
and the four-factor model of Carhart (1997). In the context of the present study, implementation
of the multi-factor model approach involves two steps. The first step is to compute the average
benchmark and then subtract the benchmark from each farm performance proxy. The second step
is to apply the two-factor model to compute ordinary least square (OLS) estimated alphas (mul-
tivariate generalization of Jensen’s alpha). The following theoretical model is derived from the
conventional financial theory’s existing framework.
Ratioit = αi + γRatiojt + βZit + µit, (2.1)
if γ = 1, then
Ratioit −Ratiojt = αi + βZit + µit, (2.2)
where
Ratioit= the ratio of return to cost of farm i for time period t;
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Ratiojt= the ratio of return to cost of county j for time period
t, which is normalized (assume γ = 1 held constant across time)2;
αi= the constant term;
Zit= a vector of the farm characteristics, which contains soil
productivity (Sprit) and farm size (Acrtilit)3;
µit= the regression residual;
i, j, t= subscript indexes for farm, county, and year, respectively.
In this model, the county-level average measure Ratiojt was selected to minimize the impacts
of geography and weather on returns (e.g., good vs. bad weather, superior vs. inferior growing
conditions). Also, the use of the county average benchmark is to control for systematic effects
that affect all farms within a county in one specific year. Therefore, excess return is a relative
performance measure. It removes systemic effects on returns that might impact every farmer peer
group in a given year.
(Ratioit−Ratiojt) is the excess ratio; αi is the ratio left unexplained by the benchmark model.
Accounting for the variation in returns associated with farm characteristics (Zit) then allows us to
mainly focus on the effects of farm management, indicated by αi or the constant term. An alpha
greater than zero means a farm manager outperforms the expected performance (Jensen, 1968;
Fama & French, 1993; Carhart, 1997; Kosowski et al. , 2006). Managerial capacities (αi) can then
measure cost management or/and profit-making capacities at the farm level.
Profitability is impacted by a number of factors, many of which are controlled to some extent
by the management decisions of the farm operator. However, natural endowments, such as soil
quality and favorable weather conditions, may disguise the manager’s actual capacities. There-
fore, quantifying how much management and natural endowment (e.g., soil productivity) matter
2County j refers to the county which contains farm i, so that Ratiojt can be treated as a benchmark for farm i.
3The effects of location, weather, and precipitation on profitability are not taken into consideration similar to most
research, because this analysis would control for these effects. The variability in temperature, and to a lesser extent
in precipitation, are similar within a county. Also, these variables are not exactly linearly related to profitability so it
is hard to predict the management skill in terms of functional form. Thus, I follow the method used by Sonka (1989)
and control farm characteristics.
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respectively in persistence is of interest. In addition, some dimensions that are not directly related
to the production process may be captured by a secondary effect, such as the size of the farm.
However, the effect of farm size on profitability is an issue continually analyzed and debated by
agricultural economists (Purdy et al. , 1997; Garcia et al. , 1982; Goodwin et al. , 2002). I suggest
there may be increasing returns to scale for farms, and a normalized measure of profitability (i.e.,
net farm income per acre) may be enhanced by expanding the scale of the operation. The above
discussion motivates the choice of the variables in the farm characteristic vector. Therefore, in
order to gain some insights, I employ a two-factor model to measure performance.
Several financial studies, such as Grinblatt & Titman (1992) and Malkiel (1995), present strong
evidence in favor of a “hot hand” phenomenon, which is when mutual funds that achieved above-
average returns continue to enjoy superior performance. In order to test if some farmers have
persistent performance, I need to identify “αit” for each of the farms over each time period. This
means OLS estimated alphas (using the time series of returns for each farm i) can not accomplish
my goal of testing for skill persistence.
To circumvent this problem, in each year, I estimate a cross-section regression:
Ratioi −Ratioj = β1Spri + β2Acrtili + µi, (2.3)
where µi is the residual of equation (3), and
αi ≡ Excess Ratioi − E[Excess Ratioi] = µi, (2.4)
where
Excess Ratioi = Ratioi −Ratioj,
E[Excess Ratioi] = β1Spri + β2Acrtili.
In this specification, alpha is represented by the residual of equation (3), which is the excess
ratio left unexplained by the linear regression model in equation (4). An alpha greater than zero
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means a farm manager outperforms the benchmark. This procedure proposed by Carhart (1997)
can allow for the possibility of examining every possible ordering of farm manager in a given year.
If some farmers have persistent performance, then it can be explained that they have consis-
tently better skills than others. Farmers receiving above-average returns might be using a superior
management skill, so finding performance persistence could help identify superior strategies. Two
out-of-sample tests of persistence are used in the analysis to analyze the ability of farm man-
agers that consistently perform well over yearly and longer time horizons, both of which have
been widely applied in studies of market performance (Elton et al. , 1987; Malkiel, 1995; Carhart,
1997; Irwin et al. , 2006).
2.2.3 Spearman Ranking Test
The first test is the Spearman ranking test, which is a paired correlation analysis across adjoining
periods4. Persistence simply means that the actual statistic is correlated from one period to the
next throughout the sample periods. For instance, if financial performance of farm i statistically
outperformed the benchmark in 1996, it would be correlated highly with the good performance
in 1997. Therefore, for a single farm manager, whether alpha rankings in consecutive periods are
positively correlated would be a measure of persistence which means the statistic is indicative of
skill. Also, performing the Spearman nonparametric test on the rank ordering of performance mea-
sure has some statistical advantages, for instance, it does not assume a linear relationship between
variables. Correlations are calculated using pairwise deletion of observations with missing values
due to an unbalanced data set. I use casewise deletion, where observations are ignored if any of
the variables are missing. Here, the null hypothesis is that the performance measure is randomly
ordered.
4Spearman (1904) rank correlation is calculated as Pearson’s correlation coefficient computed on the ranks and
average ranks (Conover, 1980). The significance is calculated using the approximation: p = 2 × ttail(n −
2, |ρˆ|√(n− 2)/√(1− ρ2)).
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2.2.4 Winner and Loser Ranking Test
Mirroring the previous discussion, the second test is a winner and loser ranking test that assesses,
in a nonparametric context, whether managers in the top half of the alphas distribution in a time
period continue in the top half of the distribution in the next period. Farms with high past alphas
demonstrate relatively higher alphas and expected returns in subsequent periods. The null hypoth-
esis is the past ranking of a farm manager does not help predict the manager’s future ranking.
This test is based on placing farm managers into winner and loser categories across adjacent
pairs of years. The first step in this test procedure is to form the sample of all farm managers that
are present in the pair of years. The second step is to rank each farm manager in the first year of
the pair (e.g., t = 1996) based on alpha estimates. Then, the managers are sorted in descending
rank order. The third step is to form two groups of mangers in yeart: a winner is defined as a
manager’s alpha ranking that has achieved above the median; a loser is defined as a manager’s
alpha ranking that has achieved below the median. The fourth step is to rank each farm manager
in the subsequent yeart+1 of the pair (e.g., 1997) based on alpha estimates and once again form
winner and loser groups of farm managers. The fifth step is to compute the following category
counts for the farm managers in the pair of years: winnert − winnert+1, winnert − losert+1,
losert − winnert+1, losert − losert+1. The sixth step is to construct a 2 × 2 contingency table
formed on the basis of winner and loser counts. The appropriate statistical test in this case is
Fisher’s exact test, a nonparametric test that is robust to outliers because both row and column totals
are predetermined in the contingency table. The null hypothesis is that the relative proportions of
yeart are independent of yeart+1. With large samples, a Pearson’s chi-squared test can also be
used.
I also calculate the percentage of winners in the initial year that remain in the upper 50% in the
subsequent year. If these conditional probabilities are higher than what would result from flipping
a coin (randomness), they can provide predictability. The disadvantage of this repeat winners and
losers approach is that it has low power to reject the null hypothesis of no performance persistence
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(Cunningham III et al., 2007). A fuller description of the variables involved follows.
2.3 Data
This research requires a panel of individual and detailed farm-level data. The lack of literature is
a direct result of lack of suitable data. My data set contains continuous observations for a sample
of 9,831 farms in the state of Illinois over 19 years, from 1996 to 2014, collected from the Illinois
Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) survey.
The FBFM records include a variety of financial and agronomic characteristics for each cooper-
ating farm operation. Participation in this farm business analysis program is voluntary; cooperating
farmers pay a fee for the educational services.
The most relevant empirical study addressing individual farm managerial skill is Urcola et
al. (2004), which also uses data from the FBFM. FBFM data prior to 1996 is summarized in a
different manner. Due to the data change, I focus on the time period from 1996 to 2014 for this
analysis. This study extends beyond the 7-year horizon used by Urcola et al. (2004). Instead, I test
for persistence using a 19-year horizon. Also, the prior research’s sample is limited to only one
county in Illinois, but does not consider different regions of the state. Finally, other prior studies
have focused on in-sample estimates of the correlation in performance measure rather than out-of-
sample estimates that are the standard in investment studies (e.g. Malkiel, 1995). An out-of-sample
measure is a more stringent test of the persistence of profit in farm management.
In this research, I restrict the analysis to corn and soybean farmers. Within Illinois, acreage
of farms enrolled in FBFM account for approximately 25% of the acres in corn and soybean
production. To be selected from a large pool of FBFM cooperator data, each farm record had to
have been certified usable by the FBFM field staff representative with 180 or more tillable acres.
In this study, operator and farmland returns are computed to represent average returns to Illinois
farmland5. Operator and farmland returns equal gross revenue minus non-land costs, and represent
5For comparison and validation, I use management return (subtracting total land costs from operator and farmland
returns yields the return to management) to test persistence. The results derived from these two measurements are
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a return to both owning and operating the farmland6.
For each of the farms, the farm ID combined with county ID results in a unique farm iden-
tification marker and is used to isolate management return ($/acre) on each farm. Ninety-eight
counties in total are investigated. All FBFM expenses were adjusted for prepaid expenses, ac-
counts payable and cash settlements. The enterprise analysis reports all the costs related to each
farm for a given year. Total costs can be further broken down into three categories: 1) direct costs
include fertilizer, seed, pesticides, drying, and storage; 2) power costs include machinery repairs,
equipment depreciation, machine hire and lease, and fuel; 3) overhead costs include land, hired
labor, building repairs and deprecation, insurance, and interest. In the dataset, revenues include
crop revenue, livestock revenue, custom revenue and other revenue. Total gross revenue after the
total cost is the net farm income7.
FBFM reports a soil productivity ratio (SPR) based on maps of soil types for each Illinois
farm, following Fehrenbacher et al. (1978). The SPR is an average of yield potential on a farm
weighted by the soil types within the farm. The SPR ranges from 40 to 100, with 100 being the
most productive soil quality, and was calculated at the farm level based on soil structure and quality
as well as suitable crops. It directly embodies the potential productivity of the soil for main crops
like soybean and corn. Therefore, the expected effect on returns should be positive as better soil
should not need more use of chemicals to compensate for deficiencies.
Total tillable acres for each farm are the indicators of farm size. While Purdy et al. (1997)
show that larger farms outperformed smaller farms in Kansas, Garcia et al. (1982) do not find any
significant relationship between size and success. In this research, it is hypothesized that persistent
very similar (see Appendix).
6The return to farmland varies depending on whether the farmland is owned, share rented, or cash rented. If
farmland is cash rented, subtracting the cash rent from operator and farmland returns yields the return to farming
while the cash rent represents the return to the land ownership.
7The costs and returns are matched up to the same crop/calendar year. But I also noticed they may not be matched
up to the same production/marketing year. For instance, corn that is harvested in October of one year may not be sold
until the following calendar year or longer. This says that returns may have various components which could include
the returns to storage. Similarly, inputs for the next production cycle which begins with planting in May may be
purchased immediately after the last harvest (between October and December) rather than in the year that it is going
to be used. Since the FBFM data account for the accrual management return within calendar year by recording both
old crop and new crop, which means marketing/production year returns are adjusted for each year on an accrual basis.
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high-return farms produce more acres than other farms.
It is possible that farmers with low skills are naturally eliminated from my database as their
farms go out of business. This might create substantial survivorship bias, leaving only highly
skilled farmers who are able to maintain high returns through time. Survivorship bias would likely
cause an overstatement of returns obtained by farmers, a consequence of tracking only farms that
remain in business at the end of sample period. Thus, survivorship bias is an important issue in
mutual fund research (Brown et al. , 1992; Malkiel, 1995; Carhart, 1997; Carpenter & Lynch,
1999) since it is typical of mutual fund and hedge funds databases. However, my sample is, to my
knowledge, the largest and most complete survivorship-bias-free farm database currently available.
I find that the comparison of mean returns of farmers present in all years and the whole group of
farmers imply that survivorship bias effects have no great differences in returns8. The sample is
stable with an average attrition rate of 18.1% and an average entry rate of 20.6%. According to
a private conversation with FBFM specialist Bradley Zwilling, “if farms are FBFM cooperators,
they are always in the data set, just not always certified useable.” So common reasons for the
“attrition rate” would be that their farm has a critical error in the data and it is not certified useable.
For instance, this could be due to not turning in their data, not have completing their records, etc.
Urcola et al. (2004) use a similar database obtained from FBFM to study the effect of farmer skills
on yields. The sample in their study is stable with an average attrition rate of 6.9% and an average
entry rate of 5.8%. In addition, the comparison of mean yields of farmers present in all years and
the whole group of farmers imply that survivorship bias effects can be considered negligible.
As a check on the representativeness of the sample, a number of previous studies compare the
financial characteristics of farm management association members to a random sample of farms
(Mueller, 1954; Olson & Tvedt, 1987; Gustafson et al. , 1990; Andersson & Olson, 1996; Kuethe
et al. , 2014). The earliest published study by Mueller (1954) find that, compared to a random sam-
ple, managerial ability is not greatly different on farms in the FBFM service and record-keeping
farms given equal basic resources, particularly farm size and soil quality.
8The comparison results are available by the authors upon request.
18
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics of the farm data. My sample includes a total of 9,831
diversified farms over 19 years. The data set was cleaned by omitting the outliers. I used a simple
rule of thumb, z = 3 guideline (i.e. data points three or more standard deviations from the mean
of Reti), as an initial screening tool, and depending on the results of that screening, examined the
data more closely and modified the outlier detection strategy accordingly. The sample includes
50,623 total observations with per acre average return of $26.22 and average expenses of $553.71.
Total land costs include interest charge on land, taxes, cash rent and leasing cost. Farms in this
report have per acre average land costs of $150.13 and per acre average operator and land return
of $176.35. In addition, the county average ratio in the sample is 25.12% (the excess ratio is 0%).
Also, over the full sample, average farm size is 984.72 acres and the average soil productivity
index value is 79.50.
2.4 Persistence Tests
2.4.1 One-year Persistence Test
The Spearman rank correlations for alphas are shown in table 2.2. Table 2.2 shows the p-values for
the null hypothesis that the past ranking of a farm manager’s alpha does not predict the manager’s
future ranking (H0 : ρ = 0 versus Ha : ρ > 0). Rank correlations are all significant and positive
between adjacent years. In this case, random rank-ordering is rejected. Rank correlations for
alphas vary between the adjacent years and have an overall average of 0.47. Thus, results indicate
that, even after controlling for soil productivity and farm size, some farmers still have consistently
better skill than other farmers. However, since the Spearman test treats the ordering of winner and
loser categories equally, it lacks power against the hypothesis of predictability in performance.
Table 2.3 shows the number of winners and losers conditional on the previous year’s perfor-
mance based on alpha ranking. On average, the percentage of repeated winners is 66.83% (the
conditional probabilities are higher than 25%, i.e. what would result from flipping a coin).
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Results show the p-values for the Fisher’s exact tests of the null hypothesis that the past ranking
of a manager’s skill does not predict the manager’s future ranking. The null hypothesis that a
winner and loser are randomly determined is rejected in all years. These results are consistent with
the conclusions of the correlation analysis shown in the previous table and support the hypothesis
that a farm manager’s skill influences financial performance and persists.
2.4.2 Long-term Persistence Test
The predictability results presented so far are based on one-year comparisons. It is possible for
performance to be unpredictable over longer time horizons, but predictable over shorter horizons.
To reduce the noise in past performance rankings, I repeat my earlier analysis and assess longer-
term predictability. The sample is again limited to all 19 crop-years of the Spearman ranking test.
The correlations are the rank correlations between a producer’s average alpha in a four-year period
and alpha in a subsequent four-year period (Cunningham III et al., 2007). Alpha rankings are
averaged for each of the farm managers during the initial four years (e.g., 1996 − 1999) and the
subsequent four years (e.g., 2000 − 2003). Tests of predictability are then applied to the two sets
of long-term averages.
Results are similar for a longer-term period. Table 4 shows skill persistence in the long-term
period in terms of positive rank correlation in two consecutive four-year periods. Table 5 shows the
percentage of managers whose alpha ranked in the top 50% in two consecutive four-year periods.
All the percentages of repeated winners in longer-term tests are higher than in the one-year tests.
The Fisher’s exact tests and Pearson’s chi-squared tests results reject the null hypothesis that alpha
ranking is by chance. Therefore, table 2.4 and table 2.5 suggest strong skill persistence in the long
run.
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2.4.3 Robustness Check
For comparison and validation, I use operator and land return, management return, return-cost-
ratio, and management return to land cost ratio to test persistence, and return on farm assets. The
results derived from these measurements are very similar (see Appendix).
In these data sets the residuals may be correlated across farms and across time, and OLS
standard errors can be biased. Historically, there are two principle approaches to this, some-
times called time-series regressions (the Fama-French method) and cross-sectional regressions
(the Fama-MacBeth method). This paper also examines the time-series method used in the liter-
ature (Fama & MacBeth, 1973). The intent is to provide intuition as to if the different approach
gives different answers.
For time-series regressions, time-series data for each farm i are used to estimate the regression
intercept αi for that farm. In this case, I estimate equation (2). I obtain an alpha for each farm
and test the significance. The reason I can use time-series regressions in this case is that the
management skills are estimated as the time-series average of the excess ratio left unexplained
by the factor regression model. The factor model has one implications: An alpha greater than
zero means a farm manager outperforms the benchmark. Standard statistical tests can be used to
test if these are positive alphas. This is equivalent to testing the intercept in the cross-sectional
regressions. For the sake of brevity, I do not include results for the time-series regression results,
but these support the existence of management skill and are available from the author upon request.
2.5 Performance Evaluation for Top and Bottom Managers
2.5.1 Performance Evaluation for Out-of-sample Periods
The performance evaluation method is based on placing farm managers into ten deciles across
adjacent pairs of years. The first step in this test procedure is to form the sample of all farm
managers that are present in the pair of years and exclude any not in both periods. The second
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step is to rank each farm manager in the first year of the pair (e.g., t = 1996) based on alphas
with the most skilled manager as the number one. Then, the managers are sorted in descending
rank order. The third step is to form deciles of mangers in yeart based on manager’s skill ranking.
The fourth step is to use the deciles of managers formed in yeart and compute how the same
manager performed in the subsequent yeart+1 of the pair (e.g., 1997) by profits. The fifth step is
to compute the difference in the profits between the top and bottom performing manager groups
and test the null hypothesis: the difference between the top and bottom performing groups is zero.
If the performance difference between the top and bottom groups is significantly different than zero
using an appropriate statistical test, then the null hypothesis can be rejected and the conclusion is
reached that top managers do have stellar management skills and stand out amongst their peers.
The appropriate statistical test in this case is Wilcoxon signed-rank test, a nonparametric test
that is well-specified and among the most powerful in their comparison of several predictability
tests for mutual funds and agricultural futures markets (Carpenter & Lynch, 1999; Aulerich et al.
, 2013). The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used when comparing two related samples, matched
samples, or repeated measurements on a single sample to assess whether their population mean
ranks differ (Wilcoxon, 1945). It can be used as an alternative to the paired Student’s t-test, t-test
for matched pairs, or the t-test for dependent samples when the population cannot be assumed to
be normally distributed (Lowry, 2014).
Table 2.6 displays the average returns for the out-of-sample yeart+1 for each decile in Panel
A. For instance, in the skill estimate (α) results the top decile is 10 and is formed based on alpha
rankings for an in-sample period t (e.g., 1996, 1997, ..., or 2013) and summing the skill estimates
of those same top decile managers in the out-of-sample period t + 1 (e.g., 1997, 1998, ..., or
2014). Similarly, in the annual profit results the top decile is 10 and is formed by ranking the skill
estimates for an in-sample yeart (e.g., 1996, 1997, ..., or 2013) and summing the profits of those
same top decile managers in the out-of-sample yeart+1 (e.g., 1997, 1998, ..., or 2014).
The out-of-sample skill estimate results are shown in column (1) in Panel A. The average α
values of all yeart+1 is 79.19 for the top 10% and -104.87 for the bottom 10%. The averages for
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top 10%, 20%, ..., 50% managers are significantly greater than zero whereas bottom 10%, 20%,
..., 50% managers find the results are less than zero. Managers’ skill estimates in out-of-sample
period t+1 correspond with their rankings in the previous period, which is clearly demonstrated in
the results where greater skill estimates are generated in yeart+1 among those larger decile (better
skilled managers) groups in yeart.
The out-of-sample profits are presented in columns (2) and (3) in Panel A. The average profits
are quite large for top managers. The top 10% of managers show better financial performance with
operator and land return (OpRet) and management return (MgtRet) of $257.55 per acre and $76.90
per acre, respectively. The bottom 10% of managers display poor performance with operator and
land return and management return of $70.88 per acre and $-83.42 per acre, respectively. Results
clearly suggest that superior gains is due to substantial skills of top decile managers not due to
factors outside of the manager. The average profits gained in out-of-sample period monotonically
increase along with the managers’ skill rankings with much larger profits achieved in yeart+1 if
one shifts from bottom decile (worst) to top decile (best) in yeart.
The profit deviation analysis is also included, which is shown in columns (4) and (5) in Panel
A. The deviation is calculated based on the difference between the value of profiti,t and its mean
profitt for yeart, where profit is measured in the form of OpRet or MgtRet. The purpose of in-
cluding the deviation measure is to analyze farm manager’s performance behavior in a different
perspective. One may argue that the averages shown in column (2) and (3) do not capture random
events happening during each time period. However, if the time effect is “fixed”, then the devia-
tions will offer more compelling evidence addressing the skill persistence question. The sign of
the deviation reports the direction of that difference (e.g., the deviation is positive when a farm’s
return outcome exceeds the benchmark in that year) while the magnitude of the value indicates
the size of the difference. For example, large deviations appear in or immediately next to top and
bottom deciles with negative values shown in deciles 1-4 and positive values in deciles 5-10.
In Panel B, table 2.6 displays the difference between top and bottom deciles for the differ-
ent skill/return measures and deciles test results. The difference of skill estimates between the
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top and bottom decile is 184.07 which is significantly different from zero. Top managers earn
$186.68 per acre more than the bottom in terms of operator and land return, and top managers ex-
perience $160.33 management gains than the bottom 10%. The statistical significance of the test
result that top and bottom managers performances differ prevails in every single scenario among
different skill/return measurements. If one expects managers to persist in earning profits then the
top/bottom out-of-sample deciles would have greater influence than the intermediate out-of-sample
deciles, and this would decline as I expand from the 10% to 50% comparisons. The results are also
presented for comparisons of the top and bottom 20%, 30%, 40% and 50%. For example, the
difference of skill estimates between the top and bottom 50% decile is 72.10 which is significantly
different from zero. Top 50% managers earn $71.49 per acre more than the bottom in terms of
operator and land return, and top managers experience $59.85 management gains than the bottom
50%. The findings persist even when I expand the size of the deciles, but the differences in magni-
tude decline. In sum, the top 10% of managers tend to show substantial persistence in performance
at an annual horizon.
The persistence in the consecutive two years indicates that managers can focus on intermediate
periods even though it may be difficult to maintain profitable position in the presence of random
events which occur in agricultural markets.
The compelling performance persistence results are due to superior skills in the top decile and
high profits gained by them. In sum, the top decile of managers tend to show substantial persistence
in performance at an annual horizon which reconcile to the results in winner and loser test.
2.5.2 Transition Table
The second method takes into account the magnitude of skill estimate differences between top and
bottom performing groups and allows for the possibility that top deciles of farm managers remain
in the same decile when other midrange farm managers switch between skill categories.
The starting of the method is similar to the previous decile test. First, create the pairs of
adjacent time periods and rank each farm manager in the first year of the pair based on skill
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ranking. Then, form deciles of mangers in yeart. Next, use the deciles of managers formed in
yeart and compute skill rankings for the same manager in the subsequent yeart+1 of the pair and
once again form deciles of farm managers. For instance, take the most skilled decile, decile 10,
in yeart and without resorting or reforming groups of managers, determine how this decile of
managers from yeart performed in yeart+1.
Table 2.7 displays transition tables of initial and subsequent annual skill rankings. The transi-
tion occurrences and probabilities for all farm managers ranked based on their skill across deciles
are presented in Panel A and Panel B respectively and graphically represented in figure 2.1. In a
case where all profits are random and no persistence exists, each value in the matrix would be equal
with probability 10%. In a case, where managers have persistent skills that are not due to luck and
managers always rank exactly the same in every period, each probability on the diagonal (1/1, 2/2,
..., 10/10) would be 100%. The values on the diagonal indicate the probability that a farm manager
will remain in their current decile, with other values indicating the likelihood of them shifting into
a different decile. For example, managers in decile 10 are likely to remain in decile 10 about one
third the time (probability equal to 0.34). Similarly, managers in decile 1 have a moderate chance
(probability equal to 0.39) of remaining in the worst category. There is a slight chance (probability
equal to 0.05) that a manager from the worst group in a given year can transit to the best group.
Likewise, there is a similar small chance (probability equal to 0.04) that a manager can transit from
the best group to the worst group within one year. For Panel B, the probabilities appear symmetric
around the middle of the distribution with the greatest probabilities in the 10/10 and 1/1 deciles.
The highest value in each row indicates whether managers are likely to remain in their current
decile rather than switching to another decile. If the highest value in each row corresponds to
values along the diagonal from upper left to lower right (the probability of remaining in the same
decile), then persistence is expected. Panel B shows that the highest, second and third highest
values are either appear in the diagonal or immediately next to it indicating that when managers
switch between categories they are likely to switch to only one decile higher or lower rather than
jump across multiple categories.
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All the diagonals are greater than 10% and many managers either stay in the same decile or
move one decile up or down. This tendency for managers to stay in or around their decile supports
the conclusions of winner and loser test which finds that skill persists among managers. Managers
who are initially in decile 10 in yeart are likely to be the decile 10 in yeart+1. Overall, the
transition tables in Panel A and Panel B provide rather strong evidence that persistent skill exists
among top farm managers.
However, managers who are initially in decile 1 (worst) in yeart are also likely to be the decile
1 in yeart+1. The managers in this case may fall into one of two types, those who possess no skill
and are severely challenged by the agricultural market, and those who take large risks to become
financial vulnerable and exhaust their equity. Persistent performing in decile 10 (best) encourages
further participation through profits, but the continued performance of those in decile 1 (worst) is
surprising since managers are continually earning negative returns. It is possible that the farmer
earing negative returns are still exploring if they currently don’t want to liquefy their assets (e.g.,
land) or they are compensating for losses with other subsidies.
Although the results from winner and loser ranking test and the top and bottom performing
deciles test generally support each other, differences in interpretation exist in the statistical sig-
nificance results. The purpose of the winner and loser ranking test is to investigate whether farm
mangers in the top half of the distribution in a time period tend to stay in top half in the next period
whereas differences in skill between the top and the bottom deciles provide support that persistent
profit-making capacity exists among the top decile of managers.
The statistical significance of the winner and loser ranking tests is likely reflective of the high
degree of persistence among top and bottom managers during the period, and as figure 2.1 demon-
strates the ranking persistence of decile 1 (worst) and decile 10 (best). Figure 2.1 displays Panel
B of the transition table of initial and subsequent annual skill rankings. A farm manager’s initial
ranking in yeart is on the x-axis and subsequent ranking in yeart+1 is on the y-axis. The z-axis
is the probability of the subsequent ranking given the initial ranking. A large portion of managers
who initially rank in decile 1 or 10 in the initial period stay in the same decile in the subsequent
26
period. This pattern becomes clear when analysing the four corner deciles and comparing the
rankings that persisted (1/1 or 10/10) versus the drastically shifting rankings (10/1 or 1/10). The
extreme rankings 1/1 and 10/10 are larger than 30% and the 10/1 and 1/10 shifts are smaller than
1%. The significance of the decile tests tend to be consistent across differences between the deciles
studies (10%,20%,30%,40%,50%) and the winner and loser rank tests, but in light of figure 2.1 the
significance in the other deciles is likely driven by the 10th decile managers not by the intermediate
deciles.
2.6 Summary and Conclusions
Using individual farm-level data from FBFM from 1996 to 2014, this study investigates whether
managerial skill persists in farm performance. The extent to which the skills used by farm man-
agers are either efficient or not was measured by a two-factor model that includes a benchmark.
The benchmark emphasis makes the model applicable to many farm types that differ in geographic
location, tenure, and other structural characteristics. Given the evidence documented here, persis-
tent profit-making capacity is an indication of skill. In addition, farm managers appear to benefit
from natural endowment (i.e. soil productivity and farm size). Based on previous research (e.g.,
Malkiel, 1995; Urcola et al., 2004; Irwin et al., 2006), two basic out-of-sample persistence tests -
a Spearman ranking test and a winner and loser ranking test - are examined to determine whether
farm managerial skill consistently performs well.
Overall results provide compelling evidence that the superior alphas of star managers survive
and are not an artifact of luck. While it is difficult for farm managers to always profit, persistence
emerges from the Illinois crop farms in terms of the rank correlations of alpha. The strongest evi-
dence for persistence exists with Spearman’s ρ reaching 0.70 for four adjacent years. The findings
identify significant persistence in ranking; managers in the top 50% of the profits distribution in t
tend to stay in upper half in t + 1. On average, 66.83% of winners are also winners in t + 1. In
addition, for both short and long horizons, the Fisher’s exact test and Pearson’s chi-squared test
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results appeared to be significant. A top and bottom performance deciles test that takes into ac-
count the magnitude of skill differentials between top and bottom groups tend to show substantial
persistence in performance at an annual horizon which reconcile to the results in winner and loser
test. Thus, my findings using an arguably more rigorous measure - out-of-sample persistence in
profit-making skill - are consistent with the hypothesis that skill does exist. With regards to the
work by Urcola et al. (2004), my findings are consistent with the structure and implication of
their models. This evidence, while not extensive in magnitude, may provide support for behavioral
theories.
I are also aware of the limitations of this study. A complete comparison of the estimation
procedures employed in this study would include identifying reinvesting strategies or land control
practices of skilled farm managers that separate them from average ones. The findings can be
further applied to indicate whether management skills are on the cost side, the revenue side, or
both. The analysis in this study could also be extended to investigate the characteristics of the
most skilled farm managers and their management styles in the performance evaluation. However,
more performance profiles and observations per farm manager are needed for this type of analysis.
Applications of persistence tests in skill represent an interesting picture for future studies. The
next step in this research should examine how this management skill persistence relates to farm
growth, since farms’ financial successes depend on management returns. It could be the case that
historical expertise may convey important information about optimal production practices in the
long run. Thus, it would be valuable to focus on “alpha” as a measure to explicitly capture pre-
dictable efficient management skill. The approach implemented in this article provides a frame-
work for more general evaluation of farm management for agencies such as farmers, investors,
educators, and policymakers. Lenders and investors will be interested in the degree to which skill
influences farm profitability. Funding issues for major lenders and the emerging regulatory design
arise from commodity and farm-related credit market activity during the recent financial crisis
(Paulson and Sherrick, 2009; Ellinger and Tirupattur, 2009). Thus, potential farm management
efficiency needs to be recognized in risk management activities. For future research, the effec-
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tiveness of education and training for superior farm management practices could be investigated
to identify the types of training most effective to improve profitability. Ultimately, studying farm
management skill persistence will help with the challenging task of prediction, and better predic-
tions lead to greater farm performance.
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2.7 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic Definition Mean St. Dev.
N Farms 9,831 −
LCi($/acre) Land Cost 150.13 93.40
Ci($/acre) Total Cost 553.71 283.63
Reti($/acre) Management Return 26.22 186.79
OpReti($/acre) Operator and Land Return 176.35 195.91
Ratioi(%)
OpRetit
Cit
per County 25.12 79.93
AcrT ili(acre) Farm Size 984.72 759.25
Spri Soil Productivity 79.50 35.01
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Table 2.2: Spearman Rank Correlations
Year N Spearman’s ρ p-Value
1996-1997 2227 0.42 0.000
1997-1998 1961 0.45 0.000
1998-1999 1824 0.45 0.000
1999-2000 1831 0.50 0.000
2000-2001 1918 0.52 0.000
2001-2002 2023 0.50 0.000
2002-2003 2426 0.51 0.000
2003-2004 2363 0.50 0.000
2004-2005 1880 0.52 0.000
2005-2006 1900 0.47 0.000
2006-2007 2470 0.53 0.000
2007-2008 2155 0.50 0.000
2008-2009 1710 0.35 0.000
2009-2010 1821 0.37 0.000
2010-2011 2043 0.48 0.000
2011-2012 1737 0.48 0.000
2012-2013 1445 0.34 0.000
2013-2014 1418 0.47 0.000
Average 1953 0.47 −
H0: αt and αt+1 are independent.
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Table 2.3: Contingency Table
Y eart+1 Percentage p-Value for p-Value for
of Repeated Fisher’s Exact Pearson’s
Winners (%) Test χ2 Test
Y eart L W
1996 L 729 384
W 384 730 65.59 0.000 0.000
1997 L 651 329
W 329 652 66.53 0.000 0.000
1998 L 605 307
W 307 605 66.34 0.000 0.000
1999 L 618 297
W 297 619 67.65 0.000 0.000
2000 L 654 305
W 305 654 68.20 0.000 0.000
2001 L 693 318
W 318 694 68.64 0.000 0.000
2002 L 821 392
W 392 821 67.68 0.000 0.000
2003 L 808 373
W 373 809 68.50 0.000 0.000
2004 L 647 293
W 293 647 68.83 0.000 0.000
2005 L 635 315
W 315 635 66.84 0.000 0.000
2006 L 853 382
W 382 853 69.07 0.000 0.000
2007 L 724 353
W 353 725 67.32 0.000 0.000
2008 L 534 321
W 321 534 62.46 0.000 0.000
2009 L 579 331
W 331 580 63.74 0.000 0.000
2010 L 691 330
W 330 692 67.78 0.000 0.000
2011 L 584 284
W 284 585 67.40 0.000 0.000
2012 L 450 272
W 272 451 62.47 0.000 0.000
2013 L 482 227
W 227 482 67.98 0.000 0.000
Average 66.83
1. H0: the relative proportions of Y eart are independent of Y eart+1.
2. Fisher’s exact test is a statistical significance test used in the analysis of contingency tables. With large samples,
a Pearson’s chi-squared test can be used.
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Table 2.4: Spearman Rank Correlations
Y eart Y eart+1 N Spearman’s ρ p-Value
1996-1999 2000-2003 774 0.69 0.000
1997-2000 2001-2004 762 0.69 0.000
1998-2001 2002-2005 732 0.68 0.000
1999-2002 2003-2006 746 0.66 0.000
2000-2003 2004-2007 815 0.70 0.000
2001-2004 2005-2008 808 0.67 0.000
2002-2005 2006-2009 804 0.64 0.000
2003-2006 2007-2010 824 0.64 0.000
2004-2007 2008-2011 813 0.67 0.000
2005-2008 2009-2012 723 0.65 0.000
2006-2009 2010-2013 752 0.65 0.000
2007-2010 2011-2014 733 0.65 0.000
Average 774 0.67 −
H0: αt and αt+1 are independent.
33
Table 2.5: Contingency Table
Y eart+1 Percentage p-Value for p-Value for
of Repeated Fisher’s Exact Pearson’s
Winners(%) Test χ2 Test
Y eart L W
96-99 L 293 94
W 94 293 75.71 0.000 0.000
97-00 L 291 90
W 90 291 76.38 0.000 0.000
98-01 L 270 96
W 96 270 73.77 0.000 0.000
99-02 L 278 95
W 95 278 74.53 0.000 0.000
00-03 L 312 95
W 95 313 76.90 0.000 0.000
01-04 L 303 101
W 101 303 75.00 0.000 0.000
02-05 L 297 105
W 105 297 73.88 0.000 0.000
03-06 L 304 108
W 108 304 73.79 0.000 0.000
04-07 L 307 99
W 99 308 75.86 0.000 0.000
05-08 L 272 89
W 89 273 75.62 0.000 0.000
06-09 L 282 94
W 94 282 75.00 0.000 0.000
07-10 L 273 93
W 93 274 74.86 0.000 0.000
Average 75.11
1. H0: the relative proportions of Y eart are independent of Y eart+1.
2. Fisher’s exact test is a statistical significance test used in the analysis of contingency tables. With large samples,
a Pearson’s chi-squared test can be used.
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Table 2.6: Farm manager performance evaluation, 1996-2014
Panel A: Farm manager performance for each decile
yeart+1
yeart (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OpRet MgtRet
Decile N α ($/acre) ($/acre) OpRet MgtRet
1 3520 -104.87 70.88 -83.42 -110.78 -111.79
2 3512 -45.12 141.34 0.27 -40.31 -28.08
3 3514 -30.52 157.82 13.55 -23.81 -14.80
4 3508 -17.15 170.69 28.14 -10.92 -0.18
5 3511 -5.78 183.98 39.82 2.34 11.45
6 3517 1.82 191.57 45.07 9.99 16.78
7 3508 10.01 197.08 47.76 15.46 19.44
8 3514 27.62 213.85 61.93 32.23 33.58
9 3512 38.28 221.98 65.76 40.33 37.41
10 (Best) 3506 79.19 257.55 76.90 75.93 48.56
Panel B: Deciles test results for farm manager performance
yeart+1
yeart (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OpRet MgtRet
Decile α ($/acre) ($/acre) OpRet MgtRet
Top vs Bottom 10% 184.07 186.68 160.33 186.72 160.35
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 133.76 133.68 112.95 133.70 112.96
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 108.55 107.80 91.43 107.81 91.44
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 88.23 87.47 73.50 87.48 73.51
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 72.10 71.49 59.85 71.51 59.87
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 2.7: Transition table, 1996-2014
Panel A: Transition table in occurrence
yeart+1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
yeart
1 1366 626 336 299 198 162 142 116 113 162
2 567 602 508 458 368 308 252 180 144 125
3 378 526 530 451 390 368 274 249 203 145
4 291 433 430 461 450 388 341 294 240 180
5 206 342 414 420 442 455 373 365 289 205
6 183 275 368 398 430 420 473 397 332 241
7 162 221 345 333 402 427 434 478 424 282
8 121 184 258 267 336 398 499 505 533 413
9 112 166 173 263 300 357 428 520 647 546
10 134 137 152 158 195 234 292 410 587 1207
Panel B: Transition table in probabilities
yeart+1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
yeart
1 0.39 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05
2 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04
3 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04
4 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.05
5 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.06
6 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.07
7 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.08
8 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.12
9 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.16
10 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.34
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Figure 2.1: Probabilities of subsequent annual skill rankings given initial rankings for farm man-
agers, 1996-2014
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Chapter 3
Farm Performance and Management
Strategies
3.1 Introduction
Good management is a crucial factor in the success of any business. Farms are no exception.
An underlying assumption by many in a number of studies of farm performance is that the best
have different management styles and strategies (Sonka et al. , 1989; Plumley & Hornbaker, 1991;
Mishra et al. , 1999).
To be successful, farm managers will make and execute the accurate decisions – it is very dif-
ferent from physical labor used in agriculture. The long-term direction of a farm is determined
through strategic planing. This is because production agricultural in the United States and other
countries is changing along the following lines: more mechanization, increasing farm size, con-
tinued adoption of new technologies, growing capital investment per worker, more borrowed or
leased capital, new marketing alternatives, and increased business risk. These factors create new
management problems, but also present new opportunities for managers with the right skills.
This study contribute to the farm performance literature in two ways. First, to examine the
question whether most skilled farms have different management strategies and characteristics, the
analysis constructs a comparative statistical way to compare individual farm alphas (or skill esti-
mates). Statistical procedures are used to test for strategy difference and economic efficiency in
farm performance using individual farm alphas over long-term horizons. Therefore, productive
and effective management skills are not an unrevealed innate quality anymore; good management
skills can be cultivated, developed and learned through farm performance investigations. Second,
the study also provides statistical analysis to address the question of whether the economic effi-
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ciency of top managers is on the cost side, the revenue side, or both. Fundamental farm manage-
ment basics are discussed, including budgeting, production planning, financial analysis, financial
management, investment analysis, and control management. Farm managers will want to consult
it to improve the effectiveness, objectivity, and success of their decisions.
In general, I find substantial difference of farm management styles and performance efficiency
in management skill portfolios. I also find evidence of most skilled farm managers are more
efficient both in resources being used and revenue being generated on farm assets. The approaches
used in this study also allow comparison among farms of different sizes and types. The activities of
top farms can be replicated by poorer performers and the study provide a unique way for comparing
the farm management styles and ability of most skilled farm managers to that of less skilled ones.
The remainder of the study is as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the most relevant
studies. Section 3 briefly describe the survivorship-bias-free data used in this study, and Section 4
discuss several potential key management performance measurements. Section 5 presents the effi-
ciency measurement and examines the revenue and cost structure of farms. Section 6 summarizes
the findings and conclusions.
3.2 Literature Review
A number of empirical studies have attempted to study the farm management strategies and per-
formances. Researchers use different data sets and techniques attempting to prove the existence of
farm operating strategies and to study their patterns in farm management. This section provides
a review of the most relevant literature, and then reviews selected research employing methods of
strategy detection that provide either direct or indirect evidence on farm management strategies.
Studies of farm performance and factors affecting management decisions have largely been
embedded within one of two widely-used theoretical frameworks. Firstly, broadly neo-classical
studies have attempted to understand variations in farm performance through resources to differ-
ences in the internal structure of farms (e.g., size and legal type) (Hall & LeVeen, 1978; Kislev
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& Peterson, 1996) and agency factors such as the level of human capital (Welch, 1970; Sumner
& Leiby, 1987). The second set of studies, drawing on the writings of institutional economists,
capture a farm’s intuitional embeddedness (e.g., formal and informal rules, regulations and laws)
(Williamson, 1988) and inter-organizational relationships (e.g., transaction costs) (Pollak, 1985)
rather than merely internal structure of farms (Gorton & Davidova, 2004).
As long recognized, the problem of efficiency involves both technical and economic facets.
Determination of the technically efficient farms provides the base for economic analysis. Many
studies have identified that different approaches to improve economic efficiencies can be successful
(Groot et al. , 2006; Haji, 2007). For example, Groot et al. (2006) evaluate 45 commercial farms
participating in regional nutrient management project for their farm management adjustments and
effectiveness in terms of nitrogen use efficiency and economic performance. It is concluded that
farms that were able to rapidly reduce fertilizer nitrogen input and establish a consistent farm man-
agement strategy were most successful in improving nitrogen use efficiency. Haji (2007) reveals
that asset, off/non-farm income, farm size, extension visits and family size were the significant de-
terminants of technical efficiency, whereas asset, crop diversification, consumption expenditures
and farm size have significant impact on allocative and economic efficiencies.
A non-parametric mathematical programming method known as data envelopment analysis
(DEA), which has become very popular in the management efficiency context (Charnes et al. ,
1978). Values in terms of prices, scales or costs has been introduced into applications to work
towards finding farms which might have technical, scale, or allocative efficiency. (e.g., Thompson
et al. , 1990; Ali & Seiford, 1993; De Koeijer et al. , 2002; Latruffe et al. , 2005; Davidova &
Latruffe, 2007). As a non-parametric method, DEA does not require or assume any functional
relationship between the inputs and outputs. However, DEA is based on a deterministic approach,
so all deviations from the frontier are attributed to inefficiencies. Thus, a certain bias of sample ef-
ficiency is possible (Gorton & Davidova, 2004). Given these issues, the focus of the current paper
provides an application of the alpha score (Li & Paulson, 2014) in a non-parametric comparative
statistical analysis of the effect of management decisions on estimates of management efficiency.
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This procedure enables consistent production strategies explaining alpha scores, while simulta-
neously producing benchmarks for high skilled managers and low skilled managers according to
their efficiency scores.
The probably implicit choice for adoption of a strategy may be governed by agri-environmental
conditions (soil quality, altitude, climate, rainfall and access to water) beyond the farmer’s skills
and objectives. An interesting question is raised whether agri-environmental factors are a curse or
a blessing to a farm manager. Environmental factors have been seen as the unobservable variables
from assessments of economic efficiency (Bhalla & Roy, 1988; Benjamin, 1995). However, to
increase the value of farm output, management strategies are still needed. Regarding soil fertility,
farmers need to increase high quality nutrient inputs at low cash and labor costs to the farmer.
Shepherd & Soule (1998) designed a farm simulation model to assess the long-term impact of
existing soil management strategies, on farm productivity, profitability and sustainability. The
model links soil management practices, nutrient availability, plant and livestock productivity, and
farm economics. Although most research determine that natural endowment or weather conditions
can have direct influence on farm performance, they do not directly calculate if farm managers
successfully profit from their farming skills or natural resource endowment.
While numerous studies have presumed that skill does lead to better performance and higher
returns (Sonka et al. , 1989; Plumley & Hornbaker, 1991; Mishra et al. , 1999), the measurement of
intrinsic skill has been conspicuously absent. The lack of attention in the literature to date is due in
part to difficulties in developing suitable data series for farmers’ financial performances in which
measures of skill effects could likely be detected, and in controlling for non-operator influences,
such as farm characteristics, in farm returns.
Urcola et al. (2004) use corn yield data from McLean County, Illinois to test whether farming
skills influence yields with a focus on short-term performance. Their results support the hypothesis
that farmer skill influences yields. The prior research’s sample however, is limited to only one
county in Illinois, which does not consider different regions of the state.
Li & Paulson (2014) follow up to Urcola et al. (2004)’s work and examine the returns and farm
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management ability of Illinois farmers. The data used are from the same database as Urcola et al.
(2004) which is the FBFM records from 1996 to 2014. They calculate profits and search for skill
using rank correlation test and winner and loser test. The results show the distribution of profits
over time is not random luck and all top rank farmers have persistent farming skills. Farmers who
are more highly skilled can consistently earn higher returns than their lower skilled peers.
To conclude, the literature provides inconclusive evidence as to the existence of management
skill. The most powerful evidence comes from profit measurements using yearly data from the
farm performance records. Previous studies using this type of data are dated or suffer from lim-
itations on the number of years analyzed or the inability to disentangle natural endowment or
weather effects from skill-based farming strategies. The participants in FBFM records, which are
basically homogeneous grain farms, provides the clearest way to develop an assessment of farm
performance and their associated strategies. Therefore, it is crucial to constructing the manage-
ment skill measure in a way that can control for farm characteristics and describe the level of
managerial compensation by further factors beyond farm size and soil productivity, in particular
by differences in managerial talents and quality.
3.3 Survivorship Bias
Evaluating farm performance using farm returns is extremely difficult. First, farm data sources
suffer from self-selected reporting and survivorship bias. It is possible that farmers with low skills
are naturally eliminated from my database as their farms go out of business. This might create
substantial survivorship bias, leaving only highly skilled farmers who are able to maintain high
returns through time. Survivorship bias would likely cause an overstatement of returns obtained
by farmers, a consequence of tracking only farms that remain in business at the end of sample
period. Figure 3.1 reports the number of farms participating in FBFM records for different time
horizons. Most farms have participated less than 5 years in the records. Only a small fraction of
farms exhibit long-term survivorship, indicating that most farms are short-term participants in the
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records.
Survivorship bias is an important issue in hedge fund and mutual fund research (Brown et al.
, 1992; Malkiel, 1995; Carhart, 1997; Carpenter & Lynch, 1999) since it is typical of mutual
fund and hedge funds databases. However, my sample is, to my knowledge, the largest and most
complete survivorship-bias-free farm database currently available. Table 3.1 presents summary
statistics for all farms and different return histories (farms present for 5 years, 10 years, and in
all years) for 1996-2014. The comparison of mean returns of all farms and different return his-
tories implies that survivorship bias effects have no great differences in returns and costs. The
average gross revenues range from $566.36 to $580.00, and the average operator and land returns
range from $218.89 to $225.47. The average total non-land costs range from $347.47 to $355.53.
The sample is stable with an average attrition rate of 18.1% and an average entry rate of 20.6%.
According to a private conversation with FBFM specialist Bradley Zwilling, “if farms are FBFM
cooperators, they are always in the data set, just not always certified useable.” So common reasons
for the “attrition rate” would be that their farm has a critical error in the data and it is not certified
useable. For instance, this could be due to not turning in their data, not have completing their
records, etc. Urcola et al. (2004) use a similar database obtained from FBFM to study the effect
of farmer skills on yields. The sample in their study is stable with an average attrition rate of 6.9%
and an average entry rate of 5.8%. In addition, the comparison of mean yields of farmers present
in all years and the whole group of farmers imply that survivorship bias effects can be considered
negligible.
As a check on the representativeness of the sample, a number of previous studies compare the
financial characteristics of farm management association members to a random sample of farms
(Mueller, 1954; Olson & Tvedt, 1987; Gustafson et al. , 1990; Andersson & Olson, 1996; Kuethe
et al. , 2014). The earliest published study by Mueller (1954) find that, compared to a random sam-
ple, managerial ability is not greatly different on farms in the FBFM service and record-keeping
farms given equal basic resources, particularly farm size and soil quality.
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3.4 Comparative Farms
Farm families establish goals for themselves and their businesses based on their personal values,
individual skills and interests, financial and physical resources, and economic and social condi-
tions facing agriculture. They can choose to emphasize wider profit margins or higher volumes of
production or to produce special services and products. After identifying and selecting strategies
to help achieve their goals, farm operators employ tactical management to carry them out. Efficient
farms which have the most similar characteristics and they should therefore provide examples of
good operating practice for inefficient farms to emulate. However, the practices do not all con-
tribute equally to the management efficiency. Some practices are more important than others. A
significance test enables one to see which of the practices have been the bigger contributors.
This section is to identify strategies and characteristics of skilled farm managers. The broader
strategy framework recognizes three levels of planning that have an effect on the farm performance.
First, profitability analysis and enterprise budgeting can help to identify more profitable enterprises
and develop a new whole-farm plan. The areas of profitability, liquidity, and solvency are closely
related. Second, financial healthiness examination aims at determining the effect on the cash
flow resulting from current debt and expansion. This procedure should help managers isolate and
identify the causes of a financial problem quickly and systematically. Third, management patterns
and strategies should be analyzed through the breakdown of the processes and sources.
3.4.1 Skill Portfolios: Two Approaches
Historically, there are two principle approaches to this, sometimes called cross-sectional regres-
sions (the Fama-MacBeth method) and time-series regressions (the Fama-French method). In the
context of the present study, construction of skill portfolios based on a two-factor model involves
two approaches. The first approach is to rank each farm manager based on alphas with the most
skilled manager as the number one according to the Li & Paulson (2014) procedure. For each time
period (e.g., 1996-2014), the alpha is the residual excess ratio (derived from operator and land
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returns) left unexplained by the benchmark model using cross sectional regressions. The second
approach is to compute the OLS-estimated alphas using the time series using the time series of
yearly operator and land returns for each farm i.
For cross sectional regressions, the comparison of the composition of management skills is
based on placing all farm managers into ten deciles for each of the sample year. The first step is
to rank each farm manager based on alphas given that year with the most skilled manager as the
number one. Then, the managers are sorted in descending rank order. The second step is to form
yearly deciles of mangers based on manager’s skill ranking. The third step is to group the yearly
skill portfolios by decile formed in step two and compute how the manager performed by key man-
agement measurements (profits, crop price, yields, operating costs, land costs, land tenure, farm
characteristics and financial conditions). The fourth step is to compute the difference in the key
measurements between the top and bottom performing manager groups and test the null hypothe-
sis: the difference between the top and bottom performing groups is zero. If the difference between
the top and bottom groups is significantly different than zero using an appropriate statistical test,
then the null hypothesis can be rejected and the conclusion is reached that top managers do have a
different set of management skills and stand out amongst their peers.
The appropriate statistical test in this case is Wilcoxon signed-rank test, a nonparametric test
that is well-specified and among the most powerful in their comparison of several predictability
tests for mutual funds and agricultural futures markets (Carpenter & Lynch, 1999; Aulerich et al.
, 2013). The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used when comparing two related samples, matched
samples, or repeated measurements on a single sample to assess whether their population mean
ranks differ (Wilcoxon, 1945). It can be used as an alternative to the paired Student’s t-test, t-test
for matched pairs, or the t-test for dependent samples when the population cannot be assumed to
be normally distributed (Lowry, 2014).
The deviation analysis is also included in each table in italic. In each year, the deviation is
calculated based on the difference between the value of the key comparable variable (profits, crop
price, yields, operating costs, land costs, land tenure, farm characteristics and financial conditions)
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and its mean for all farms within a county given that year. In this specification, the yearly county-
level average was selected to minimize the impacts of geography and weather on returns (e.g., good
vs. bad weather, superior vs. inferior growing conditions). Also, the use of the county average
benchmark is to control for systematic effects that affect all farms within a county in one specific
year (see figure 3.2). Therefore, it removes systemic effects that might impact every farmer peer
group in a given year. The deviations can “fix” the time effect, which will offer more compelling
evidence addressing the management style question. The sign of the deviation reports the direction
of that difference (e.g., the deviation is positive when a farm’s certain key outcome exceeds the
yearly county benchmark, which is the mean outcome in that year), while the magnitude of the
value indicates the size of the difference. Also, a percentage deviation is calculated for robustness
check. Note that the percentage deviation has no units: I divided the absolute deviation by the
mean, so the units canceled.
For time-series regressions, time-series data for each farm i are used to estimate the intercept
αi using same two-factor model as for the cross sectional regressions for that farm. In this case,
I obtain a single alpha score for each farm manager and form deciles of managers based on alpha
ranking. The first step is to rank each farm manager based on alpha scores with the most skilled
manager as the number one. Then, the managers are sorted in descending rank order. The second
step is to form deciles of mangers based on manager’s skill ranking. The third step is to use
the deciles of managers formed in step two and compute how the manager performed by key
management measurements (profits, crop price, yields, operating costs, land costs, land tenure,
farm characteristics and financial conditions). The fourth step is to compute the difference in
the key measurements between the top and bottom performing manager groups and test the null
hypothesis: the difference between the top and bottom performing groups is zero.
A subset including only the farms present for more than 10 years was constructed (see table
3.2). This subset includes a total of 4,157 farm-level observations for each variable. T-test is
applied for each farm. Over the entire sample period, 1,636 farms have significantly positive
alphas, which is around 40% of the total farm number; there are 685 farms with negative alphas
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taking up to 16% of total farms. After constructing a managerial return measure in a way that
controls for farm characteristics by further factors beyond farm size and soil productivity, only 263
farms have significantly positive alphas, which is 6% of total farms; and the number of farms with
negative alpha increases to 2,414 with the percentage of 58%. The adjusted measure describes
the level of managerial return by differences in managerial talents and quality beyond natural
resource endowment. It shows that the mean (positive) is to the right of the median (negative)
and the distribution of alpha is right-skewed, indicating that the right tail is longer; the mass of
the distribution is concentrated on the left of the distribution. High value of kurtosis arise in the
circumstance where the probability mass is concentrated around the mean and occasional values
far from the mean.
The skill portfolios based on cross sectional regressions by year can be considered as short
term (year to year) performance rankings, while the skill portfolios based on time series regression
with at least 10 years of data can be referred to as long term performance rankings. The intent is
to provide intuition as to if the different approach gives different answers.
3.4.2 Profitability
Two measures of a farm’s profitability are used in measuring the farm’s ability to generate op-
erator’s share management income. For cross sectional regressions, which is also referred to as
short-term performance results, table 3.3 displays the operator and land return and management
return for each skill portfolio in Panel A. The top skill decile is 10 and is formed based on alpha
rankings. More skilled farm managers can earn higher net farm income. Column (1) in table 3.3
shows that the average operator and land return for the top decile of farm managers from 1996
to 2014 is $352.40/acre, which is $308/acre more than the bottom farms, averaging $17.04/acre.
Column (2) shows that most skilled farm managers record the highest management returns, av-
eraging $203.81/acre, while the bottom farms record the lowest, averaging -$202.90/acre. The
difference is $406.71/acre. Column (3) and (4) present a simple monotonic relationship between
alpha and profitability, which is not surprising because alpha is estimated by using operator and
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land returns measure. Column (5) and (6) calculate the percentage deviations, which is equal to
the absolute deviation divided by the mean. Patterns shown in percentage deviations confirm with
the previous absolute deviations that most skilled managers show better profit making capacity and
the top/bottom deciles have greater influence than the intermediate deciles.
In Panel B, table 3.3 displays the difference between top and bottom deciles for the profitability
measures and deciles test results. The difference of operator and land returns between the top and
bottom decile is $308.36/acre which is significantly different from zero. Top managers have an
average management return of $321.54 higher than the bottom 10%. The statistical significance
of the test result that top and bottom managers performances differ prevails in every portfolio of
liquidity measurements. The results are also presented for comparisons of the top and bottom
20%, 30%, 40% and 50%. The findings persist even when I expand the size of the deciles, but the
differences in magnitude decline. This suggests that the top/bottom deciles have greater influence
than the intermediate deciles. In sum, the top 10% of managers tend to show substantial profit
making capacity in financial conditions.
Table 3.4 demonstrates similar results for time series regressions. An interesting pattern arise
that both absolute deviations and percentage deviations are smaller compared to table 3.3. The re-
sults are also compared between the top and bottom manager performance in Panel B. For example,
all differences between the top and bottom 10% farms show smaller values. The long-term perfor-
mance deviations shrink compared to short-term performances indicating that farms that achieve
consistent performance over longer term show more stability due to persistent skill, while it is more
volatile for average farms to survive from year to year due to luck, bad weather, microeconomic
condition changes, disease, etc.
The financial performance results are due to superior skills in the top decile and high profits
gained by them. However, poor returns or low net farm income can have many causes. The
farm may not be large enough to generate the level of production needed for an adequate income.
Fixed costs such as machinery and building depreciation, interest, and general farm overhead costs
should be evaluated. Poor returns may be due to low physical efficiency, low selling prices, and/or
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high input costs. This needs a comprehensive examination of strategies, both in terms of the
propensity of farm managers with certain characteristics and their ability to make profits relative
to their peers.
3.4.3 Revenue Composition: Crop Yields and Prices
The revenue includes all cash and noncash revenue from the crop. The accuracy of the projected
profit for the enterprise depend on the accurate estimates of yields and prices. Projected yield is
based on historical yields. For a budget for a long-term planning for the enterprise, the appropriate
selling price depends on a review of historical prices.
Illinois agriculture is based largely on crop production, especially corn and soybeans. Illinois
ranked the first in the nation in soybean production with over 547 million bushels produced in
2014.1 It produced the second greatest amount of corn in 2014 with 2.34 billion bushels.2 Year-
to-year variation in farm revenue are related to the growing season, crop yields, grain prices, and
acres in high-cash-value crops. Too much rainfall and too dry season in certain parts of the state
can directly affect crop yields. Table 3.5 shows the crop yields on a yearly basis. The average
corn yield for Illinois farms range from 170.72 bushels/acre for the top skilled farmers to 152.18
bushels/acre for the bottom ones. Soybean yields from 1996 though 2014 are reported from 47.00
bushels/acre for the bottom farmers to 52.02 bushels/acre for the top farmers.
Table 3.6 shows the crop yields for Illinois farms participating in the FBFM program for more
than 10 years. The average corn yield for Illinois farms range from 170.04 bushels/acre for the
top skilled farmers to 153.42 bushels/acre for the bottom ones. Soybean yields from 1996 though
2014 are reported from 47.39 bushels/acre for the bottom farmers to 51.84 bushels/acre for the top
farmers. Results suggest that most skilled farm operators average highest crop yields. Corn yields
on the recordkeeping farms averaged 6 to 15 percent above average for all Illinois farms.
The average marketing year prices for corn and soybeans can vary from year to year with
1http://www.statista.com/statistics/192076/top-10-soybean-producing-us-states/
2http://cornsuits.com/which-states-produced-the-most-corn-in-2014/
49
cyclical movements. Sales for corn and soybeans have been divided between old crop and new
crop sales. For example, if prices received for old crop sold in one year are below their inventory
prices, it will result in a negative marketing margin and lower crop returns. If prices received
for new crop are high enough then crops may not be eligible for loan deficiency payments or/and
producers not receive a countercyclical payment. Table 3.7 reports the average marketing year
prices received for both new crop and old crop sold during shorter periods. Corn prices (new crop)
received for most skilled farmers average $3.08, which is 13 cents higher than least skilled ones.
Corn prices (old crop) received for the top farmers average $3.19, which is 10 cents higher than
the least skilled ones. Soybeans (new crop) are sold for $7.70 to $7.92 during the same period.
Soybean prices (old crop) received for the top farmers average $7.99, which is 18 cents higher than
the bottom ones.
Table 3.8 reports the average marketing year prices received for both new crop and old crop
sold during longer periods. Corn prices (new crop) received for most skilled farmers during 1996
to 2014 average $3.28, which is 11 cents higher than least skilled ones. Corn prices (old crop)
received for the top farmers average $3.36, which is 7 cents higher than the least skilled ones.
Soybeans (new crop) are sold for $7.83 to $8.05 during the same period. Soybean prices (old crop)
received for the top farmers average $8.19, which is 18 cents higher than the bottom ones. In sum,
most successful farmers receive higher crop prices and reveal better marketing skills.
The crop yields results show much more consistency between the management skill and the
crop yields. For example, there is a monotonic relationship between the skill and yield outcomes
(see columns (1) and (2)). In addition, the deviations are smaller for long term performers than
short term survivors (see columns (3) and (6)). However, the results for crop prices may vary. The
deviation deduction pattern does not agree with the previous findings. This suggests a potential
interesting hypothesis that the skill persistence may be driven more by the yield effect than by the
price effect. It is equivalent to say that crop yields are the dominating factor determining long term
performance.
One of the focus on yield and price levels is to choose the commodity programs under the
50
2014 Farm Bill. Differences in expected payments between Agricultural Risk Coverage - County
Coverage (ARC-CO) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) will be an important factor when making the
program choice decisions offered under the 2014 Farm Bill. Realization of Market Year Average
prices and county yields from 2014 through 2018 will affect differences in payments (Schnitkey,
2015). One strategy is to choose ARC-CO on some farms and PLC on other farms, splitting
protection between a revenue program whose guarantee will change over time and a target price
program with a fixed reference price.
3.4.4 Land Costs and Tenure Position
Land control practices are important in the matrix of management skills. Farms have different land
management patterns reflected in the land charge. The short-term land costs results are shown in
table 3.11. The average rental cost for the top 10% is $144.07 for the top 10% and $132.08 for
the bottom 10%. They also save money on ownership expenses with land charge of $10.25 less
than bottom 10% managers. The average total land costs is $167.73 for the top 10% and $177.98
for the bottom 10%. The average cash rents for top 10%, 20%, ..., 50% managers are significantly
greater than that of bottom 10%, 20%, ..., 50% managers, where as total land costs find the results
are opposite.
The long-term land costs results are shown in table 3.12. The average rental cost for the
top 10% is $138.06 for the top 10% and $8.38 less than bottom 10% managers. The average
total land costs is $165.78 for the top 10% and $179.04 for the bottom 10%. These results show
widespread significance across all costs and time periods. In general, farmers’ long term land costs
are much stable with smaller deviations than short term land costs. Managers’ skills correspond
with their control of land costs, which is clearly demonstrated in the results where less land costs
are generated among those larger decile (better skilled managers) groups. However, cash rental
rates are often determined by output/input prices, soil quality, relative location, and other county-
specific factors (Du et al. , 2007; Paulson et al. , 2013). Higher rental rates paid by skilled operators
may be masked by differences in soil productivity and various market and industry factors.
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The majority of farmland in the Midwest is controlled under rental agreements which are in-
creasingly of the fixed cash rent type. Given the current level of price volatility, the tenure position
of a farm operation has a significant effect on downside risk exposure. The comparison can shed
light on the importance of tenure position to the performance and risk exposure of grain farms.
The short term tenure positions are presented in table 3.13. The top 10% of managers show
more reliance on crop share lease with the percentages of cash rent, crop share, and self owned
land of 32.51%, 49.56%, and 18.05%, respectively. The bottom 10% of managers display the
percentages of each type of 31.23%, 49.56%, and 18.05%, respectively.
The long term tenure positions are presented in table 3.14. The share rent type are quite popular
among top managers. Results show decreased deviations in column (4)-(9) compared to table 3.13.
The top 10% of managers show more reliance on crop share lease with the percentages of cash rent,
crop share, and self owned land of 32.65%, 47.09%, and 20.95%, respectively. The bottom 10%
of managers display the percentages of each type of 34.85%, 51.70%, and 14.35%, respectively.
Results clearly suggest that top decile managers prefer rental agreements, while less skilled farmers
have relatively more self-owned land. Leasing in general and crop-share leasing in particular have
proven to be efficient strategies over time for farmland acquisition.
3.4.5 Non-land Cost Structure
Table 3.9 provides a good understanding of the costs of production and is useful for enterprise
budgeting and making management decisions. Costs are classified in different ways, depending on
whether they are fixed or variable and cash or noncash. Opportunity cost is another type of cost
not included in the accounting expenses, which is used in the management return concept.
Farms with a high proportion of machinery or hired labor tend to have higher operating ex-
penses. The top 10% managers can significantly make investing decisions more efficiently and
save money on both variable and fixed cost items. Total direct costs for the top 10% managers are
$36.59 less than bottom ones. The figure for the difference of total power and equipment costs is
$76.09. The top 10% managers cost $59.51 less on total overhead costs than the bottom 10%.
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For a long term perspective (see table 3.10), the top 10% managers can significantly make
investing decisions more efficiently and save money on non-land costs with a smaller relative
uncertainty (in terms of deviations). Total direct costs for the top 10% managers are $39.27 less
than bottom ones. The figure for the difference of total power and equipment costs is $66.45. The
top 10% managers cost $53.81 less on total overhead costs than the bottom 10%. In sum, most
skilled managers are better at budgeting and managing business risks.
3.4.6 Farm Characteristics
Table 3.15 and 3.16 present the farm characteristics that are associated with operating skills. In
general, long term farm characteristics show relative smaller deviations in column (3)-(6). More
skilled farm managers operate on farms that have a high soil productivity. However, the farm size
held by the farm operator can have a non-linear relationship with management skill. For example,
the most skilled farmers control relatively smaller land size compared to mid-ranked farmers. The
size of the farm business has been shown to decrease with the level of risk aversion (Boumtje et al.
, 2001). A reduction in farm size can be a means of coping with the risky nature of the agricultural
business. Too little land may mean the business is too small to fully use other resources. At
the other extreme, too much land may require borrowing a large amount of money, cause serious
cash flow problems, and overextend the operator’s management and machinery capacity. Either
situation can result in financial stress and eventual failure of the business.
3.4.7 Financial Status: Liquidity, Solvency, and Efficiency
Liquidity is an assessment of a farm’s ability to meet current cash-flow needs. The amount of
working capital (the difference between current assets and current liabilities) and the current ratio
(current assets divided by current liabilities) are two measures of liquidity. Table 3.17 displays
the short term working capital and current ratio for each skill portfolio in Panel A. The top skill
decile is 10 and is formed based on alpha rankings. Columns (1) and (2) show that the average
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amount of working capital of the top decile farms from 1996 through 2014 is $266,296, while
the bottom decile farms record the lowest, averaging $116,129. Current ratios range from 462 %
for the farms in decile 8 to 1778 % for the top farms. Table 3.18 displays the long term working
capital and current ratio. Columns (1) and (2) show that the average amount of working capital
of the top decile farms is $281,650, while the bottom decile farms record the lowest, averaging
$88,847. Current ratios range from 290 % for the farms in decile 8 to 2437 % for the top farms.
The most skilled farms recorded the highest current ratio, which demonstrates the healthiness of
their financial conditions.
In Panel B, table 3.17 displays the difference between top and bottom deciles for the short term
liquidity measures and deciles test results. The difference of working capitals between the top and
bottom decile is $150,166 which is significantly different from zero. Top managers have a higher
average current ratio than the bottom 10%. Table 3.17 displays the difference between top and
bottom deciles for the long term liquidity measures. The difference of working capitals between
the top and bottom decile is $192,802 which is significantly different from zero. Top managers
present a higher average current ratio. The statistical significance of the test result that top and
bottom managers performances differ prevails in every portfolio of liquidity measurements. The
results are also presented for comparisons of the top and bottom 20%, 30%, 40% and 50%. The
findings persist even when I expand the size of the deciles, but the differences in magnitude decline.
This suggests that the top/bottom deciles have greater influence than the intermediate deciles. In
sum, the top 10% of managers tend to show substantial liquidity in financial conditions.
Solvency is a measure of the farm’s overall financial strength and risk-taking ability. It refers
to the value of assets owned by the business compared to the amount of liability, or the relation
between debt and equity capital. The increasing farmland values and farm and non-farm incomes
have boosted farm’s ability to meet family living demands and retire term debt. The debt-to-farm
equity and debt-to-farm asset indictors show how debt capital is combined with equity capital.
Smaller values are preferred, and the ratios will approach to zero as liability approach zero. Large
values result from small equity, which means an increasing chance of insolvency. This is useful in
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looking at the risk exposure of the business. Table 3.19 presents the short term results. Column
(1) shows that the average debt-to-farm equity percentage range from 61.28% for the top farms to
86.54% for the bottom farms. Column (2) shows that the average debt-to-farm asset percentage
range from 30.65% for the top farms to 34.65% for the bottom farms. Table 3.20 shows that the
average long term debt-to-farm equity percentage range from 52.59% for the top farms to 75.47%
for the bottom farms. The average debt-to-farm asset percentage range from 27.77% for the top
farms to 35.59% for the bottom farms. In sum, the top decile of managers tend to show substantial
solvency in financial conditions.
Some managers are able to generate more production or use fewer resources than their neigh-
bors because they use their resources more efficiently. A general definition for efficiency is the
quantity or value of production achieved per unit of resource employed. If a comparison with
other farms with a budget goal shows that an operation has an adequate volume of resources but
is not reaching its production goals, then some resources are not being used efficiently. A farm
business may use many type of resources, so there are different ways to measure both economic
and physical efficiency.
The “farm debt crisis” from 1983 to 1987 provided evidence that the farm record-keeping
methods and financial analyses of that time were often inadequate or underused. Following the
debt crisis, farm financial education increased, leading to growth in the number of available books,
farm record systems, and services, but the new methods were generally not standardized, In 1989,
the Farm Financial Standards Task Force (FFSTF) was formed to address accounting and record
keeping problems on farms and ranches. Subsequently, they changed their names to the Farm
Financial Standards Council (FFSC). In 2006, the FFSC developed a report concerning manage-
ment accounting guidelines for agricultural producers. This section of selected financial efficiency
measurements follow the financial accounting recommendations of the FFSC. One of the impor-
tant purposes of this section is to analyze if management skills are embodied on the cost side, the
revenue side, or both.
The first measure is the asset turnover ratio, which measures how efficiently capital invested in
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farm assets is being used. It is useful in measuring the farm’s ability to utilize assets to generate
income. This ratio is found by dividing the gross revenue generated by the market value of total
farm assets.
For a short term perspective, table 3.21 shows that the average asset turnover ratio for the top
10% farms is 0.51 indicates that gross revenue for one year was equal to 51 percent of the total
capital invested in the business. At this rate, it would take around 2 years to produce agricultural
products with a value equal to the total assets. The asset turnover ratio will vary by farm type.
The average asset turnover ratio for the bottom 10% farms is 0.30 indicates that gross revenue for
one year was equal to 30 percent of the total capital invested in the business. At this rate, it would
take more than 3 years to produce agricultural products with a value equal to the total assets. For a
long-run perspective, table 3.22 shows that the average asset turnover ratio for the top 10% farms
is 0.52, while the average ratio for the bottom 10% farms is 0.34. Long term asset turnover ratios
have smaller deviations compared to short term ones.
The average asset turnover ratio for the whole sample period from 1996 to 2014 on all northern
Illinois grain farms (located north of a line from Kankakee to Moline) is 43.61%. Operators
on farms in central Illinois has 19-year average asset turnover ratio of 44.21%. Central Illinois
occupies the area between the Kankakee-Moline line in the north and the Motatton-Alton line in
the south. The figure for asset turnover ratio varies considerably with the location and type of farm.
For the same period from 1996 through 2014 grain farms, operators in southern Illinois average
34.71% for asset turnover ratio. Southern Illinois farms have an average soil productivity index
equal to 58, compared with an average of 81 for northern Illinois farms and 86 for central Illinois
farms. Better growing conditions in the northern and central Illinois have led to larger earnings
from crops.
Figure 3.3 suggests that farms that own most of their resources will generally have lower asset
turnover ratios than those that rent land and other assets. In addition, farms with a large tillable
land and high soil productivity tend to have higher asset turnover ratios (see figure 3.4).
The asset turnover ratio will vary by farm type. Diary, hog, and poultry farms will generally
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have higher rates, beef cow farms tend to be lower, and crop farms usually have intermediate
values. Therefore, the asset turnover ratio should be compared only among farms of the same
general type.
The second measure of financial efficiency is the operational expense ratio, which is recom-
mended to show what percent of gross revenue went for operating expenses. The operating expense
ratio is computed by dividing total operating expenses (excluding depreciation) by gross revenue.
Operating expenses - annual cash outlays for the nondepreciable items - include fertilizer, pesti-
cides, seeds (including homegrown seeds), machinery repairs, machinery hire and lease, fuel and
oil, farm share of electricity, telephone, and light vehicle expenses, building repairs and rents,
drying and storage, hired labor, livestock expenses, taxes, insurance, and miscellaneous expenses.
The interest paid is not included because an interest charge is made on the operator’s total farm
investment.
Table 3.23 shows that the short term average operating expense ratio for the bottom 10% farms
(89%) is significantly higher than the top 10% farms (52%). Table 3.24 shows that the short term
average operating expense ratio for the bottom 10% farms (80%) is significantly higher than the
top 10% farms (53%). Long term operating expense ratios provide smaller deviations compared
to short term ones.
The average operating expense ratio for the whole sample period from 1996 to 2014 on all
northern Illinois grain farms is 68.47%. Operators on farms in central Illinois had 19-year average
operating expense ratio of 66.35%. For the same period from 1996 through 2014 grain farms,
operators in southern Illinois averaged 68.70% for asset turnover ratio. Better growing conditions
in the central Illinois have led to lower costs.
Figure 3.3 suggests that farms with a high proportion of rented land tend to have lower oper-
ating expense ratios. Due to economy of scale, farms with a large tillable land tend to have lower
operating expense ratios. High soil productivity also lowers this ratio (see figure 3.4).
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3.5 Conclusions
This study emphasizes the strategic and operations aspects of managing a farm. In general, I
find substantial difference of farm management styles and performance efficiency in management
skill portfolios. I also find evidence of most skilled farm managers are more efficient on both
revenue side and costs side. With regards to time periods, the weight of the evidence points to the
persistence in management styles and decisions for a subset of farm managers who are long term
participants in the sample. The approaches used in this study also allow comparison among farms
of different sizes and types. The activities of top farms can be replicated by poorer performers
and the study provide a unique way for comparing the farm management styles and ability of most
skilled farm managers to that of less skilled ones.
The innovative method is framed by comparing business strategies and performance styles
in the following aspects: production and operations planning, land management and control, and
production costs evaluation. Farm managers will want to consult it as well to improve the effective-
ness, objectivity, and success of their decisions. It offers a guidance for farmer’s strategic planning
to evaluate, choose, and implement the business strategies that best fit the farm. Future studies can
focus on decision making beyond the traditional microeconomic analysis – decision making under
risk and the development of scenarios to understand the impact of an uncertain future.
In this study, I did not study farm manager’s preferences by performing traditional cross-
sectional regressions across farms of management skill on a variety of characteristics due to com-
plicated nonliearity, endogeneity and multicoliearity problems. The sample used in the analysis
consists mainly grain farms. The future studies can expend the analysis by focusing on the econ-
omy of scope across different types of farm enterprises. Moreover, future farm operators have to
balance their personal goals for an independent lifestyle, financial security, and rural living against
societal concerns about food safety, environmental quality, and agrarian values.
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3.6 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics, 1996 through 2014
All Farms 5 Years 10 Years All Years
Number of farms 9,831 4,106 2,242 227
Total acres per farm 984 1,017 1,066 1,343
Soil-productivity rating 79.51 79.64 79.28 77.28
Corn yield (bu/acre) 162.20 162.63 163.02 162.46
Corn price ($/bu) 3.18 3.18 3.20 3.22
Soybean yield (bu/acre) 48.75 48.96 49.25 49.37
Soybean price ($/bu) 6.04 6.19 6.51 7.48
Crop revenue ($/acre) 529.10 532.58 535.99 536.41
Other farm receipts ($/acre) 49.90 48.43 44.02 30.94
Gross revenue 579.00 580.00 579.92 566.36
($ per acre)
Total direct costs 161.39 162.49 164.45 169.05
Soil fertility 67.00 67.36 68.18 71.68
Pesticides 36.28 36.40 36.62 36.75
Seed 45.79 46.22 46.92 48.29
Drying and storage 12.32 12.49 12.71 12.32
Total power and equipment costs 97.98 98.53 97.83 93.54
Machinery hire/lease 14.10 14.00 13.69 12.39
Utility 7.92 7.71 7.42 5.90
Machinery repairs 23.64 23.71 23.42 22.25
Fuel and oil 17.28 17.51 17.55 16.98
Light vehicle 3.14 3.06 2.99 2.29
Machinery depreciation 31.90 32.52 32.75 33.71
Total overhead costs 94.16 93.86 93.25 84.87
Hired labor 13.33 13.36 13.70 13.05
Building repair and rent 7.54 7.43 7.21 5.60
Building depreciation 7.08 6.96 6.74 5.86
Insurance 20.21 20.34 20.46 20.01
Miscellaneous 8.03 7.85 7.63 6.49
Interest (non-land) 37.97 37.90 37.48 33.84
Total non-land costs (353.53) (354.89) (355.53) (347.47)
Operator and land return 225.47 225.11 224.40 218.89
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Table 3.2: Alpha estimates for farms with 10 more years of data available
Panel A: Excess Ratio Regression
Number of farms with usable data 4,157
Number of farms with significantly positive alpha 1,636
Percentage of farms with significantly positive alpha 39.35%
Number of farms with non-significant alpha 1,836
Percentage of farms with non-significant alpha 44.17%
Number of farms with significantly negative alpha 685
Percentage of farms with significantly negative alpha 16.48%
Panel B: Excess Ratio Regression Adjusted by Farm Characteristics
Number of farms with usable data 4,157
Number of farms with significantly positive alpha 263
Percentage of farms with significantly positive alpha 6.32%
Number of farms with non-significant alpha 1,621
Percentage of farms with non-significant alpha 54.39%
Number of farms with significantly negative alpha 2,414
Percentage of farms with significantly negative alpha 58.07%
Panel C: Alpha Distributions (Adjusted by Farms Characteristics)
Number of farms with usable data 4,157
Number of farms with positive alpha 1,917
Number of farms with negative alpha 2,240
Mean 21.60
10th percentile -462.14
25th percentile -105.85
50th percentile -7.36
75th percentile 97.67
90th percentile 452.91
Shapiro-Wilk test of normality (p-value) 0.00
Skewness 33.18
Kurtosis 2342.67
Note: t-test is applied for each farm across more than 10-
year-period observations.
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Table 3.3: Short-term (Cross-sectional Regression) Profitability Evaluation, 1996-2014
Panel A: Profitability for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile OpRet MgtRet OpRet1 MgtRet1 OpRet2 % MgtRet2 %
($/acre) ($/acre)
1 17.04 -136.68 -164.85 -175.41 -341.20 -1652.56
2 100.34 -44.60 -80.37 -82.32 -258.95 -765.03
3 135.96 -10.31 -46.14 -48.32 -62.96 -317.30
4 156.63 11.93 -25.01 -25.25 -50.32 -256.31
5 178.08 33.93 -3.17 -2.10 52.01 9.97
6 195.03 51.12 14.53 15.58 138.34 164.27
7 213.20 68.22 32.69 34.11 34.29 375.13
8 235.59 91.07 53.79 56.13 139.53 405.45
9 261.13 117.81 79.35 82.28 88.05 790.94
10 (Best) 325.40 184.86 139.89 146.06 262.69 1252.04
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile OpRet MgtRet OpRet1 MgtRet1 OpRet2 % MgtRet2 %
($/acre) ($/acre)
Top vs Bottom 10% 308.36 321.54 304.74 321.47 603.89 2904.60
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 234.60 242.01 232.26 243.07 475.40 2230.71
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 189.62 195.14 188.16 196.87 384.46 1728.14
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 156.35 160.43 155.54 162.49 309.50 1453.98
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 128.48 131.79 127.98 133.54 264.89 1194.15
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.4: Long-term (Time-series Regression) Profitability Evaluation, 1996-2014
Panel A: Profitability for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile OpRet MgtRet OpRet1 MgtRet1 OpRet2 % MgtRet2 %
($/acre) ($/acre)
1 59.55 -89.56 -130.78 -137.69 -105.76 -1185.01
2 116.92 -27.73 -69.25 -70.99 -52.51 -617.79
3 148.41 2.48 -41.90 -43.43 -220.19 -270.25
4 168.79 24.34 -20.93 -22.49 -14.09 -254.29
5 180.12 36.94 -3.45 -4.01 269.12 -15.35
6 193.69 49.93 8.74 9.89 -74.72 72.18
7 216.30 72.27 25.46 26.74 22.46 204.84
8 236.59 91.97 48.76 49.62 37.33 394.49
9 259.98 115.63 68.35 71.36 53.28 579.79
10 (Best) 310.13 169.76 116.22 122.28 86.17 1102.63
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile OpRet MgtRet OpRet1 MgtRet1 OpRet2 % MgtRet2 %
($/acre) ($/acre)
Top vs Bottom 10% 250.58 259.32 247.00 259.98 191.93 2287.65
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 196.85 201.38 192.34 201.21 148.91 1742.91
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 160.66 164.11 158.48 165.19 185.07 1383.82
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 132.34 135.04 130.43 136.17 147.95 1152.34
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 108.60 110.63 106.79 111.73 49.66 939.45
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.5: Short-term (Cross-sectional Regression) Crop Yields, 1996-2014
Panel A: Yields for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile YieldCorn YieldSoy yieldc1 yields1 yieldc2 % yields2 %
(bushel/acre) (bushel/acre)
1 152.18 47.00 -8.59 -2.49 -5.83 -5.25
2 155.10 48.22 -5.96 -1.20 -3.79 -2.58
3 157.79 48.52 -3.49 -0.88 -2.32 -1.85
4 160.02 49.18 -1.55 -0.37 -0.90 -0.73
5 161.77 49.40 -0.27 -0.07 -0.20 -0.08
6 162.87 49.66 1.50 0.24 0.99 0.51
7 164.13 50.15 2.31 0.56 1.52 1.19
8 166.39 50.53 3.74 0.84 2.40 1.75
9 167.58 51.10 5.01 1.37 3.32 2.86
10 (Best) 170.72 52.02 7.33 2.02 4.84 4.20
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile YieldCorn YieldSoy yieldc1 yields1 yieldc2 % yields2 %
(bushel/acre) (bushel/acre)
Top vs Bottom 10% 18.54 5.02 15.92 4.51 10.67 9.45
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 15.51 3.95 13.44 3.54 8.89 7.45
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 13.20 3.30 11.37 2.93 7.50 6.16
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 10.93 2.72 9.49 2.43 6.23 5.10
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 8.97 2.23 7.95 2.01 5.22 4.20
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.6: Long-term (Time-series Regression) Crop Yields, 1996-2014
Panel A: Yields for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile YieldCorn YieldSoy yieldc1 yields1 yieldc2 % yields2 %
(bushel/acre) (bushel/acre)
1 153.42 47.39 -7.58 -2.14 -5.05 -2.14
2 156.03 47.95 -4.65 -1.35 -3.07 -1.35
3 158.05 48.78 -3.54 -0.97 -2.42 -0.97
4 160.17 49.30 -1.43 -0.26 -0.75 -0.26
5 160.38 49.46 -0.25 0.16 -0.33 0.16
6 161.77 49.35 0.27 -0.12 0.03 -0.12
7 163.81 50.27 1.80 0.62 1.25 0.62
8 166.43 50.75 4.01 1.03 2.64 1.03
9 167.89 51.37 4.46 1.26 2.98 1.26
10 (Best) 170.04 51.84 6.97 1.79 4.77 1.79
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile YieldCorn YieldSoy yieldc1 yields1 yieldc2 % yields2 %
(bushel/acre) (bushel/acre)
Top vs Bottom 10% 16.62 4.45 14.55 3.92 9.82 8.28
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 14.24 3.94 11.84 3.27 7.94 6.93
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 12.29 3.28 10.41 2.85 6.98 6.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 10.13 2.70 8.61 2.35 5.73 5.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 8.38 2.14 7.00 1.83 4.66 3.90
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.7: Short-term (Cross-sectional Regression) Prices Received, 1996-2014
Panel A: Prices for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Decile PriceNewCorn PriceOldCorn PriceNewSoy PriceOldSoy pnc1 poc1 pns1 pos1 pnc2 % poc2 % pns2 % pos2 %
($/bushel) ($/bushel) ($/bushel) ($/bushel)
1 3.08 3.19 7.72 7.81 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -1.80 -1.42 -0.62 -1.12
2 3.09 3.20 7.71 7.82 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -1.23 -0.65 -0.57 -0.77
3 3.10 3.20 7.70 7.84 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.90 -0.71 -0.90 -0.47
4 3.11 3.21 7.72 7.90 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.83 -0.29 -0.50 0.29
5 3.12 3.22 7.76 7.89 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.35 -0.14 -0.11 0.01
6 3.13 3.23 7.75 7.87 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.10 0.12 -0.09 -0.14
7 3.15 3.21 7.78 7.89 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.47 0.02 0.19 0.36
8 3.16 3.24 7.79 7.87 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.87 0.77 0.26 0.12
9 3.20 3.25 7.83 7.90 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.02 1.72 0.97 0.69 0.44
10 (Best) 3.21 3.26 7.92 7.99 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.11 1.96 1.33 1.66 1.29
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Decile PriceNewCorn PriceOldCorn PriceNewSoy PriceOldSoy pnc1 poc1 pns1 pos1 pnc2 % poc2 % pns2 % pos2 %
($/bushel) ($/bushel) ($/bushel) ($/bushel)
Top vs Bottom 10% 0.13 0.08 0.19 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.19 0.18 3.76 2.74 2.28 2.41
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 0.12 0.06 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.15 0.13 3.36 2.19 1.77 1.81
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 0.10 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.10 2.83 1.95 1.56 1.40
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.08 2.45 1.54 1.34 1.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.06 2.05 1.28 1.08 0.83
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.8: Long-term (Time-series Regression) Prices Received, 1996-2014
Panel A: Prices for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Decile PriceNewCorn PriceOldCorn PriceNewSoy PriceOldSoy pnc1 poc1 pns1 pos1 pnc2 % poc2 % pns2 % pos2 %
($/bushel) ($/bushel) ($/bushel) ($/bushel)
1 3.14 3.29 7.90 8.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 -1.79 -1.35 -0.48 -1.21
2 3.17 3.30 7.83 8.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.05 -1.15 -0.67 -0.76 -0.62
3 3.17 3.31 7.83 8.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 -1.07 -0.58 -0.87 -0.22
4 3.20 3.34 7.88 8.09 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.29 -0.47 -0.27 -0.10
5 3.21 3.31 7.87 8.12 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.19 -0.18 -0.24 0.14
6 3.19 3.35 7.90 8.12 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.57 -0.19 0.11
7 3.19 3.31 7.88 8.08 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 0.07 0.09
8 3.24 3.34 7.94 8.09 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.87 0.63 0.34 0.24
9 3.25 3.34 7.99 8.13 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.04 1.64 1.05 1.08 0.64
10 (Best) 3.28 3.36 8.05 8.19 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.09 2.01 1.10 1.33 0.95
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Decile PriceNewCorn PriceOldCorn PriceNewSoy PriceOldSoy pnc1 poc1 pns1 pos1 pnc2 % poc2 % pns2 % pos2 %
($/bushel) ($/bushel) ($/bushel) ($/bushel)
Top vs Bottom 10% 0.14 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.17 3.80 2.45 1.82 2.16
(0.01) (0.14) (0.11) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 0.11 0.06 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.13 3.30 2.08 1.83 1.71
(0.00) (0.09) (0.03) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.10 2.85 1.80 1.62 1.29
(0.00) (0.07) (0.02) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.08 2.20 1.44 1.30 1.02
(0.00) (0.09) (0.05) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.06 1.80 1.31 1.05 0.81
(0.01) (0.08) (0.07) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.9: Short-term (Cross-sectional Regression) Non-land Costs Structure, 1996-2014
Panel A: Land Tenure for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Decile Direct Power and Equipment Overhead direct1 power1 overhead1 direct2 % power2 % overhead2 %
($) ($) ($)
1 171.26 145.91 134.03 13.77 47.73 39.81 8.58 48.65 41.08
2 169.42 115.12 109.39 11.44 19.06 16.69 6.65 19.47 17.25
3 167.50 105.41 99.95 8.94 9.23 7.00 5.42 9.53 7.51
4 165.56 99.54 94.95 6.20 4.03 2.52 3.61 3.38 1.92
5 161.86 95.21 91.48 3.26 -1.57 -1.58 2.03 -1.49 -1.77
6 158.87 89.68 86.99 -0.04 -6.64 -6.09 -0.06 -6.06 -5.61
7 156.72 87.61 84.46 -2.88 -10.28 -9.94 -1.70 -9.83 -9.43
8 153.63 83.77 81.66 -6.02 -14.44 -13.08 -3.53 -14.56 -13.30
9 148.75 80.06 79.12 -10.75 -18.68 -15.67 -6.40 -19.20 -16.67
10 (Best) 134.67 69.82 74.52 -23.98 -28.57 -19.75 -14.65 -30.03 -21.08
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Decile Direct Power and Equipment Overhead direct1 power1 overhead1 direct2 % power2 % overhead2 %
($) ($) ($)
Top vs Bottom 10% -36.59 -76.09 -59.51 -37.75 -76.30 -59.56 -23.23 -78.68 -62.16
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% -28.97 -55.59 -44.90 -29.97 -57.03 -45.97 -18.14 -58.69 -48.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% -23.70 -44.27 -36.03 -24.96 -45.91 -37.34 -15.08 -47.15 -38.97
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% -19.99 -36.19 -29.65 -20.99 -38.02 -31.12 -12.63 -38.67 -32.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% -16.59 -30.06 -24.62 -17.45 -31.43 -25.80 -10.53 -31.85 -26.42
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.10: Long-term (Time-series Regression) Non-land Costs Structure, 1996-2014
Panel A: Land Tenure for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Decile Direct Power and Equipment Overhead direct1 power1 overhead1 direct2 % power2 % overhead2 %
($) ($) ($)
1 179.20 138.78 127.74 16.61 40.79 35.22 9.33 40.89 35.95
2 173.14 113.80 105.11 10.08 17.17 14.07 5.81 17.16 14.78
3 172.07 104.66 97.49 8.47 8.00 6.43 4.91 7.92 6.04
4 169.71 99.00 92.77 5.84 3.53 2.13 3.43 3.68 2.40
5 166.99 95.56 89.40 3.42 -0.32 -1.32 1.84 -0.27 -0.91
6 164.05 92.22 86.20 -0.20 -5.22 -4.87 -0.02 -4.77 -4.35
7 161.50 88.23 84.22 -2.80 -8.90 -7.26 -1.50 -8.86 -7.71
8 158.09 84.84 80.84 -6.65 -12.75 -11.59 -3.69 -12.71 -11.40
9 152.97 81.58 78.47 -10.92 -16.29 -13.59 -6.31 -16.30 -14.55
10 (Best) 139.93 72.33 73.93 -23.95 -26.17 -19.36 -13.85 -26.91 -20.39
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Decile Direct Power and Equipment Overhead direct1 power1 overhead1 direct2 % power2 % overhead2 %
($) ($) ($)
Top vs Bottom 10% -39.27 -66.45 -53.81 -40.56 -66.96 -54.58 -23.19 -67.80 -56.34
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% -29.72 -49.35 -40.24 -30.78 -50.23 -41.14 -17.65 -50.65 -42.85
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% -24.47 -39.51 -32.39 -25.56 -40.41 -33.44 -14.63 -40.65 -34.39
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% -20.40 -32.32 -26.43 -21.33 -33.41 -27.42 -12.20 -33.62 -28.32
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% -16.91 -26.53 -21.78 -17.79 -27.71 -22.65 -10.14 -27.79 -23.35
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.11: Short-term (Cross-sectional Regression) Land Costs, 1996-2014
Panel A: Land Costs for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile Cash Total cash1 total1 cash2 % total2 %
($/acre) ($/acre)
1 132.08 177.98 -14.77 10.00 -10.56 5.10
2 141.82 172.22 -10.14 4.54 -5.07 2.95
3 152.02 170.22 2.49 1.78 1.50 1.38
4 162.91 170.23 6.37 -0.24 1.01 -0.32
5 145.95 168.24 -2.94 -1.29 0.16 -0.81
6 151.45 165.90 3.74 -3.45 1.90 -1.83
7 158.47 169.70 7.77 -1.56 5.75 -0.84
8 157.85 168.42 6.81 -3.15 4.16 -1.73
9 150.67 168.11 2.87 -3.48 1.19 -2.05
10 (Best) 144.07 167.73 -1.98 -3.16 0.12 -1.86
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile Cash Total cash1 total1 cash2 % total2 %
($/acre) ($/acre)
Top vs Bottom 10% 11.99 -10.25 12.79 -13.16 10.68 -6.96
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 10.45 -7.18 12.93 -10.59 8.48 -5.98
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 8.94 -5.39 10.07 -8.70 6.55 -5.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 5.63 -4.18 7.93 -6.86 6.11 -3.90
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 5.60 -3.81 7.68 -5.92 5.24 -3.32
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.12: Long-term (Time-series Regression) Land Costs, 1996-2014
Panel A: Land Costs for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile Cash Total cash1 total1 cash2 % total2 %
($/acre) ($/acre)
1 146.44 179.04 -5.31 9.87 -1.88 4.35
2 155.67 168.35 -1.10 0.32 -0.54 0.60
3 149.41 170.42 -5.08 1.55 -4.12 1.28
4 158.22 168.33 3.98 -0.63 4.00 -0.25
5 173.34 170.06 3.15 0.90 4.86 0.61
6 157.22 167.84 1.82 -2.79 0.83 -1.45
7 151.31 171.00 -2.87 1.34 -1.99 0.59
8 167.58 171.02 11.78 -1.21 8.23 -0.73
9 157.67 169.39 3.89 -3.19 0.01 -1.19
10 (Best) 138.06 165.78 -10.08 -6.21 -9.15 -3.82
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile Cash Total cash1 total1 cash2 % total2 %
($/acre) ($/acre)
Top vs Bottom 10% -8.38 -13.26 -4.77 -16.07 -7.27 -8.17
(0.74) (0.00) (0.59) (0.00) (0.98) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% -3.00 -6.12 0.23 -9.80 -3.28 -4.98
(0.80) (0.00) (0.52) (0.00) (0.98) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 4.09 -3.88 5.80 -7.45 1.95 -3.99
(0.17) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 1.41 -2.24 2.71 -5.10 0.02 -2.78
(0.34) (0.11) (0.08) (0.04) (0.17) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% -1.91 -2.24 1.95 -4.82 -0.74 -2.64
(0.35) (0.07) (0.28) (0.00) (0.47) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.13: Short-term (Cross-sectional Regression) Land Tenure, 1996-2014
Panel A: Land Tenure for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Decile Cash Share Own cash1 share1 own1 cash2 % share2 % own2 %
(%) (%) (%)
1 31.23 38.87 29.99 -5.41 -4.40 9.79 -15.82 -11.51 52.02
2 35.19 41.62 23.34 -1.79 -1.67 3.46 -5.33 -4.90 19.85
3 36.36 42.92 20.81 -0.40 -0.73 1.14 -0.46 -2.48 4.47
4 38.16 42.52 19.48 0.88 -0.78 -0.10 2.76 -2.31 -1.88
5 39.70 42.25 18.14 2.51 -0.80 -1.71 7.57 -5.14 -8.25
6 40.31 42.17 18.02 2.70 -0.84 -1.86 9.44 -3.83 -12.58
7 40.07 42.95 17.10 2.26 0.44 -2.70 5.79 -1.62 -13.43
8 40.29 42.85 16.92 2.26 0.73 -2.99 6.06 3.00 -14.17
9 38.79 44.67 16.80 1.29 1.85 -3.13 3.62 6.07 -15.34
10 (Best) 32.51 49.56 18.05 -4.30 6.22 -1.93 -13.59 22.80 -10.94
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Decile Cash Share Own cash1 share1 own1 cash2 % share2 % own2 %
(%) (%) (%)
Top vs Bottom 10% 1.27 10.68 -11.94 1.11 10.62 -11.72 2.23 34.31 -62.96
(0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 2.44 6.87 -9.25 2.10 7.07 -9.16 5.60 22.64 -49.11
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 2.94 4.55 -7.46 2.29 5.20 -7.48 5.92 16.92 -38.95
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 2.69 3.52 -6.20 2.06 4.21 -6.27 5.20 12.86 -32.11
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 2.27 2.80 -4.98 1.69 3.36 -5.04 4.53 10.55 -26.56
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.14: Long-term (Time-series Regression) Land Tenure, 1996-2014
Panel A: Land Tenure for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Decile Cash Share Own cash1 share1 own1 cash2 % share2 % own2 %
(%) (%) (%)
1 32.65 47.09 20.95 -5.09 0.48 4.62 -14.28 1.83 25.51
2 37.09 44.98 19.42 -1.83 -1.04 2.86 -5.21 -1.85 15.52
3 39.00 45.62 16.44 0.24 -0.78 0.52 -1.42 -1.24 -1.76
4 40.39 45.62 15.58 1.18 -1.18 -0.02 5.10 -1.79 -1.16
5 41.27 45.43 15.18 2.24 -1.10 -1.18 4.53 -5.55 -6.50
6 42.84 44.60 15.56 2.30 -1.50 -0.83 7.14 -3.89 -7.71
7 42.27 45.25 14.97 1.67 -0.06 -1.60 4.47 -0.32 -6.50
8 40.61 46.09 15.24 0.83 0.36 -1.18 1.68 1.39 -3.39
9 40.88 45.71 14.40 1.56 -0.12 -1.45 5.18 0.18 -4.35
10 (Best) 34.85 51.70 14.35 -3.00 4.88 -1.80 -9.79 11.07 -10.08
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Decile Cash Share Own cash1 share1 own1 cash2 % share2 % own2 %
(%) (%) (%)
Top vs Bottom 10% 2.20 4.61 -6.61 2.09 4.40 -6.43 4.49 9.24 -35.58
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 3.01 2.65 -5.81 2.75 2.65 -5.37 7.48 5.61 -27.75
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 2.55 1.94 -4.28 2.03 2.16 -4.15 5.08 4.64 -19.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 2.38 1.41 -3.37 1.65 1.90 -3.51 3.65 3.85 -15.64
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 2.21 0.98 -2.62 1.33 1.44 -2.74 3.43 3.42 -12.78
(0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.15: Short-term (Cross-sectional Regression) Farm Characteristics, 1996-2014
Panel A: Farm size and soil quality for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile Size SPR size1 spr1 size2 % spr2 %
(acre)
1 924.12 76.11 -199.01 -2.09 -20.46 -2.64
2 1054.53 77.22 -68.68 -1.29 -7.50 -1.32
3 1116.73 78.15 -10.16 -0.81 -1.93 -0.90
4 1118.82 79.23 5.40 -0.60 0.66 -0.52
5 1168.49 79.43 54.39 -0.19 5.02 0.02
6 1149.52 80.29 58.75 0.37 6.21 0.55
7 1162.54 80.62 75.03 0.43 7.27 0.72
8 1142.57 81.15 62.96 0.72 6.54 1.14
9 1128.38 81.08 56.84 1.08 6.03 1.38
10 (Best) 1021.88 82.57 -35.09 2.38 -1.79 1.58
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile Size SPR size1 spr1 size2 % spr2 %
(acre)
Top vs Bottom 10% 97.77 6.46 163.92 4.48 18.67 4.22
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 85.99 5.16 144.88 3.42 16.11 3.46
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 65.96 4.44 120.98 2.79 13.56 2.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 60.44 3.68 108.18 2.35 11.83 2.55
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 44.57 3.11 87.43 1.99 9.70 2.15
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
73
Table 3.16: Long-term (Time-series Regression) Farm Characteristics, 1996-2014
Panel A: Farm size and soil quality for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile Size SPR size1 spr1 size2 % spr2 %
(acre)
1 1145.36 76.53 -169.18 -1.32 -15.68 -1.63
2 1227.15 76.99 -81.72 -0.96 -7.51 -1.23
3 1268.56 78.18 -42.79 -0.62 -3.95 -0.79
4 1308.83 78.02 -13.88 -0.26 -1.23 -0.32
5 1341.00 78.20 43.93 -0.26 3.11 -0.32
6 1270.99 79.31 48.99 0.11 4.67 0.07
7 1317.76 79.53 60.49 0.18 5.04 0.25
8 1313.28 80.17 52.26 0.76 5.24 0.95
9 1277.44 81.64 52.42 0.79 5.02 1.00
10 (Best) 1266.12 82.05 50.53 1.60 5.40 2.02
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile Size SPR size1 spr1 size2 % spr2 %
(acre)
Top vs Bottom 10% 120.76 5.53 219.71 2.92 21.08 3.65
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 85.70 5.09 177.10 2.33 16.82 2.94
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 72.06 4.06 149.78 2.01 14.28 2.54
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 56.34 3.42 130.96 1.62 12.28 2.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 31.09 2.96 105.81 1.37 10.14 1.72
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.17: Short-term (Cross-sectional Regression) Liquidity Evaluation, 1996-2014
Panel A: Liquidity for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile WorkingCapital CurrentRatio wc1 cr1 wc2 % cr2 %
($)
1 116,129 16.65 -78,515 6.35 -40.31 -92.01
2 136,031 6.70 -62,454 -1.62 -40.86 26.18
3 152,043 5.49 -35,922 -3.42 -52.69 0.03
4 189,224 8.36 -5,487 -1.26 -19.57 -6.51
5 177,419 7.03 -11,343 -1.56 7.35 -7.08
6 185,980 7.50 1,935 -2.38 3.52 -3.34
7 218,914 12.11 33,310 0.53 13.49 2.41
8 217,720 4.62 29,605 -2.94 9.57 16.45
9 241,363 8.96 54,910 -0.23 41.83 37.43
10 (Best) 266,296 17.78 75,522 7.15 78.99 27.70
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile WorkingCapital CurrentRatio wc1 cr1 wc2 % cr2 %
($)
Top vs Bottom 10% 150,166 1.12 154,037 0.80 119.31 119.70
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 127,735 1.65 135,688 1.29 100.89 65.82
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 107,036 0.79 112,300 1.00 87.94 49.37
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 87,721 1.53 93,947 0.93 74.22 39.25
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 71,856 1.31 77,794 0.58 58.63 32.13
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.18: Long-term (Time-series Regression) Liquidity Evaluation, 1996-2014
Panel A: Liquidity for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile WorkingCapital CurrentRatio wc1 cr1 wc2 % cr2 %
($)
1 88,847 11.69 -125,674 -0.00 -63.84 -22.53
2 186,549 3.59 -15,910 -5.71 -28.38 -0.81
3 168,628 2.90 -39,444 -5.42 -1.94 -10.86
4 195,299 3.02 -17,375 -6.30 -14.73 -12.35
5 167,486 7.93 8,514 2.73 -4.90 4.09
6 265,100 5.72 4,538 -2.48 -35.23 -3.55
7 200,257 17.97 22,869 5.19 25.96 10.61
8 207,668 3.05 35,148 -1.68 14.66 2.21
9 250,799 8.31 52,470 2.84 50.56 8.22
10 (Best) 281,650 24.37 82,579 11.36 62.79 26.95
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile WorkingCapital CurrentRatio wc1 cr1 wc2 % cr2 %
($)
Top vs Bottom 10% 192,802 12.68 208,254 11.36 126.62 49.48
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 129,069 8.43 138,982 9.80 102.96 29.23
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 98,843 5.61 117,416 7.74 74.04 23.78
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 75,544 7.94 98,292 8.66 65.76 23.57
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 80,137 5.88 77,866 5.88 46.28 17.32
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.19: Short-term (Cross-sectional Regression) Solvency Evaluation, 1996-2014
Panel A: Solvency for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile D/E D/A d/e1 d/a1 d/e2 % d/a2 %
(%) (%)
1 86.54 34.65 16.45 0.78 13.38 0.32
2 76.62 34.58 11.93 1.03 10.04 3.52
3 75.46 34.59 -8.24 0.49 12.85 2.81
4 62.92 33.98 -9.07 0.74 -11.97 1.87
5 57.26 34.44 -21.51 0.83 -24.82 2.63
6 63.24 32.78 -0.98 -0.14 6.46 0.23
7 96.50 33.23 -16.58 -0.34 2.80 -0.83
8 69.43 34.24 -1.31 0.84 0.37 2.71
9 70.72 32.20 3.71 -1.59 -0.16 -4.28
10 (Best) 61.28 30.65 -7.97 -2.68 -9.43 -9.07
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile D/E D/A d/e1 d/a1 d/e2 % d/a2 %
(%) (%)
Top vs Bottom 10% -25.26 -4.00 -24.42 -3.46 -22.81 -9.39
(0.02) (0.01) (0.14) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Top vs Bottom 20% -15.58 -3.19 -16.30 -3.04 -16.49 -8.57
(0.00) (0.00) (0.005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% -12.40 -2.24 -8.58 -1.90 -15.15 -5.74
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% -0.90 -1.87 -0.03 -1.69 -7.68 -4.98
(0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 0.43 -1.82 4.03 -1.55 0.07 -4.46
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.20: Long-term (Time-series Regression) Solvency Evaluation, 1996-2014
Panel A: Solvency for each decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile D/E D/A d/e1 d/a1 d/e2 % d/a2 %
(%) (%)
1 75.47 35.59 7.26 2.94 16.89 12.60
2 70.47 33.75 -0.33 0.70 -2.00 3.60
3 75.27 34.85 6.28 1.57 6.95 4.47
4 74.76 34.32 8.74 1.79 10.08 7.32
5 101.79 36.88 2.84 -0.13 -1.90 -2.04
6 52.30 29.17 -4.19 -0.71 -4.22 -2.15
7 59.30 30.52 -1.01 -1.09 -2.27 -4.84
8 69.44 33.73 -1.18 0.50 1.17 1.81
9 63.36 31.29 -5.22 -1.45 -4.75 -5.63
10 (Best) 52.59 27.77 -13.81 -4.39 -21.31 -16.20
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile D/E D/A d/e1 d/a1 d/e2 % d/a2 %
(%) (%)
Top vs Bottom 10% -22.88 -7.82 -21.08 -7.32 -38.20 -28.80
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% -14.91 -5.12 -12.95 -4.72 -20.45 -18.97
(0.00) (0.00) (0.005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% -11.83 -3.76 -11.08 -3.49 -15.50 -13.48
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% -12.73 -3.78 -10.72 -3.34 -14.70 -13.15
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% -19.98 -4.56 -9.99 -2.79 -12.25 -10.56
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.21: Short-term (Cross-sectional Regression) Asset Turnover Ratio, 1996-2014
Panel A: Asset turnover ratio for each decile
(1) (2) (3)
Decile Asset Turnover Ratio ratio1 ratio2 %
1 0.30 -0.13 -28.97
2 0.37 -0.06 13.20
3 0.40 -0.03 -6.12
4 0.41 -0.02 -4.34
5 0.43 0.00 1.52
6 0.44 0.02 3.11
7 0.44 0.02 5.96
8 0.47 0.04 8.74
9 0.49 0.06 13.74
10 (Best) 0.51 0.09 20.07
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3)
Decile Asset Turnover Ratio ratio1 ratio2 %
Top vs Bottom 10% 0.21 0.21 49.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 0.16 0.17 38.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 0.13 0.13 30.30
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 0.11 0.11 25.30
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 0.09 0.09 20.57
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.22: Long-term (Time-series Regression) Asset Turnover Ratio, 1996-2014
Panel A: Asset turnover ratio for each decile
(1) (2) (3)
Decile Asset Turnover Ratio ratio1 ratio2 %
1 0.34 -0.10 -21.30
2 0.44 -0.02 -3.56
3 0.44 -0.01 -2.81
4 0.43 0.00 -1.62
5 0.48 0.03 5.46
6 0.42 -0.01 -1.35
7 0.43 0.01 2.32
8 0.43 0.01 2.47
9 0.45 0.02 6.14
10 (Best) 0.52 0.08 15.74
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3)
Decile Asset Turnover Ratio ratio1 ratio2 %
Top vs Bottom 10% 0.18 0.17 37.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% 0.10 0.11 23.42
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% 0.06 0.08 17.35
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% 0.05 0.06 14.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% 0.03 0.04 9.87
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.23: Short-term (Cross-sectional Regression) Operational Expense Ratio, 1996-2014
Panel A: Operational expense ratio for each decile
(1) (2) (3)
Decile Operator Expense Ratio ratio1 ratio2 %
1 0.89 0.21 24.79
2 0.77 0.09 14.19
3 0.73 0.05 8.43
4 0.70 0.03 4.71
5 0.68 0.00 0.25
6 0.66 -0.02 -2.44
7 0.64 -0.04 -5.45
8 0.61 -0.07 -9.00
9 0.58 -0.10 -13.58
10 (Best) 0.52 -0.16 -22.02
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3)
Decile Operator Expense Ratio ratio1 ratio2 %
Top vs Bottom 10% -0.37 -0.37 -46.81
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% -0.28 -0.28 -37.29
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% -0.22 -0.22 -30.67
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% -0.18 -0.18 -25.54
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% -0.15 -0.15 -20.97
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Table 3.24: Long-term (Time-series Regression) Operational Expense Ratio, 1996-2014
Panel A: Operational expense ratio for each decile
(1) (2) (3)
Decile Operator Expense Ratio ratio1 ratio2 %
1 0.80 0.14 18.17
2 0.76 0.08 12.49
3 0.72 0.05 8.13
4 0.69 0.03 4.20
5 0.68 0.01 1.00
6 0.66 -0.01 -0.90
7 0.64 -0.03 -4.45
8 0.62 -0.05 -7.36
9 0.59 -0.08 -12.04
10 (Best) 0.53 -0.13 -19.42
Panel B: Deciles test results
(1) (2) (3)
Decile Operator Expense Ratio ratio1 ratio2 %
Top vs Bottom 10% -0.27 -0.27 -37.59
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 20% -0.22 -0.22 -31.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 30% -0.18 -0.18 -25.87
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 40% -0.15 -0.15 -21.56
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top vs Bottom 50% -0.12 -0.12 -17.63
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wilcoxon p-value in parenthesis.
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Figure 3.1: Number of Farms Participating in FBFM Records for Different Time Horizons
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Figure 3.2: Plots of key variables, 1996-2014
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Figure 3.3: Economic efficiency of various land tenure systems
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Figure 3.4: Economic efficiency of various farm characteristics
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Chapter 4
Do Profitable Farmers Acquire More Land?
4.1 Introduction
For decades, the dominant trend in U. S. agriculture at the farm level has been towards greater
concentration. The large farms and contract operations have grown in numbers while the number
of mid-sized independent family farms has shrunk. Most U.S. farms—97 percent in 2011—are
family operations, and even the largest farms are predominantly family-run. Midsize and large-
scale family farms account for 8 percent of U.S. farms but 60 percent of the value of production.
In contrast, small family farms make up 90 percent of the U.S. farm count but produce only a 26-
percent share of farm output.1 This study analyzes the factors underpinning this prominent trend.
It has crucial policy implications because theory would suggest high profit farms should capture
the resources over time.
In addition, farm programs remain a controversial, intensively-debated farm policy issue which
may affect farm growth and farmland market behavior. In particular, some researchers argue that
social benefits equality issues arise from the fact that wealthier farmers are becoming even more
wealthier, while poorer farmers are struggling to survive, because of that, the allocation of farm
program benefits among different farmers (especially the distinction between large versus small)
has become a topic of considerable debate. This creates a question whether farm managers should
acquire more land to increase their farm sizes. From 1995 to 2014, the top 10 percent of commodity
payment recipients were paid about 70 percent of commodity payments in Illinois amounting to
1Hoppe, Robert A. Structure and Finances of U.S. Farms: Family Farm Report, 2014 Edition, EIB-132, U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, December 2014. http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/
1728096/eib-132.pdf
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$15.2 billion. Data also show that the top 20% farms collected 86 percent of government payments
with an average of $269,319 per recipient compared to $10,689 per recipient for the remaining
80% farms between 1995 and 2014.2 These conditions emphasize the importance of a study on
how farm profitability could affect farm growth, management decisions and government programs.
Another critical issue associated with farm policy is the resurgence of interest in increased
land values. An extensive empirical literature has attempted to measure the extent to which farm
program benefits are capitalized into land values (e.g., Shoemaker et al. , 1990; Barnard et al. ,
1997; Goodwin et al. , 2003; Lence & Mishra, 2003), hence transferring benefits toward land-
owners rather than producers. When farm policy drives up land values, it raises production costs.
The recent land market behavior may cancel out the comparative advantage of high production
yield regions, such as the Corn Belt, the major agricultural production region of the United States.
Soaring farmland prices have generated considerable national attention and given rise to questions
about land value growth rates and changing agricultural structure.
Moreover, the effects of many controversial regulations concerning agricultural policy and eco-
logical destruction depend crucially on how land use patterns respond to economic changes. Con-
versely, any policy affecting agricultural markets can have indirect land use effects (e.g., biofuel
regulations lead to growing demand for cropland). These effects require promising innovations in
technology, institutional and policy approaches to cope with increasing pressures on land resource.
This paper specifically tests whether or not there are linkages between farm profits and farm
growth. I hypothesize that higher profit farms will grow faster than lower profit farms, therefore
acquiring larger farmland. While the present paper deals mainly with the role of land acquisition
decisions of farmers, the results are of relevance in a more general context. From a broader policy
perspective, rising concentration of landholdings raises serious questions about the potential of
current agricultural growth to act as a vehicle for broad based economic growth. The underlying
arguments can also apply to a variety of topics involving risk management. One particular danger is
that rising farm income and farmland demand could be accompanied by greater financial leverage,
2Data source: Environmental Working Group Farm Subsidy Database.
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increasing the industry’s vulnerability to a drop in income, as in the 1980s. The broad question
regarding the implications of the rapid growth of farm incomes due to rising and volatile crop
prices for farmers is very important, especially for small farmers who look for a means of survival
and success. The global food price spike of 2008 has reinvigorated interest throughout the world in
securing adequate food supplies. Volatile agricultural commodity prices have been, and continue to
be a main cause for concern among agricultural commodity traders, producers, and policy makers.
Since several fundamental issues are addressed simultaneously, the systematic tendency of modern
agricultural production will have important policy implications.
4.2 Literature Review
While various behavioral or technical rules of farm profit growth and expansion have already been
established in empirical studies or are generally accepted, deeper understanding of the underlying
factors and their interrelations is required. The present paper helps to explain the patterns of
production by farms of different scales, and in some cases refutes or qualifies common beliefs and
traditional explanations.
In analyzing effects on farm growth, research focuses on the the changes of farm size, per-
formance, and structure (Weiss, 1999; Bremmer et al. , 2002). It was found that lorenz curves
for agriculture in North America were becoming more “bowed” over time. The result would be
a rapid net decline of farm numbers akin to the “rural exodus” (Ehrensaft et al. , 1984). Several
studies present the interpretation of the impact of size on growth in various scenarios in the context
of the Gibrat’s law (e.g., Shapiro et al. , 1987; Sumner & Leiby, 1987). The analysis is undertaken
by testing Gibrat’s “Law of Proportionate Effect.” Gibrat offered the hypothesis that the percent-
age growth of firms are independent of their initial size. Shapiro et al. (1987) conduct tests and
conclude that Gibrat’s law is rejected.
Among the most relevant literature that concentrates on farm efficiency, the effect of farm
size on profitability and that on tenure choice is an issue continually analyzed and debated by
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agricultural economists. Examples include Garcia et al. (1982), Feder (1985), Purdy et al. (1997)
and Goodwin et al. (2002). All of these models are basically static in nature because land is
assumed to be fixed and tenure is exogenous to the model.
Two studies have examined land accumulation in a dynamic optimization framework (Shalit
& Schmitz, 1982; Chambers & Phipps, 1988). Shalit & Schmitz (1982) consider the manner in
which credit is allocated for land purchase. Chambers & Phipps (1988) examines the qualitative
effects of a complex interplay of economic factors on tenure and farm size. Their works focus on
either external or internal determinants of farm expansion. None of these studies explore the joint
effects of factors in the entire farm system.
In the specific case of the land acquisition decision model, this paper clarifies rigorously the
effects of credit constraints and economic incentives on production behavior. It is similar to the
study of Sumner & Leiby (1987) and Weiss (1999) in that it depends critically on the individual
and farm-specific characteristics to analyze the structural change in the farm sector. While these
models have motivated a large number of empirical studies for agricultural sector, empirical work
that goes beyond testing Gibrat’s Law by focusing on the profitability as a key determinant of
farm growth is rare. Previous research can be used as a starting point for specifying a richer
empirical model by providing econometric evidence on the importance of human capital, off-farm
employment, and other individual and farm-specific characteristics for explaining both aspects of
structural change: survival and growth. However, unlike previous studies, this analysis stresses the
empirical analysis of farm growth by investigating farm growth and profitability simultaneously.
Furthermore, there has been a continued trend away from share rent contracts towards fixed
cash rent agreements throughout much of the Midwest since the early 1990s (Barry et al. , 1998,
2000; Sotomayor et al. , 2000; Paulson et al. , 2012). Fixed cash leases may be preferred for a
number of reasons, such as greater bidding flexibility and more autonomous control of manage-
ment decisions for the tenant operator, and the elimination of management decisions and a stable
fixed return for the landowner. Cash rent agreements also reduce the landowner’s responsibilities
in dealing with the Farm Service Agency and related government payments and subsidy programs,
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as well as crop insurance decisions. However, Paulson et al. (2010) argue that this shift in rental
agreement type has serious implications for the risk exposure facing tenants, which even the ability
to purchase crop insurance at high coverage levels cannot fully balance.
In recent years, environmental and economic impacts at farm level and individual farm re-
sponses to agricultural and agri-environmental policies strongly depend on characteristics like farm
size, specialisation, and production intensity under different scenarios. Consequently, a number of
papers have drawn relevant policy implications from the estimation of cropland acreage equations
(e.g., Goodwin & Mishra, 2006; Zimmermann et al. , 2009). Other research applies different types
of econometric estimators to analyze farm structural change and dynamic adjustments induced by
a policy change. Studies show that agricultural support increases farms’ profitability and thereby
reduces farm exits (Goetz & Debertin, 2001; Breustedt & Glauben, 2007). In particular, Storm
et al. (2014) find that the total economic size of a farm is more important for its survival than
the on-farm wage rates. Considering the spatial interdependence, their results indicate that direct
payments may help smaller farms for survival, compared to the unaffected survivorship of larger
farms. These papers have frequently adopted econometric approaches when taking into account
the complex econometric issues.
In fact, estimation requires the adoption of accurate panel-data techniques suitable for a system
of equations. However, empirical longitudinal data to test the theory is one of the main items that
are missing in the literature. Econometric modeling for agricultural structure and policy analy-
sis increasingly relies on farm-level data such as the Agricultural Resource Management Survey
(ARMS) collected by the National Agricultural Statistics Service of the USDA. The collected data
refer to a large number of farms providing very detailed information on farm production activi-
ties, as well as on farm structural characteristics and resource use. However, the structure of this
detailed data lack repeated sampling dimension on individual farm since the observed sample is
taken randomly each year (Goodwin & Mishra, 2006; Platoni et al. , 2012). Given this limitation
of ARMS database, it is impossible to follow the same farm for several years to interpret farmers’
choices over time. Therefore, It is needed to have a database that is maintained as a panel. For
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panel data involving a sufficiently long time horizon, I propose using the rich and valuable Farm
Management Farm Business (FBFM) database. The FBFM data represent the detailed information
about economic well-being of Illinois farm households. I focus on data taken from nineteen years
of the FBFM record—1996–2014 including a total of 2,525 farms. These years were chosen as
representative of the rapid farm growth environment.
In the present paper, using a FBFM sample I compare the performances of different groups for
empirical tests. My contribution to the literature is threefold: first, this paper uses empirical testing
approaches which build on the theoretical analysis of farm growth and land accumulation; second,
longitudinal data involving a sufficiently long time horizon are used to test the theory; third, since
several fundamental issues are addressed simultaneously, the analysis of systematic tendency of
modern agricultural production will have important policy implications. An innovative aspect
of this study is that it brings together these qualitative, quantitative, and institutional sources of
information to paint a more complete picture of farm growth in the United States.
4.3 Data
The data set contains continuous observations for a sample of 9,831 farms in the state of Illinois
over nineteen years, from 1996 to 2014, collected from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Manage-
ment (FBFM) survey. FBFM data prior to 1996 is summarized in a different manner. The FBFM
records include a variety of financial and agronomic characteristics for each cooperating farm op-
eration. In 2014, about one out of every five Illinois commercial farms with over 1,000 acres or
total farm sales over $250,000 is enrolled in the FBFM service. Except for 1988 and 2000, enroll-
ment has declined slightly each year since 1982. One factor contributing to this decline has been
the continued decline in the number of farms in the state.
In the 2012 Census of Agriculture, farms selling $100,000 or more accounted for 96% of all
sales from Illinois farms. Estimates for 2014 indicate that over 95% of FBFM farms have total sales
over $100,000. The segment of Illinois agriculture that includes farms with more than $100,000 in
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total sales is often referred to as “commercial farming”.
In this research, I restrict the analysis to corn and soybean farmers. Within Illinois, acreage
of farms enrolled in FBFM account for approximately 25% of the acres in corn and soybean
production. To be selected from a large pool of FBFM cooperator data, each farm record had to
have been certified usable by the FBFM field staff representative with 180 or more tillable acres.
In this study, operator and farmland returns are computed to represent average returns to labor
and farmland. The summary statistics by different region in Illinois (north, central, and south) are
shown in table 4.1. Operator and farmland returns equal gross revenue minus non-land costs, and
represent a return to both owning and operating the farmland.3
If the months of operator labor are 12 or less, then there is one operator for the farm. If months
of operator labor are more than 12, then the number of operators is determined by taking months
of operator labor divided by 12. For each of the farms, the farm ID combined with county ID
results in a unique farm identification marker and is used to isolate management return ($/acre)
on each farm. Ninety-eight counties in total are investigated. All FBFM expenses were adjusted
for prepaid expenses, accounts payable and cash settlements. The enterprise analysis reports all
the costs related to each farm for a given year. Total costs can be further broken down into three
categories: 1) direct costs include fertilizer, seed, pesticides, drying, and storage; 2) power costs
include machinery repairs, equipment depreciation, machine hire and lease, and fuel; 3) overhead
costs include land, hired labor, building repairs and deprecation, insurance, and interest. In the
dataset, revenues include crop revenue, livestock revenue, custom revenue and other revenue. Total
gross revenue after the total cost is the net farm income.4
3The return to farmland varies depending on whether the farmland is owned, share rented, or cash rented. If
farmland is cash rented, subtracting the cash rent from operator and farmland returns yields the return to farming
while the cash rent represents the return to the land ownership.
4The costs and returns are matched up to the same crop/calendar year. But I also noticed they may not be matched
up to the same production/marketing year. For instance, corn that is harvested in October of one year may not be sold
until the following calendar year or longer. This says that returns may have various components which could include
the returns to storage. Similarly, inputs for the next production cycle which begins with planting in May may be
purchased immediately after the last harvest (between October and December) rather than in the year that it is going
to be used. Since the FBFM data account for the accrual management return within calendar year by recording both
old crop and new crop, which means marketing/production year returns are adjusted for each year on an accrual basis.
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FBFM reports a soil productivity ratio (SPR) based on maps of soil types for each Illinois farm,
following Fehrenbacher et al. (1978). The SPR is an average of yield potential on a farm weighted
by the soil types within the farm. The SPR ranges from 40 to 100, with 100 being the most
productive soil quality, and was calculated at the farm level based on soil structure and quality as
well as suitable crops. It directly embodies the potential productivity of the soil for main crops like
soybean and corn. Therefore, the expected effect on returns should be positive as better soil should
not need more use of chemicals to compensate for deficiencies. With higher soil productivity, one
would expect short-run profitability to be higher for any given level of input use.
Total tillable acres for each farm are the indicators of farm size. Farm leases create rights and
obligations relating to economic and other interests. It is important to specify mutual agreeable
leasing arrangements in owner-tenants relations. Agricultural leases are often categorized by the
form of payment. The most common forms are cash rent, flexible cash rent, and crop-share leases.
Farmland with two types of lease payments (cash rent and crop-share leases) as well as operator-
owned land are considered in this study.
Selected characteristics for these farms are presented in table 4.2. These farms were relatively
homogenous in enterprise mix and had a usable data record in the FBFM system for more than
one year. Obviously this is not a random sample. Selection of record-keeping farms has the
advantage that management factor should be more homogenous across the structural dimensions
being evaluated. The data set was cleaned by omitting the outliers. A simple tool of box plots was
used as an initial screening tool, and depending on the results of that screening, I examined the data
more closely and modified the outlier detection strategy accordingly. The sample includes 13,745
total observations with per acre average return of $51.81 and average expenses of $566.56. Total
land costs include interest charge on land, taxes, cash rent and leasing cost. Farms in this report
have per acre average land costs of $149.58 and average farm size of 930.33 acre. In addition,
the table also present average household size, average non-farm income, and average age of farm
operators. The last three rows show the average farm financial characteristics. Current ratio is
calculated to measure the liquidity of a farm and its ability to pay short-term liabilities (debt and
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payables) with its short-term assets (cash, inventory, receivables). The average current ratio is
13.43. Debt to asset ratio is 30.45 which is to evaluate the solvency of a farm. Asset turnover
ratio of 0.38 is used as an indicator of the farm operating efficiency. Also, over the full sample,
the average soil productivity index value is 81.89. Plots of key variables in this study are shown in
figure 4.1.
The average size of Illinois cropland acreage has moved toward much larger farms and led to
corresponding structural changes in the complex farm sector. Lorenz curves for distributions of
Illinois net farm income and farm size for 1996, 2005, and 2014, respectively, reveal an increase
in economic concentration (figure 4.2 & figure 4.3). The upturn of the farm growth rate is in-
triguing and probably suggests the entrance of nonfarm capital into agriculture at a large scale of
production.
4.4 The Hypothesis
In this paper, I focus on the linkages between farms profits and land control patterns (size and lease
types), which can help to identify farms that are more profitable and analyze how they expand. A
major goal of the analysis is to determine the relative economic efficiency of farm operators and
then analyze their behavior in farmland markets. As shown by Garcia et al. (1982), the degree
to which the farms differ in farm size and the extent to which they are profit maximizers can be
different across various farm groups. Under the hypothesis that farms have different operations
means and profitability capacities, the sample of farms for this study is subdivided into (a) a good
farm category (alpha greater than 0) and (b) a poor farm group (less than or equal to 0). To separate
good farms from poor farms, I apply the procedure to returns proposed by Li & Paulson (2014).
In the context of the present study, implementation of the two-factor model approach involves
two steps. The first step is to compute the average benchmark and then subtract the benchmark
from each farm performance proxy to calculate the dependent variable ExcessRatioi,t. The sec-
ond step is to apply the two-factor model to compute ordinary least square (OLS) estimated alphas
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(i.e. Jensen’s alpha). The following theoretical model is derived from the conventional financial
theory’s existing framework.
Excess Ratioi,t = Ratioi,t −Ratioj,t = β1Spri,t + β2Acrtili,t + µi,t, (4.1)
where
E[Excess Ratioi,t] = β1Spri,t + β2Acrtili,t.
alphai ≡ Excess Ratioi,t − E[Excess Ratioi,t] = µi,t, (4.2)
where
Ratioi,t= the ratio of return to cost of farm i for time period t;
Ratioj,t= the ratio of return to cost of county j for time period
t, which is normalized (assume γ = 1 held constant across time);5
alphai= the constant term;
µi,t= the regression residual;
i, j, t= subscript indexes for farm, county, and year, respectively.
The average yearly ratios are shown in table 4.3.6 In this model, the county-level average
measure (Ratiojt) was selected to minimize the impact of geography and weather on returns (see
figure 4.4). The use of a county average benchmark helps to control for systematic effects (e.g.,
good v.s. bad weather, superior v.s. inferior growing conditions, or high v.s. low prices) that
affect all farms within a country in one specific year. Therefore, excess return is a relative per-
formance measure. It removes systemic effects on returns that might impact every farmer peer
group in a given year. (Ratioi,t − Ratioj,t) is the excess ratio; alphai is the ratio left unexplained
5County j refers to the county which contains farm i, so that Ratioj,t can be treated as a benchmark for farm i.
6The data set was cleaned by omitting the outliers. I used a simple rule of thumb, z = 3 guideline (i.e. data points
three or more standard deviations from the mean of returns, as an initial screening tool, and depending on the results of
that screening, examined the data more closely and modified the outlier detection strategy accordingly using boxplots.
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by the benchmark model. An alpha greater than zero means a farm outperforms the expected
performance, which can then differentiate good from bad farms.
A subset including only the farms present for more than 10 years was constructed to form good
vs poor farm groups (see table 4.4). This subset includes a total of 4,157 farm-level observations
for each variable. T-test is applied for each farm. Over the entire sample period, 1,636 farms
have significantly positive alphas, which is around 40% of the total farm number; there are 685
farms with negative alphas taking up to 16% of total farms. After constructing a managerial return
measure in a way that controls for farm characteristics by further factors beyond farm size and soil
productivity, only 263 farms have significantly positive alphas, which is 6% of total farms; and the
number of farms with negative alpha increases to 2,414 with the percentage of 58%. The adjusted
measure describes the level of managerial return by differences in managerial talents and quality
beyond natural resource endowment.
Production management factors in a farming system, such as farm size and soil productivity,
are endogenous with farm profitability (see figure 4.5). Better soil quality can have a positive
impact on farm profitability. In addition, land accumulation decisions depend on profit estimates.
Specifically, it means farms that expand the most are more profitable. Also, the reduction in long-
run average and marginal costs arises from an increase in farm size due to economies of scale.
While the positive correlations may reflect the persistent farm-specific advantages, it may also
reflect the specific nature of agriculture, where growth is related to land acquisition.
Returns have systemic influence on tenure choice (see figure 4.6). As farm size increases, the
ratio of cash rented acreage to total land size increases, while the proportion of crop share lease
declines moderately. During the sample period, the proportion of land owned by the operator is
relatively stable. It is also evident that more profitable farms have a greater proportion of rented
land. The growing reliance on cash leasing results in simpler, more flexible bidding opportunities
for expanding leased acreage. Under cash leases, landlords may also achieve more stable returns
over time, adjust more easily to ownership costs of changing land values, eliminate sharing of
operating expenses, avoid management participation and crop-marketing decisions, remain eligible
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for social security payments at retirement.
From this study an important hypothesis can be derived and tested:
Hypothesis. Farm acreage expansion is dependent on farm return per acre. In other words, re-
turns have systemic influence on the accumulation decision and hence upon the land tenure.
The profit dynamic process evolving with adjustable land accumulation decisions suggest that,
high profit farms have more of an economic incentive to expand. Farms with better financial
condition are able to bear more risks and thus have better incentives to scale up.7 As farm income
increases, farms can grow their size to achieve economies to scale. Land and variable inputs
such as fertilizers, seeds and pesticides are directly involved in the crop growth and development
processes. Drastic changes in cropping practices under long-term choices, such as increasing land
sizes or changing acreage allocation, will directly influence crop yields. Wealthy farmers are able
to increase both bargaining power through both vertical and horizontal integration and to invest
in land purchase, labor-saving machinery, innovative technology and specialized management, in
order for production cost per unit to further decrease.
Also, wealthier farms have more funds to invest in expansion, therefore they will be able to
expand faster. To secure necessary loans for additional land to expand farm size, the farmer pro-
vides as collateral his net wealth. Credit is allocated for land purchases and the supply of credit to
the farmer depends critically on his net wealth (Shalit & Schmitz, 1982). Thus, land acquisition
decision are made to increase profits and to provide leverage for further land expansion.
7Incentives for managerial risk-taking are widely analyzed in recent CEO compensation literature (e.g., Laeven &
Levine, 2009; Bhagat & Bolton, 2014; Guo et al. , 2015; Uhde, 2015). For example, it is suggested that especially
incentives from variable compensation packages in banks may have provoked a significant increase in managerial
risk-taking and hence, may have been an additional cause of the 2007 global financial crisis (Bebchuk & Spamann,
2009).
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4.5 Econometric Models and Hypothesis Testing
4.5.1 Dynamic Growth Model
By the convergence literature, economists typically refer to the large literature on “β-convergence”,
when the partial correlation between growth in income over time and its initial level is negative.
By contrast, Gibrat’s law of proportionate effect states that the proportional rate of growth of a
firm is independent of its absolute size. The law of proportionate growth gives rise to a distribution
that is log-normal and growth rates follow a random walk (Prais, 1976). Thus, growth is a purely
stochastic process that arises from the cumulative effect of the random operation of a multitude of
forces acting independently of each other.
In this study, I extend the simple test for Gibrat’s law by introducing a vector of indepen-
dent variables including a profit measurement. An econometric expression of the question can be
specified by estimating
ln(sizei,t)− ln(sizei,t−1) = θ + βln(sizei,t−1) + δalphai,t + x′i,tγ + λt + ηi + i,t, (4.3)
where sizeit denotes total farm size of farm i in year t. A vector of structural exogenous variables
(xi,t) are selected in order to reflect personal characteristics, farm structure and performance. To
characterize the entrepreneur, age, time horizon, labor input of family members and off-farm in-
come have been taken into account. Farm structure is reflected by the variables: soil type, location,
solvency, liquidity, financial efficiency.
The measure of profitability (alphai,t) is the operator’s share of net farm income adjusted by
farm size and soil productivity, which is simply defined as the residuals of a regression of excess
ratio on farm size and soil productivity (see section 4). Constructing the excess measure in this
way, it describes the level of managerial compensation by further factors beyond farm size and soil
productivity, in particular by differences in managerial talents and quality. Note, that I perform the
regressions using different profitability measures for subsamples of total tillable land, cash rented
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land and self-owned land during further sensitivity analysis in Section 7.
A further ingredient of the regression model is a time dummy, which captures systematic
shocks (λt) affecting aggregate production functions across the board. ηi is a individual effect
that is unobservable. i,t denotes farm-specific time-varying shock in year t.
The above equation can be rewritten as:
ln(sizei,t) = θ + β¯ln(sizei,t−1) + δalphai,t + x′i,tγ + λt + ηi + i,t, (4.4)
where β¯ = 1 + β
As shown by figure 4.5, alphai,t is potentially correlated with the error term in the dynamic pro-
cess. In order to handle potential endogeneity problem in the above regression analysis,E(alphai,t) =
alphai,t−1 is used as a proxy for alphai,t. Note that profit predictability arises from the momentum
effect (Li & Paulson, 2014). By assumption, the error term is not correlated with alphai,t−1 and
therefore alphai,t−1 is an exogenous variable.
Note that Gibrat’s law requires that β¯ = 1. In addition, the value of β¯ has important im-
plications for economic concentration. If β¯ = 1, the random process will result in increasing
concentration over time. If β¯ > 1, the system is explosive and concentration will increase rapidly.
Only if β¯ is sufficiently less than 1, will the decrease of concentration tend to offset the effects
of the random process. This indicates that small farms grow faster than large farms and implies
“β-convergence”.
A problem arises with the dynamic panel data (DPD) model. If growth rates are serially corre-
lated (i.e., the regressors are correlated with the lagged dependent variable), then the OLS estimate
of β¯ and γ are inconsistent and biased. The instrumental variables estimator is usually considered.
The “internal” instruments for the lagged dependent variable can be constructed from the second
and third lags of instrumented variable, either in the form of differences or lagged levels. If error
is i.i.d., those lags of instrumented variable will be highly correlated with the lagged dependent
variable (and its difference) but uncorrelated with the composite error process.
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Arellano and Bond (AB) method is implemented for the present study because this approach is
based on the notion that the instrumental variables approach does not exploit all of the information
available in the sample (Arellano & Bond, 1991). AB approach constructs more efficient estimates
of the DPD model in a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) context.
Consider equation (4), where one lag of the dependent variable is included as a regressor
(time dummies are exclude for illustration purpose). Taking the first difference of this equation to
eliminate the farm-specific effect (ηi),
∆ln(sizeit) = β∆ln(sizeit−1) + δ∆alphai,t + ∆xitγ + ∆i,t, (4.5)
where ∆ln(sizeit) = ln(sizeit) − ln(sizeit−1), ∆αit = αit − αit−1, ∆xit = xit − xit−1, and
∆it = it − it−1. Least squares are inconsistent because ∆it is correlated with ∆ln(sizeit−1).
The GMM estimator uses an instrument matrix of the form
Z =

ln(sizei1) 0 0 ... 0 ... 0
0 ln(sizei1) ln(sizei2) ... 0 ... 0
. . . ... . ... .
0 0 0 ... ln(sizei1) ... ln(sizei,T−2)

where rows correspond to the first-differenced equations for periods t=3,4,...,T for individual i, and
exploit the moment conditions
E[Z ′i∆i] = 0 (4.6)
where ∆i = (∆i3,∆i4, ...,∆iT )′.
In general, the asymptotically efficient GMM estimator based on this set of moment conditions
minimizes the criterion
JN = (
1
N
N∑
i=1
∆′iZi)
′WN(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Z ′i∆i) (4.7)
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The optimal weighting matrix WN can be calculated from the variance of the error terms (it) for
the one-step AB estimator and using an initial known weighting matrix of the one-step estimator
for the two-step AB estimator. The two-step AB estimator is consistent and asymptotically efficient
in the presence of heteroskedasticity.
4.5.2 Choice Behavior Model
How much land to control and how to acquire it are two of the most important decisions to be
made by any farmer. Errors made at this point may plague the business for many years. Too little
land may mean the business is too small to fully use other resources. At the other extreme, too
much land may require borrowing a large amount of money, cause serious cash flow problems, and
overextend the operators’s management capacity. Either situation can result in financial stress and
eventual failure of the business.
Instead of anecdotal stories in many studies with special attention given to land tenure choices,
this section turns to econometric analysis by offering a quick glance at some of the empirical
patterns that can be brought to bear on the relationship between natural resources, farm growth,
and some of the main determinants of growth, including profitability. Probit model is estimated
using the maximum likelihood method to analyze the potential impacts on the appropriate rate of
land acquisition.
Pr(y = 1 | X) = Φ(X ′β) (4.8)
In this model, farm growth (y) is measured as a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the
area and production size both increased by at least 5% (Bremmer et al. , 2002). The average farm
growth rate is 3% for all Illinois farms. Explanatory variables (X) include a vector of farm/operator
specific variables.
An approach that extends the probit model to account for endogeneity was proposed by Rivers
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& Vuong (1988), assuming the following usual triangular system:
y2i = 1(Xiβ + y1iγ + i > 0) (4.9)
y1i = Xiδ + Zipi + vi (4.10)
where y1i is the vector of explanatory variables excluding endogeneous variable (initial farm size
ln(size)i,t−1) and including control variables (Xi) and instrumental variables Zi (with ln(size)it−2
instrumenting ln(size)i,t−1). The jointly normally distributed error terms correlate. A simple
procedure that estimates this model is the following two-step approach. First regress y1i on Xi and
Zi. Collect the residuals vˆi. The second step involves estimating the probit model of interest, and
including the first stage residuals as an additional regressor. This method has also been termed the
control function approach, as the inclusion of vˆi controls for the correlation between vi and i.
There is a full range of possible roles for a farmer in land acquisition (see Appendix D). One
possibility is through land ownership. About 20% of Illinois farmland is owned by the operator.
At the other end of the spectrum, the farmer pays the rent with a cash lease, or on a crop share
basis. Many farmers find a combination of ownership and leasing to be desirable. What is most
important is for the farmer to decide how involved he or she wants to be and pursue an agreement
that meets that desire.
In the multinomial probit model, The probability that subject i will choose alternative j is:
Prij = Pr(yi = j | X) = Φ(x′ijβ). (4.11)
The observations yi, for i = 1...n, of the outcomes of three-way choices from a categorical distri-
bution. The observed land choice outcomes - cash rent lease, crop share lease, and full ownership
- are treated as classifying an observation into one of the categories. The purpose of the model
is to estimate the likelihood that an observation with particular farm characteristics will fall into
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a specific category (acreage share choice made for each farm) where the chosen outcome is de-
fined as the maximum acreage among the three observations of the farm. The alternative-invariant
regressors (e.g. profitability) vary over the individual i but do not vary over the alternative j.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Testing the Dynamic Growth Model
In this section, I examine the trends in concentration in the Illinois agricultural sector, the effects
of the profitability estimate on the process of land acquisition, and the role of means of controlling
more acres. I assume that the size distribution of farms is (approximately) log normal in order to
examine concentration in terms of the variance of logarithms of farm size. The relevant estimations
are provided in the first column of table 4.5.
First-differencing the equation removes the individual effect and its associated omitted-variable
bias, implying unobserved heterogeneity. The two-steps GMM estimators are used. The number
of optimal maximum lags is 4, which is indicated by Sargan tests. Changes in farm size are
instrumented with two to four year lagged values for farm size. Time dummies and regional effects
are included in all equations. The Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent
variables asymptotically distributed as χ2k under the null of no relationship, where k is the number
of coefficients estimated (excluding time dummies).
The result suggest that Gibrat’s law is rejected, leading to the distribution are unlikely to be
completely random. Negative serial correlation is observed. The estimate of β¯ is less than unity,
which indicates that small farms do grow faster than large farms. However, the effects of random-
ness are sufficiently important to ensure that concentration in agriculture continues to increase.
Thus, the tendency for farm sizes to regress toward the mean is not strong enough to overcome the
effects of “spontaneous drift.”
The sign of profitability measurement (alphai,t−1) is significantly positive, which support the
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hypothesis that farm acreage expansion is dependent on farm return. In other words, returns have
systemic influence on the accumulation decision. All the variables in personal characteristics are
not significant. Specifically, age has a negative impact on farm size expanding while household
size and non-farm income have positive impacts on land accumulation.
In addition, better soil quality can have a positive impact on land expansion rate. While the
positive correlations may reflect the nature of persistent farm-specific advantages, it may also
reflect the increased urbanization. Farms that expand the most are located in central and northern
Illinois, where growth is related to better soil quality compared to southern part of Illinois. Also,
proximity to an urban area (e.g. the greater Chicago metropolitan area in northern/northeastern
Illinois) may allow producers to find a profitable market and increase the pool of labor available.
Finally, financial conditions are important factors, because the liquidity and solvency will de-
termine a long-run land acquisition decision. Results suggest that financial condition indicators
suggest that better liquidity, solvency, and operating efficiency have positive impact on land acqui-
sition, among which both debt-to-asset ratio and asset-turnover ratio signs are significant. These
findings suggest that farms that have better efficiency and financial feasibility are able to have
larger financial fundings to acquire larger farmland through holding more debt.
4.6.2 Testing the Choice Behavior Model
Table 4.6 presents the probit model estimation results. The results are consistent with the dynamic
approach results presented in the previous table. The findings show that an increase in profitability
of a farm makes the expedited farm expansion more likely. One of the challenges of using probit
model is that the interpretation of the magnitude of coefficients is not available. To gain some
insights on the results, I also report the marginal effects after reporting the coefficients.8 The
marginal effect of farm profitability reflects that in 1996-2014, a 0.1% increase in the probability
of farm size growths greater than 5% (roughly an additional 50 acres in farm size) given a 1
unit change in the profitability indicator. The findings suggest that increases in the profitability
8The marginal effects are estimated as the average of the individual marginal effects. δp/δxj =
∑
F ′(X′β)
n βj .
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accelerate land expansion behavior in farmland markets, exacerbating a market concentration.
The two basic types of leases commonly used for renting agricultural land are cash rent and
crop share. Each has some advantages and disadvantages to the owner and the tenant. The results
in in table 4.9 tell the same story. Recall from figure 4.6 that family owned land acreage was pretty
stable at the rate below 20%. The first three columns show farmers’ most preferred outcomes
among three land control choices (crop share lease, cash rent lease, full ownership). The choice
frequency of cash rent lease increases, while the frequency of crop share lease declines moderately.
During the sample period, the frequency of full ownership is relatively stable.
It is also evident that more profitable farms have a greater proportion of rented land. The grow-
ing reliance on cash leasing results in simpler, more flexible bidding opportunities for expanding
leased acreage. The findings show that, in 1996-2014, an increase in profitability of a farm makes
it more likely that the farm acquires larger land through cash leases, and less likely for owning
land. However, the likelihood varies in different years. For instance, an increase of farm return
makes the selection of cash rent type more likely in relation to the selection of owned land. More
profitable farms are more likely to choose cash rent lease in comparison to crop share lease in
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2014. Moreover, there
is less likelihood by profitable farms to choose full ownership as a means of obtaining control of
land throughout the sample years.
4.7 Robustness Checks
In the last section, I conduct an extensive set of tests to determine the reinvesting strategies of
farmers. One should note, however, that many issues could complicate the interpretation of my
results above. For example, farms may have diversified management styles and procedures. If
so, this could bias the results, which have rested on the assumption of homogeneous management
factors. In this section, I explore these concerns and test whether my results are sensitive to changes
in the nature of the land control means, to the set of participants in the FBFM survey records, or to
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the subperiods included in the analysis. In general, I show that my main findings in this paper are
robust to changes in these parameters.
4.7.1 Land-control Means
Although the validity of the farm growth theory has been well assessed by means of econometric
models, it is difficult to determine the explanatory power of it on the basis of empirical farm data.
For example, grouping landlords with owner-operators can cause aggregation bias given the limi-
tation of FBFM data. Therefore, explicit modeling of subgroups of farms by taking into account
land-control means could enhance understanding of farm performance. Under fixed cash rent, the
tenant pays the landlord a fixed return for use of the land and assumes all financial risks associated
with production. A crop-share agreement splits both risk and returns among the tenant and land-
lord as they typically share in both the realized revenues from and costs associated with production
based on agreed upon share rates. While the specific attributes of share rental agreements vary, the
general structure is one in which the tenant provides labor and machinery, the landlord provides
the land, and both parties share in the revenues from, and other costs (e.g., variable inputs) asso-
ciated with, crop production. The risk-reward tradeoff between fixed cash rent contracts and crop
share agreements is well known, and equally documented in the theoretical literature on tenancy
contracts (e.g., Allen & Lueck, 1992a,b; Stiglitz, 1974).
As a robustness check, I form two subgroups of farms based on whether their land is cash-
rented or self-owned. To explore the sensitivity of my results, I compare the results under these
two subgroups and for the whole sample as shown in my previous results. Results are shown in
column (2) and (3) of table 4.5, table 4.7, and table 4.8. The main findings, with a few exceptional
cases that arrive at the opposite conclusions, are almost identical to the baseline results in the last
section, especially the significantly sign of profitability measurement, which support the hypothe-
sis that farm acreage expansion is dependent on farm return. In other words, returns have systemic
influence on the accumulation decision. Among different land-control means categories, results
strongly support that more profitable farms tend to acquire larger land more aggressively.
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4.7.2 Length of Data Records
A major concern is to determine the different farm management styles of farms with long-term
FBFM records compared to relatively “short-lived” operations. It is possible that this can lead to
nontrivial heteroskedasticity in the cross-section of estimates. The analysis can indicate the results
of management decisions of making profits and creating financial stability over the past periods.
Hence, the sample of farms for this study was subdivided into two groups (a) farms that present
for more than 10 years and (b) farms that present for all years in the full data sample. Table 4.10 -
4.12 report the findings and they strongly indicate that land accumulation behavior remains similar
to the above baseline results.
4.7.3 Subperiods Dependence
I proceed and analyze the short-term effect of profitability incentives through excess ratio measure-
ment with a special emphasis on the structural change of commodity prices. To further examine
whether the farm management styles change over the sample period, I examine two subperiods of
roughly equal lengths, namely 1996-2005 and 2006-2014. The rapid rise in corn prices that began
in the fall of 2006 coincided with exponential growth in U.S. corn ethanol production. At about
the same time, new ethanol consumption mandates were added to existing ethanol import tariffs
and price subsidies. Droughts, floods, a severe U.S. recession, and two general commodity price
surges have also occurred since 2006. Therefore, focus is placed on the more recent post-2006 pe-
riods characterized by high commodity price levels and volatility. I find that the baseline findings
are reconfirmed for the subperiods (see table 4.13 - 4.16).
4.7.4 Profit Measurements
In unreported tests, I repeat tests among several profit measurements (e.g., non-adjusted operator
and land return, management return, and management return ratio), and find that all measurements
exhibit strong growth pattern. For the sake of brevity, I do not include results for the dynamic
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model and the probit model categorized by profit measurements, but these results are very similar
to the baseline results above and are available from the author upon request.
On the whole I find that, in every case, I arrive at exactly the same conclusion about manage-
ment style, especially in land accumulation decision under wealth effect, which is substantially
different from past farm management studies which focus on the effects of resources and internal
farm structure on profitability. Thus, the testings perform consistently across different types of
data inclusion rules.
4.8 Conclusions
This paper makes three main contribution to the literature. First, I use FBFM records to com-
pare the performances of different groups for empirical tests by creating an innovative approach to
measure farm return. A beneficial feature of my dataset is that the longitudinal data allow me to to
observe a sufficiently long time horizon for each of the farm in the sample. I then uses empirical
testing approaches involving dynamic approach and choice behavior models. These approaches
build on the theoretical analysis of farm growth and land accumulation. A benefit of these esti-
mation models used in this paper is that they can decompose the dynamic farm growth function
by separately analyzing how farm growth responds to changes in operator characteristics, farm
structure and financial conditions. Especially, this feature allows me to decompose the profitabil-
ity effect. One limitation of discrete choice model is that the interpretation of the magnitude of
coefficients is not available.
The hypothesis that farm acreage expansion is dependent on farm return is supported by the
evidence found in this study. Farm profitability have systemic influence on the accumulation de-
cision and hence upon the land tenure. As farm size increases, the ratio of cash rented acreage to
total land size increases, while the proportion of crop share lease declines moderately. During the
sample period, the proportion of land owned by the operator is relatively stable. It is also evident
that more profitable farms have a greater proportion of rented land. The growing reliance on cash
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leasing results in simpler, more flexible bidding opportunities for expanding leased acreage. Un-
der cash leases, landlords may also achieve more stable returns over time, adjust more easily to
ownership costs of changing land values, eliminate sharing of operating expenses, avoid manage-
ment participation and crop-marketing decisions, remain eligible for social security payments at
retirement.
I conclude that there is greater concentration in the agricultural sector, and subsequent research
should be directed toward explaining this systematic tendency. Gibrat’s law is rejected for Illinois
farms. However, the effects of randomness are sufficiently important to ensure that concentration
in agriculture continues to increase. Thus, the tendency for farm sizes to regress toward the mean
is not strong enough to overcome the effects of “spontaneous drift.”
As Lund (1983) notes, there has been no generally accepted measure of scale in the economics
literature to guide the choice in agricultural studies. The most commonly employed agricultural
measure, geographical land area managed, may be inappropriate for capturing differences in farm-
ing systems (e.g., the size of intensive livestock production). The preceding results were derived
by pooling farms of all types. To examine whether the results were sensitive to this pooling, it
is meaningful to conduct robustness check for selected subsamples, e.g., livestock farms. Also,
research into causes and effects is continuing.
Since several fundamental issues are addressed simultaneously, the systematic tendency of
modern agricultural production will have important policy implications. An innovative aspect
of this study is that it brings together these qualitative, quantitative, and institutional sources of
information to paint a more complete picture of farm growth in the United States.
4.8.1 Policy Implications
From a policy perspective, my results exhibit wealth effect on farm leasing systems and farmland
market, which helps to determine the ability of farms to invest and grow, with effects on boom/bust
cycles in farmland market and total production levels. Understanding the relationship between
farm profitability and land accumulation will help government to better evaluate the effects of its
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policies on farmland, government programs and economic growth.
Since 2009, wealth in the U.S. farm sector has surged along with booming farmland values.
Similar to non-farm households, farm enterprises historically have used wealth to support con-
sumption and investments when income fades. During years of low income, farmers tap their
existing wealth to finance spending on capital investments.
According to the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis, farmers are expected to include
possible income fluctuations into their lifetime income and plan consumption levels that will be
consistent over their lifetime. One possible explanation is that farm households are less liquidity
constrained. During income fluctuations, farm households can use their land as collateral to obtain
credit to make additional income during low income years (Langemeier & Patrick, 1993). Thus,
similar to non-farm households, the wealth effect often leads to sharp increases in debt and leverage
in farm enterprises. For instance, a farmer with good equity position may borrow in a low income
year and expect to repay debt in a high income year. Historically, the sharp accumulation of debt
has preceded financial crises.
One explanation for farm households to keep their latent consumption levels during transitory
income changes is that the U.S. government provides additional funding sources through federal
farm support programs to help them in their low income years. For instance, the 2002 farm bill
helps to stabilize and support farm income through direct payments, loan programs, and counter
cyclical programs. Following the 2002 farm bill, the 2008 farm bill provides farmers protection
against revenue shortfalls under Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) payments. In addition,
programs such as Agricultural Risk Coverage - County Coverage (ARC-CO) and Price Loss Cov-
erage (PLC) are offered under the 2014 Farm Bill.
These farm programs play an important role in financial management of crop farms by allow-
ing farms to mitigate a large share of production risk. However, economic theory suggests that
increasing farm financial security may have unintended consequences if farmers might be more
willing to take on more risk due to risk balancing effects (Featherstone et al. , 1988). Therefore,
the efficiency of federally subsidized crop insurance as a mechanism to reduce risk for agricultural
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producers is unclear. For example, Gabriel & Baker (1980) demonstrate that as the variability of
net cash flows decreases (business risk), farmers may increase borrowing (increase financial risk).
Ifft et al. (2013) demonstrate that farms with federal crop insurance have a greater average prob-
ability of default. Recently, land rental agreements, particularly in the Corn Belt, have trended
away from crop share agreements towards fixed cash leases (Paulson et al. , 2013). If expansion
of crop insurance program offerings has led to or allowed a shift towards the riskier fixed cash rent
agreements, then the risk reduction benefits provided through the subsidization of crop insurance
may be overestimated. At least a portion of the risk reduction gains resulting from crop insurance
program subsidization could be mitigated by the resulting shift in other forms of risky behavior.
Viewed from a public policy perspective, this suggests that the availability of government pro-
grams may lead to riskier management behavior. Thus, it may be worth analyzing the components
of farm profitability and how farm leasing contract choices change in the absence of government
payments to farmers. This would also provide explicit information regarding the extent of success
farm bills have in smoothing farm household income during financial fluctuations.
The theoretical arguments of risk balancing effect can be used to justify higher bids for cash
rents and upward pressure on the average rental rates paid by farm operations. The benefits the
farm safety net may be capitalized in rental rates and passed from the tenant to the landowner.
Thus, this suggests that the subsidy dollars and other taxpayer costs associated with the crop in-
surance program may impact producer management decisions which increase other sources of
business risk- specifically those associated with land costs.
Policy makers should also investigate benefits and risk factors among different farmland leasing
contract choices to help farmers make better business decisions. For instance, the risk-reducing
attribute of the crop-share lease has been evidenced for the farm operator, while the cash rent
contract is the favorable contract to the landlord. Boumtje et al. (2001) argue that “the combination
of cash and share leasing” characterizing most of the solutions produces a farm-level effect similar
to the flexible cash contract – which appears to be the equilibrium contract. Paulson et al. (2012)
also find that flexible cash leases can manage additional risk exposure of nominal financial risk
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caused by increasing production costs, including land costs. Based on these studies, it is worth
revisiting the potential for the use of flexible cash leases as an alternative to fixed cash leases or
crop share agreements.
Technological changes in agriculture radically changed the optimal size of the farm. Regardless
of the factors determining the boundaries of feasible farm sizes, the price of farmland and access
to credit markets determine the ability of producers to reach an efficient farm size. The boom/bust
cycle increases the collateral risk facing lenders and, hence, increases the interest rate that must be
charged on real estate debt. Thus, policy makers should focus on stabilizing farm income growth
to obtaining an efficient farm size.
Perhaps most importantly, policies that involve farm income should focus on permanent but
not transitory income changes because farm households can easily smooth their income and will
only adjust their consumption and investment based on permanent agricultural structural changes.
Past cycles in U.S. agriculture suggest that U.S. farm booms go bust when leverage ratios and
farm bankruptcies spike. Although rising debt levels are an important contributor to farm solvency
issues, sharp declines in farm real estate values and assets, have been the primary trigger of farm
insolvency and bankruptcy. The prospects of lower farm incomes and higher interest rates in the
future raise concerns about future farm wealth. Thus, policies on farm households should account
for the possibility that farm expansion behavior is determined by permanent structural changes.
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4.9 Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics, 1996 through 2014
All Farms North Central South
Number of farms 9,831 1,729 3,919 1,054
Total acres per farm 984 938 1,059 1,252
Soil-productivity rating 79.51 80.69 85.78 57.67
Corn yield (bu/acre) 162.20 162.70 168.20 134.00
Corn price ($/bu) 3.18 3.17 3.24 3.09
Soybean yield (bu/acre) 48.75 49.30 50.72 43.09
Soybean price ($/bu) 6.04 5.84 6.17 6.30
Crop revenue ($/acre) 529.10 557.93 547.23 437.60
Other government payment ($/acre) 49.90 30.35 27.46 24.60
Gross revenue 579.00 588.28 574.69 462.20
($ per acre)
Total direct costs 161.39 170.39 165.82 141.53
Soil fertility 67.00 68.30 68.51 63.12
Pesticides 36.28 38.11 37.01 32.57
Seed 45.79 48.40 47.10 40.75
Drying and storage 12.32 15.58 13.20 5.09
Total power and equipment costs 97.98 100.74 85.40 89.69
Machinery hire/lease 14.10 17.25 10.89 9.92
Utility 7.92 6.87 6.03 5.85
Machinery repairs 23.64 24.42 20.21 23.15
Fuel and oil 17.28 17.40 15.75 17.23
Light vehicle 3.14 3.50 2.43 2.04
Machinery depreciation 31.90 31.30 30.09 31.50
Total overhead costs 94.16 86.92 83.47 77.01
Hired labor 13.33 8.70 10.21 12.70
Building repair and rent 7.54 6.81 5.32 5.10
Building depreciation 7.08 6.82 5.33 5.86
Insurance 20.21 20.42 20.32 16.20
Miscellaneous 8.03 7.37 7.28 6.62
Interest (non-land) 37.97 36.80 35.01 30.53
Total non-land costs (353.53) (358.05) (334.69) (308.23)
Operator and land return 225.47 230.23 240.00 153.97
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Table 4.2: Selected Characteristics of the Sample, 1996 through 2014
Statistic Definition Mean St. Dev.
yldCorn Corn Yield 166.33 33.95
prCorn Corn Price 3.24 1.41
yldBean Soybean Yield 50.19 10.47
prBean Soybean Price 4.44 4.57
mgtRet Management Return 51.81 175.67
opRet Operator Return 203.02 187.05
cstTotal Total Cost 566.56 301.82
lanTotal Land Cost 149.58 70.60
lanRent Rental Cost 65.50 65.35
acrT il Total Farm Size 930.33 565.41
acrCash Cash Rented Size 347.32 420.70
acrShare Share Leased Size 436.05 428.49
acrOwn Owned Size 717.63 664.42
hhNum Household Size 3.07 1.43
age Operator’s Age 61.29 10.69
NonfarmInc Non-farm Income 37,291.75 71,518.02
spr Soil Productivity Rate 81.89 10.89
CurrentRatio Current Ratio 13.43 94.85
D/A Debt-asset Rate 30.45 22.65
AssetTurnover Asset Turnover 0.38 0.25
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Table 4.3: Average Profitability Measurement, 1996 through 2014
Year N Return Cost Ratio (%)
1996 5,454 164.50 369.90 48.15
1997 5,517 107.99 424.77 29.44
1998 5,223 45.85 420.92 13.66
1999 5,128 83.19 416.80 22.73
2000 5,056 97.26 433.08 26.20
2001 4,964 82.44 434.00 21.41
2002 4,966 80.48 423.74 21.85
2003 4,896 137.14 416.56 36.14
2004 4,871 160.72 442.92 39.61
2005 4,601 113.42 467.24 26.94
2006 4,369 150.44 499.15 34.22
2007 4,365 286.73 561.86 55.96
2008 4,313 286.32 655.84 47.92
2009 4,261 141.71 725.20 24.00
2010 4,200 287.61 709.50 44.74
2011 4,130 381.52 792.92 51.36
2012 4,021 392.01 880.34 47.84
2013 4,027 224.61 924.55 27.02
2014 4,227 204.63 907.18 24.57
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Table 4.4: Farms with Significant Alpha Estimates
Panel A: Excess Ratio Regression
Number of farms with usable data 4,157
Number of farms with positive alpha 1,636
Percentage of farms with positive alpha 39.35%
Number of farms with non-significant alpha 1,836
Percentage of farms with non-significant alpha 44.17%
Number of farms with negative alpha 685
Percentage of farms with negative alpha 16.48%
Panel B: Excess Ratio Regression Adjusted by Farm Characteristics
Number of farms with usable data 4,157
Number of farms with positive alpha 263
Percentage of farms with positive alpha 6.32%
Number of farms with non-significant alpha 1,621
Percentage of farms with non-significant alpha 54.39%
Number of farms with negative alpha 2,414
Percentage of farms with negative alpha 58.07%
Note: t-test is applied for each farm across more than 10-
year-period observations.
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Table 4.5: AB Estimates (all variables in first differences), 1996 through 2014
Dependent variable: ln(size)it
(1) (2) (3)
ln(acrT il)it ln(acrCash)it ln(acrOwn)it
ln(size)i,t−1 0.366∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.093) (0.108)
alphai,t-1 0.00018∗∗ 0.00081∗∗∗ 0.00033∗∗∗
(0.00010) (0.00033) (0.00010)
hhNumit 0.002 0.014 −0.00021
(0.003) (0.013) (0.003)
ageit −0.010 −0.002 −0.005
(0.017) (0.004) (0.014)
NonfarmIncit 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
sprit 0.002 0.002 0.00093
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
CurrentRatioit 0.00001 0.00002 0.00001
(0.00000) (0.00004) (0.00002)
D/Ait 0.002
∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.00042) (0.001) (0.00046)
AssetTurnoverit 0.528
∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.091) (0.051)
RegionNorthit 0.043 0.038 0.047
(0.036) (0.045) (0.031)
RegionCentralit 0.064
∗∗∗ 0.029 0.045∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.043) (0.021)
Time effects Y Y Y
Observations used 6,194 4,620 6,194
Sargan test 49.355 (47) 36.36 (47) 54.717 (47)
Autocorrelation test (1) Normal=−2.866 Normal=−4.313 Normal=−2.382
Autocorrelation test (2) Normal=1.495 Normal=1.004 Normal=1.127
Wald test for coefficients 119.687 (11) 145.914 (11) 177.048 (11)
Wald test for time dummies 110.546 (17) 67.679 (17) 170.177 (17)
Note: 1. Standard deviation in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
2. ln(size)i,t−1 represents ln(acrT il)i,t−1, ln(acrCash)i,t−1, or ln(acrOwn)i,t−1,
respectively, for its associated column.
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Table 4.6: Probit Model Estimates for Total Farm Size, 1996 through 2014
Dependent variable: y = ln(acrT il)i,t−ln(acrT il)i,t−1
ln(acrT il)i,t−1
× 100%
y = 1, if growth rate>5%;
y = 0, otherwise Average marginal effect
ln(acrT il)i,t−1 −0.00002 −0.00000
(0.00003)
alphai,t-1 0.001 0.00021
(0.001)
hhNumit 0.008 0.002
(0.012)
ageit −0.018∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.002)
NonfarmIncit 0.00000 0.00000
(0.00000)
sprit −0.002 −0.00043
(0.002)
CurrentRatioit 0.0003∗ 0.00008
(0.0002)
D/Ait 0.007∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.001)
AssetTurnoverit 0.370∗∗∗ 0.090
(0.080)
RegionNorthit 0.064 0.016
(0.056)
RegionCentralit 0.074 0.018
(0.054)
Constant −0.172 −0.042
(0.182)
Observations 9,377 9,377
Log Likelihood −4,109.209 −
Akaike Inf. Crit. 8,244.419 −
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.7: Probit Model Estimates for Cash Rented Land Size, 1996 through 2014
Dependent variable: y = ln(acrCash)i,t−ln(acrCash)i,t−1
ln(acrCash)i,t−1
× 100%
y = 1, if growth rate>5%;
y = 0, otherwise Average marginal effect
ln(acrCash)i,t−1 −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.00014
(0.00005)
alphai,t-1 0.001 0.00042
(0.001)
hhNumit 0.002 0.00064
(0.012)
ageit −0.010∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.002)
NonfarmIncit 0.00000∗∗∗ 0.00000
(0.00000)
sprit 0.002 0.00059
(0.002)
CurrentRatioit −0.0001 −0.00002
(0.0002)
D/Ait 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001)
AssetTurnoverit 0.701∗∗∗ 0.208
(0.085)
RegionNorthit 0.039 0.012
(0.059)
RegionCentralit 0.047 0.014
(0.057)
Constant −0.590∗∗∗ −0.175
(0.189)
Observations 7,503 7,503
Log Likelihood −3,953.318 −
Akaike Inf. Crit. 7,932.635 −
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.8: Probit Model Estimates for Owned Land Size, 1996 through 2014
Dependent variable: y = ln(acrOwn)i,t−ln(acrOwn)i,t−1
ln(acrOwn)i,t−1
× 100%
y = 1, if growth rate>5%;
y = 0, otherwise Average marginal effect
ln(acrOwn)i,t−1 −0.0003∗∗ −0.00007
(0.0001)
alphai,t-1 0.002∗ 0.00044
(0.001)
hhNumit −0.028∗∗ −0.007
(0.014)
ageit −0.014∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.002)
NonfarmIncit 0.00000 0.00000
(0.00000)
sprit −0.001 −0.00024
(0.002)
CurrentRatioit 0.0002 0.00004
(0.0002)
D/Ait 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001)
AssetTurnoverit −0.642∗∗∗ −0.161
(0.140)
RegionNorthit −0.055 −0.014
(0.061)
RegionCentralit 0.097∗ 0.024
(0.058)
Constant 0.121 0.030
(0.213)
Observations 7,246 7,246
Log Likelihood −3,269.718 −
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,565.436 −
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.9: Multinomial Probit Estimates, 1996 through 2014
Frequency of Each Outcome Coefficient Estimate on Profitability
Reference: acrShare Reference: acrOwn
Year acrShare acrCash acrOwn acrCash acrOwn acrCash acrShare
All years 0.49 0.35 0.15 0.05 −0.33 0.55∗∗∗ 0.47
(0.33) (0.28) (0.18) (0.29)
1996 0.69 0.19 0.11 −0.10 −0.20 0.03 0.19
(0.14) (0.96) (0.19) (0.50)
1997 0.66 0.22 0.11 −0.01 −1.26 (0.02) (0.02)
(0.10) (8.34) (0.12) (0.13)
1998 0.65 0.23 0.10 0.09 −0.004 (0.01) (0.06)
(0.11) (0.04) (0.15) (0.29)
1999 0.62 0.23 0.13 0.01 −0.05 0.56∗∗ 0.45∗∗
(0.09) (0.32) (0.24) (0.19)
2000 0.61 0.25 012 0.07 −0.04 0.43∗∗∗ 0.52
(0.16) (0.17) (0.14) (0.45)
2001 0.54 0.31 0.13 0.08 −0.01 0.17 0.02
(0.15) (0.31) (0.13) (0.32)
2002 0.57 0.30 0.12 0.04 −0.04 0.33∗∗∗ 0.23∗
(0.11) (0.79) (0.11) (0.14)
2003 0.52 0.35 0.12 0.06 −0.001 0.17 0.17
(0.03) (0.09) (0.13) (0.22)
2004 0.47 0.39 0.13 −0.17 −0.46 0.31∗ 0.86
(0.28) (1.22) (0.16) (1.08)
2005 0.49 0.36 0.14 0.09 −0.03 0.35∗∗ 0.20
(0.12) (0.75) (0.15) (0.21)
2006 0.47 0.39 0.13 −0.11 −0.29 0.33∗∗∗ 0.56
(0.18) (0.86) (0.12) (0.55)
2007 0.44 0.41 0.13 −0.16 −0.16 0.034 0.032
(0.08) (0.18) (0.09) 0.04
2008 0.43 0.42 0.14 0.05 −0.16 0.26 0.18
(0.33) (0.48) (0.21) (0.27)
2009 0.41 0.44 0.13 0.05 −0.06 0.27 0.13
(0.21) (0.08) (0.23) (0.30)
2010 0.45 0.39 0.14 0.07 −0.16 0.51∗∗∗ 1.06
(0.26) (0.21) (0.14) (1.25)
2011 0.42 0.43 0.14 −0.14 −0.13 0.00 0.14
(0.18) (0.29) (0.19) (0.50)
2012 0.42 0.44 0.12 0.31 −0.27 0.18 0.66
(0.27) (0.84) (0.12) (0.94)
2013 0.39 0.44 0.15 −0.17 −0.32 0.25∗ 0.52
(0.15) (0.72) (0.13) (0.70)
2014 0.39 0.44 0.15 0.05 −0.12 0.34∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.30) (0.10) (0.12)
Note: 1. Standard deviation in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.10: AB Estimates (farms present for more than 10 years), 1996 through 2014
Dependent variable: ln(size)it
(1) (2) (3)
ln(acrT il)it ln(acrCash)it ln(acrOwn)it
ln(size)i,t−1 0.153 0.430∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.082) (0.101)
alphai,t-1 0.00024∗ 0.00132∗∗∗ 0.00040∗∗∗
(0.00016) (0.00040) (0.00013)
hhNumit −0.002 −0.014 −0.00315
(0.003) (0.015) (0.003)
ageit 0.008 0.079∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.084) (0.007)
NonfarmIncit −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
sprit 0.00066 0.001 0.00028
(0.001) (0.003) (0.00087)
CurrentRatioit 0.00003
∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.00003∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00009) (0.00001)
D/Ait 0.002
∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.00050) (0.001) (0.00057)
AssetTurnoverit 0.510
∗∗∗ 1.099∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.113) (0.056)
RegionNorthit 0.034 0.034 0.047
(0.044) (0.057) (0.038)
RegionCentralit 0.042
∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.020) (0.019) (0.023)
Time effects Y Y Y
Observations used 3,973 3,027 3,973
Sargan test 44.111 (47) 34.811 (47) 37.529 (47)
Autocorrelation test (1) Normal=−1.142 Normal=−3.827 Normal=−2.765
Autocorrelation test (2) Normal=2.065 Normal=1.561 Normal=1.356
Wald test for coefficients 96.159 (11) 120.370 (11) 158.147 (11)
Wald test for time dummies 84.919 (17) 74.983 (17) 142.879 (17)
Note: 1. Standard deviation in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
2. All variables in first differences.
3. ln(size)i,t−1 represents ln(acrT il)i,t−1, ln(acrCash)i,t−1, or ln(acrOwn)i,t−1,
respectively, for its associated column.
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Table 4.11: Probit Model Estimates (farms present for more than 10 years), 1996 through 2014
Dependent variable: y = ln(size)i,t−ln(size)i,t−1
ln(size)i,t−1
× 100%
y = 1, if growth rate>5%;
y = 0, otherwise
ln(acrT il)it ln(acrCash)it ln(acrOwn)it
ln(size)i,t−1 −0.00000 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0003
(0.00004) (0.0001) (0.0002)
alphai,t-1 0.002∗ 0.002 0.003∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
hhNumit −0.002 0.009 −0.029
(0.017) (0.017) (0.02)
ageit −0.016∗∗∗ −0.005∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NonfarmIncit −0.00000 −0.00000 −0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
sprit −0.0001 0.003 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
CurrentRatioit 0.0005 −0.00004 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
D/Ait 0.006∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
AssetTurnoverit 0.581∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ −0.725∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.122) (0.204)
RegionNorthit −0.019 0.026 −0.137
(0.077) (0.081) (0.086)
RegionCentralit 0.011 0.067 0.046
(0.072) (0.075) (0.079)
Constant −0.465∗ −1.014∗∗∗ 0.268
(0.272) (0.280) (0.312)
Observations 5,189 4,244 3,999
Log Likelihood −2,190.861 −2,155.850 −1,733.669
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,407.72 4,337.70 3,493.34
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.12: Probit Model Estimates (farms present for all years), 1996 through 2014
Dependent variable: y = ln(size)i,t−ln(size)i,t−1
ln(size)i,t−1
× 100%
y = 1, if growth rate>5%;
y = 0, otherwise
ln(acrT il)it ln(acrCash)it ln(acrOwn)it
ln(size)i,t−1 −0.0002 −0.001 −0.007∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.001) (0.00)
alphai,t-1 0.013 0.023∗ 0.009
(0.01) (0.013) (0.02)
hhNumit 0.094 0.257∗∗ −0.104
(0.10) (0.118) (0.13)
ageit −0.017 0.01 0.001
(0.02) (0.026) (0.03)
NonfarmIncit −0.00001 0.00001 −0.00001
(0.00) (0.000) (0.00)
sprit −0.008 −0.0001 −0.063∗∗
(0.02) (0.018) (0.03)
CurrentRatioit −0.050 0.022 0.022
(0.04) (0.022) (0.05)
D/Ait −0.002 −0.001 0.016
(0.01) (0.008) (0.01)
AssetTurnoverit 1.721∗∗∗ 1.971∗∗∗ −4.903∗∗∗
(0.44) (0.467) (1.63)
RegionNorthit −0.441 0.157 0.216
(0.40) (0.474) (0.47)
RegionCentralit −0.225 0.239 0.27
(0.32) (0.416) (0.43)
Constant 0.359 −3.461∗ Constant 6.184∗∗
(1.92) (2.036) (2.66)
Observations 323 244 218
Log Likelihood −118.301 −118.824 −65.823
Akaike Inf. Crit. 262.602 263.648 157.646
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.13: AB Estimates, 1996 through 2005
Dependent variable: ln(size)it
(1) (2) (3)
ln(acrT il)it ln(acrCash)it ln(acrOwn)it
ln(size)i,t−1 0.450∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.160) (0.117)
alphai,t-1 0.00048 0.001∗ 0.00024
(0.00020) (0.00056) (0.00019)
hhNumit 0.001 −0.001 0.00017
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ageit 0.009 0.005 0.019
(0.004) (0.011) (0.004)
NonfarmIncit 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
sprit 0.002 0.002 0.00048
(0.002) (0.001) (0.00077)
CurrentRatioit 0.00003
∗∗ 0.00002∗ 0.00001
(0.00001) (0.00009) (0.00002)
D/Ait 0.002
∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.00059) (0.00059) (0.00072)
AssetTurnoverit 0.579
∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.162) (0.077)
RegionNorthit 0.052 0.052 0.050
(0.068) (0.072) (0.056)
RegionCentralit 0.032
∗∗ −0.019 0.023
(0.027) (0.060) (0.026)
Time effects Y Y Y
Observations used 2,701 1,860 2,701
Sargan test 18.061 (20) 15.247 (20) 17.987(20)
Autocorrelation test (1) Normal=−2.467 Normal=−2.988 Normal=−2.749
Autocorrelation test (2) Normal=0.052 Normal=1.279 Normal=-0.363
Wald test for coefficients 92.857 (11) 74.518 (11) 125.699 (11)
Wald test for time dummies 44.849 (8) 34.939 (8) 93.360 (8)
Note: 1. Standard deviation in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
2. All variables in first differences.
3. ln(size)i,t−1 represents ln(acrT il)i,t−1, ln(acrCash)i,t−1, or ln(acrOwn)i,t−1,
respectively, for its associated column.
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Table 4.14: Probit Model Estimates, 1996 through 2005
Dependent variable: y = ln(size)i,t−ln(size)i,t−1
ln(size)i,t−1
× 100%
y = 1, if growth rate>5%;
y = 0, otherwise
ln(acrT il)it ln(acrCash)it ln(acrOwn)it
ln(size)i,t−1 −0.00000 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
alphai,t-1 0.0002 0.003∗∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
hhNumit 0.003 −0.025 0.01
(0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
ageit −0.021∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
NonfarmIncit 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) 0.000
sprit −0.004∗ 0.006∗∗ −0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
CurrentRatioit −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0004
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
D/Ait 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
AssetTurnoverit 0.473∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ −0.374
(0.124) (0.138) (0.244)
RegionNorthit 0.036 0.133 −0.152
(0.083) (0.090) (0.099)
RegionCentralit 0.093 0.077 0.152∗
(0.076) (0.084) (0.086)
Constant 0.346 −0.389 −0.272
(0.292) (0.313) (0.362)
Observations 3878 2925 2891
Log Likelihood −1,838.084 −1,627.971 −1,281.922
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,702.17 3,281.94 2,589.84
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4.15: AB Estimates, 2006 through 2014
Dependent variable: ln(size)it
(1) (2) (3)
ln(acrT il)it ln(acrCash)it ln(acrOwn)it
ln(size)i,t−1 0.315 0.450∗∗∗ 0.086
(0.245) (0.147) (0.210)
alphai,t-1 0.00019 0.00052 0.00035∗∗∗
(0.00020) (0.00047) (0.00013)
hhNumit 0.00037 0.016 −0.00451
(0.008) (0.018) (0.008)
ageit −0.015 −0.001 −0.017
(0.016) (0.003) (0.016)
NonfarmIncit 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
sprit 0.005 0.017 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
CurrentRatioit 0.00000 −0.00005∗ 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00002) (0.00003)
D/Ait 0.002
∗∗∗ −0.001 0.002∗∗∗
(0.00081) (0.001) (0.00074)
AssetTurnoverit 0.572
∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.109) (0.067)
RegionNorthit 0.034 0.001 0.067∗
(0.041) (0.083) (0.035)
RegionCentralit 0.105
∗∗ 0.079 0.089∗
(0.048) (0.059) (0.044)
Time effects Y Y Y
Observations used 2,644 2,107 2,644
Sargan test 17.269 (17) 12.022 (17) 21.328 (17)
Autocorrelation test (1) Normal=−1.170 Normal=−2.661 Normal=−0.415
Autocorrelation test (2) Normal=0.223 Normal=0.236 Normal=0.041
Wald test for coefficients 76.958 (11) 90.547 (11) 104.599 (11)
Wald test for time dummies 56.179 (7) 31.589 (7) 82.558 (7)
Note: 1. Standard deviation in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
2. All variables in first differences.
3. ln(size)i,t−1 represents ln(acrT il)i,t−1, ln(acrCash)i,t−1, or ln(acrOwn)i,t−1,
respectively, for its associated column.
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Table 4.16: Probit Model Estimates, 2006 through 2014
Dependent variable: y = ln(size)i,t−ln(size)i,t−1
ln(size)i,t−1
× 100%
y = 1, if growth rate>5%;
y = 0, otherwise
ln(acrT il)it ln(acrCash)it ln(acrOwn)it
ln(size)i,t−1 −0.00002 −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
alphai,t-1 0.002 0.0003 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
hhNumit −0.033 −0.012 −0.065∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.024)
ageit −0.021∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
NonfarmIncit 0.00000∗∗ 0.00000∗∗∗ 0
0.000 0.000 0.000
sprit −0.001 −0.004 −0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CurrentRatioit 0.0004 −0.0003 0.001∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
D/Ait 0.005∗∗ 0.0001 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
AssetTurnoverit 0.371∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ −0.686∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.146) (0.226)
RegionNorthit 0.07 −0.036 0.027
(0.097) (0.100) (0.101)
RegionCentralit 0.012 0.04 0.123
(0.097) (0.099) (0.100)
Constant −0.045 0.228 0.215
(0.315) (0.320) (0.354)
Observations 3704 3099 2939
Log Likelihood −1,390.451 −1,427.776 −1,292.982
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,806.90 2,881.55 2,611.96
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Figure 4.1: Plots of key variables per region, 1996-2014
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Figure 4.2: Distributions of net farm income, 1996-2014
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Figure 4.3: Distributions of farm size, 1996-2014
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Figure 4.4: County average ratios
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Figure 4.5: Density plots for two groups of farms, 1996-2014
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Figure 4.6: Land tenure changes for two groups of farms, 1996-2014
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Appendix A
Operator and Land Return
The operator and land return is used in the following regression:
OpRetit(per acre)−OpRetjt(per acre) = αi + βZit + µit,
Table A1: One-year Spearman Rank Correlations
Year N Spearman’s ρ p-Value
1996-1997 2224 0.40 0.000
1997-1998 1960 0.41 0.000
1998-1999 1822 0.41 0.000
1999-2000 1827 0.48 0.000
2000-2001 1917 0.51 0.000
2001-2002 2022 0.48 0.000
2002-2003 2424 0.43 0.000
2003-2004 2361 0.46 0.000
2004-2005 1880 0.49 0.000
2005-2006 1899 0.44 0.000
2006-2007 2467 0.48 0.000
2007-2008 2151 0.46 0.000
2008-2009 1710 0.32 0.000
2009-2010 1820 0.35 0.000
2010-2011 2041 0.45 0.000
2011-2012 1737 0.45 0.000
2012-2013 1444 0.29 0.000
2013-2014 1416 0.46 0.000
Average 1951 0.43 −
H0: αt and αt+1 are independent.
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Table A2: One-year Contingency Table
Y eart+1 Percentage p-Value for p-Value for
of Repeated Fisher’s Exact Pearson’s
Winners (%) Test χ2 Test
Y eart L W
1996 L 715 397
W 397 715 64.30 0.000 0.000
1997 L 625 355
W 355 625 63.78 0.000 0.000
1998 L 593 318
W 318 593 65.09 0.000 0.000
1999 L 621 292
W 292 622 68.13 0.000 0.000
2000 L 658 300
W 300 659 68.79 0.000 0.000
2001 L 675 336
W 336 675 66.77 0.000 0.000
2002 L 770 442
W 442 770 63.53 0.000 0.000
2003 L 795 385
W 385 796 67.46 0.000 0.000
2004 L 639 301
W 301 639 67.98 0.000 0.000
2005 L 621 328
W 328 622 65.54 0.000 0.000
2006 L 838 395
W 395 839 68.05 0.000 0.000
2007 L 712 363
W 363 713 66.33 0.000 0.000
2008 L 514 341
W 341 514 60.12 0.000 0.000
2009 L 562 348
W 348 562 61.76 0.000 0.000
2010 L 671 349
W 349 672 65.88 0.000 0.000
2011 L 567 301
W 301 568 65.44 0.000 0.000
2012 L 436 286
W 286 436 60.39 0.000 0.000
2013 L 471 237
W 237 471 66.53 0.000 0.000
Average 65.32
1. H0: the relative proportions of Y eart are independent of Y eart+1.
2. Fisher’s exact test is a statistical significance test used in the analysis of contingency tables. With large samples,
a Pearson’s chi-squared test can be used.
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Table A3: Four-year Spearman Rank Correlations
Y eart Y eart+1 N Spearman’s ρ p-Value
1996-1999 2000-2003 774 0.67 0.000
1997-2000 2001-2004 762 0.67 0.000
1998-2001 2002-2005 732 0.65 0.000
1999-2002 2003-2006 746 0.62 0.000
2000-2003 2004-2007 815 0.66 0.000
2001-2004 2005-2008 808 0.62 0.000
2002-2005 2006-2009 804 0.61 0.000
2003-2006 2007-2010 824 0.64 0.000
2004-2007 2008-2011 813 0.67 0.000
2005-2008 2009-2012 723 0.64 0.000
2006-2009 2010-2013 752 0.65 0.000
2007-2010 2011-2014 733 0.63 0.000
Average 773 0.64 −
H0: αt and αt+1 are independent.
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Table A4: Four-year Contingency Table
Y eart+1 Percentage p-Value for p-Value for
of Repeated Fisher’s Exact Pearson’s
Winners(%) Test χ2 Test
Y eart L W
1996-1999 L 287 100
W 100 287 74.16 0.000 0.000
1997-2000 L 280 101
W 101 280 73.49 0.000 0.000
1998-2001 L 268 98
W 98 268 73.22 0.000 0.000
1999-2002 L 276 97
W 97 276 73.99 0.000 0.000
2000-2003 L 303 104
W 104 304 74.69 0.000 0.000
2001-2004 L 290 114
W 114 290 71.78 0.000 0.000
2002-2005 L 285 117
W 117 285 70.90 0.000 0.000
2003-2006 L 292 120
W 120 292 70.87 0.000 0.000
2004-2007 L 300 106
W 106 301 74.14 0.000 0.000
2005-2008 L 264 97
W 97 265 73.41 0.000 0.000
2006-2009 L 273 103
W 103 273 72.61 0.000 0.000
2007-2010 L 265 101
W 101 266 72.68 0.000 0.000
Average 73.00
1. H0: the relative proportions of Y eart are independent of Y eart+1.
2. Fisher’s exact test is a statistical significance test used in the analysis of contingency tables. With large samples,
a Pearson’s chi-squared test can be used.
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Management Return
I define management return as follows:
mgtRetit($/acre) =
P × Yit − Cit
Acrtili
=
Revit − Cit
Acrtili
,
This management return is used in the following regression:
mgtRetit($/acre)−mgtRetjt($/acre) = αi + βZit + µit,
Table A5: One-year Spearman Rank Correlations
Year N Spearman’s ρ p-Value
1996-1997 2224 0.43 0.000
1997-1998 1960 0.48 0.000
1998-1999 1822 0.47 0.000
1999-2000 1827 0.46 0.000
2000-2001 1917 0.52 0.000
2001-2002 2022 0.49 0.000
2002-2003 2424 0.45 0.000
2003-2004 2361 0.48 0.000
2004-2005 1880 0.47 0.000
2005-2006 1899 0.43 0.000
2006-2007 2467 0.51 0.000
2007-2008 2151 0.46 0.000
2008-2009 1710 0.33 0.000
2009-2010 1820 0.33 0.000
2010-2011 2041 0.44 0.000
2011-2012 1737 0.45 0.000
2012-2013 1444 0.31 0.000
2013-2014 1416 0.48 0.000
Average 1951 0.44 −
H0: αt and αt+1 are independent.
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Table A6: One-year Contingency Table
Y eart+1 Percentage p-Value for p-Value for
of Repeated Fisher’s Exact Pearson’s
Winners (%) Test χ2 Test
Y eart L W
1996 L 715 397
W 397 715 64.30 0.000 0.000
1997 L 664 316
W 316 664 67.76 0.000 0.000
1998 L 614 297
W 297 614 67.40 0.000 0.000
1999 L 612 301
W 301 613 67.14 0.000 0.000
2000 L 662 296
W 296 663 69.21 0.000 0.000
2001 L 680 331
W 331 680 67.26 0.000 0.000
2002 L 793 419
W 419 793 65.43 0.000 0.000
2003 L 795 385
W 385 796 67.46 0.000 0.000
2004 L 628 312
W 312 628 66.81 0.000 0.000
2005 L 636 313
W 313 637 67.12 0.000 0.000
2006 L 860 373
W 373 861 69.83 0.000 0.000
2007 L 721 354
W 354 722 67.16 0.000 0.000
2008 L 525 330
W 330 525 61.40 0.000 0.000
2009 L 544 366
W 366 544 59.78 0.000 0.000
2010 L 677 343
W 343 678 66.47 0.000 0.000
2011 L 565 303
W 303 566 65.21 0.000 0.000
2012 L 432 290
W 290 432 59.83 0.000 0.000
2013 L 471 237
W 237 471 66.53 0.000 0.000
Average 65.89
1. H0: the relative proportions of Y eart are independent of Y eart+1.
2. Fisher’s exact test is a statistical significance test used in the analysis of contingency tables. With large samples,
a Pearson’s chi-squared test can be used.
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Table A7: Four-year Spearman Rank Correlations
Y eart Y eart+1 N Spearman’s ρ p-Value
1996-1999 2000-2003 774 0.65 0.000
1997-2000 2001-2004 762 0.68 0.000
1998-2001 2002-2005 732 0.64 0.000
1999-2002 2003-2006 746 0.59 0.000
2000-2003 2004-2007 815 0.62 0.000
2001-2004 2005-2008 808 0.58 0.000
2002-2005 2006-2009 804 0.60 0.000
2003-2006 2007-2010 824 0.63 0.000
2004-2007 2008-2011 813 0.65 0.000
2005-2008 2009-2012 723 0.62 0.000
2006-2009 2010-2013 752 0.62 0.000
2007-2010 2011-2014 733 0.62 0.000
Average 774 0.63 −
H0: αt and αt+1 are independent.
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Table A8: Four-year Contingency Table
Y eart+1 Percentage p-Value for p-Value for
of Repeated Fisher’s Exact Pearson’s
Winners(%) Test χ2 Test
Y eart L W
1996-1999 L 282 105
W 105 282 72.87 0.000 0.000
1997-2000 L 282 99
W 99 282 74.02 0.000 0.000
1998-2001 L 270 96
W 96 270 73.77 0.000 0.000
1999-2002 L 268 105
W 105 268 71.85 0.000 0.000
2000-2003 L 296 111
W 111 297 72.97 0.000 0.000
2001-2004 L 289 115
W 115 289 71.53 0.000 0.000
2002-2005 L 294 108
W 108 294 73.13 0.000 0.000
2003-2006 L 304 108
W 108 304 73.79 0.000 0.000
2004-2007 L 301 105
W 105 302 74.38 0.000 0.000
2005-2008 L 255 106
W 106 256 70.91 0.000 0.000
2006-2009 L 277 99
W 99 277 73.67 0.000 0.000
2007-2010 L 268 98
W 98 269 73.50 0.000 0.000
Average 73.03
1. H0: the relative proportions of Y eart are independent of Y eart+1.
2. Fisher’s exact test is a statistical significance test used in the analysis of contingency tables. With large samples,
a Pearson’s chi-squared test can be used.
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Management Return/Total Cost
I define a ratio to measure the percentage return with respect to the total cost per acre:
Ratioit(%) =
(Revit − Cit)/Acrtili
Cit/Acrtili
× 100 = mgtRetit(per acre)
Cit(per acre)
× 100.
This ratio of performance measure is used in the following regression:
Ratioit −Ratiojt = αi + βZit + µit,
Table A9: One-year Spearman Rank Correlations
Year N Spearman’s ρ p-Value
1996-1997 2227 0.44 0.000
1997-1998 1961 0.45 0.000
1998-1999 1824 0.44 0.000
1999-2000 1831 0.48 0.000
2000-2001 1918 0.51 0.000
2001-2002 2023 0.47 0.000
2002-2003 2426 0.47 0.000
2003-2004 2363 0.48 0.000
2004-2005 1880 0.51 0.000
2005-2006 1900 0.45 0.000
2006-2007 2470 0.53 0.000
2007-2008 2155 0.49 0.000
2008-2009 1710 0.34 0.000
2009-2010 1821 0.34 0.000
2010-2011 2043 0.47 0.000
2011-2012 1737 0.48 0.000
2012-2013 1445 0.34 0.000
2013-2014 1418 0.48 0.000
Average 1953 0.45 −
H0: αt and αt+1 are independent.
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Table A10: One-year Contingency Table
Y eart+1 Percentage p-Value for p-Value for
of Repeated Fisher’s Exact Pearson’s
Winners (%) Test χ2 Test
Y eart L W
1996 L 720 393
W 393 721 64.78 0.000 0.000
1997 L 657 323
W 323 658 67.14 0.000 0.000
1998 L 597 315
W 315 597 65.46 0.000 0.000
1999 L 614 301
W 301 615 67.21 0.000 0.000
2000 L 657 302
W 302 657 68.51 0.000 0.000
2001 L 675 336
W 336 676 66.86 0.000 0.000
2002 L 786 427
W 427 786 64.80 0.000 0.000
2003 L 789 392
W 392 790 66.89 0.000 0.000
2004 L 644 296
W 296 644 68.51 0.000 0.000
2005 L 644 306
W 306 644 67.79 0.000 0.000
2006 L 860 375
W 375 860 69.64 0.000 0.000
2007 L 715 362
W 362 716 66.48 0.000 0.000
2008 L 535 320
W 320 535 62.57 0.000 0.000
2009 L 552 358
W 358 553 60.77 0.000 0.000
2010 L 681 340
W 340 682 66.80 0.000 0.000
2011 L 577 291
W 291 578 66.59 0.000 0.000
2012 L 443 279
W 279 444 61.50 0.000 0.000
2013 L 473 236
W 236 473 66.71 0.000 0.000
Average 66.06
1. H0: the relative proportions of Y eart are independent of Y eart+1.
2. Fisher’s exact test is a statistical significance test used in the analysis of contingency tables. With large samples,
a Pearson’s chi-squared test can be used.
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Table A11: Four-year Spearman Rank Correlations
Y eart Y eart+1 N Spearman’s ρ p-Value
1996-1999 2000-2003 774 0.66 0.000
1997-2000 2001-2004 762 0.68 0.000
1998-2001 2002-2005 732 0.65 0.000
1999-2002 2003-2006 746 0.63 0.000
2000-2003 2004-2007 815 0.66 0.000
2001-2004 2005-2008 808 0.64 0.000
2002-2005 2006-2009 804 0.60 0.000
2003-2006 2007-2010 824 0.61 0.000
2004-2007 2008-2011 813 0.65 0.000
2005-2008 2009-2012 723 0.63 0.000
2006-2009 2010-2013 752 0.63 0.000
2007-2010 2011-2014 733 0.63 0.000
Average 774 0.64 −
H0: αt and αt+1 are independent.
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Table A12: Four-year Contingency Table
Y eart+1 Percentage p-Value for p-Value for
of Repeated Fisher’s Exact Pearson’s
Winners(%) Test χ2 Test
Y eart L W
1996-1999 L 286 101
W 101 286 73.90 0.000 0.000
1997-2000 L 277 104
W 104 277 72.70 0.000 0.000
1998-2001 L 267 99
W 99 267 72.95 0.000 0.000
1999-2002 L 271 102
W 102 271 72.65 0.000 0.000
2000-2003 L 300 107
W 107 301 73.96 0.000 0.000
2001-2004 L 295 109
W 109 295 73.02 0.000 0.000
2002-2005 L 293 109
W 109 293 72.89 0.000 0.000
2003-2006 L 298 114
W 114 298 72.33 0.000 0.000
2004-2007 L 302 104
W 104 303 74.63 0.000 0.000
2005-2008 L 259 102
W 102 260 72.02 0.000 0.000
2006-2009 L 272 104
W 104 272 72.34 0.000 0.000
2007-2010 L 265 101
W 101 266 72.68 0.000 0.000
Average 73.01
1. H0: the relative proportions of Y eart are independent of Y eart+1.
2. Fisher’s exact test is a statistical significance test used in the analysis of contingency tables. With large samples,
a Pearson’s chi-squared test can be used.
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Management Return/Land Cost
I define a ratio to measure the percentage return with respect to the total land cost per acre:
Ratioit(%) =
(Revit − Cit)/Acrtili
LCit/Acrtili
× 100 = mgtRetit(per acre)
LCit(per acre)
× 100.
This ratio of performance measure is used in the following regression:
Ratioit −Ratiojt = αi + βZit + µit,
Table A13: One-year Spearman Rank Correlations
Year N Spearman’s ρ p-Value
1996-1997 2224 0.39 0.000
1997-1998 1960 0.41 0.000
1998-1999 1822 0.39 0.000
1999-2000 1827 0.45 0.000
2000-2001 1917 0.50 0.000
2001-2002 2022 0.45 0.000
2002-2003 2424 0.44 0.000
2003-2004 2361 0.45 0.000
2004-2005 1880 0.47 0.000
2005-2006 1899 0.43 0.000
2006-2007 2467 0.45 0.000
2007-2008 2151 0.41 0.000
2008-2009 1710 0.33 0.000
2009-2010 1820 0.32 0.000
2010-2011 2041 0.46 0.000
2011-2012 1737 0.42 0.000
2012-2013 1444 0.26 0.000
2013-2014 1416 0.44 0.000
Average 1951 0.42 −
H0: αt and αt+1 are independent.
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Table A14: One-year Contingency Table
Y eart+1 Percentage p-Value for p-Value for
of Repeated Fisher’s Exact Pearson’s
Winners (%) Test χ2 Test
Y eart L W
1996 L 703 409
W 409 703 63.22 0.000 0.000
1997 L 642 338
W 338 642 65.51 0.000 0.000
1998 L 583 328
W 328 583 64.00 0.000 0.000
1999 L 614 299
W 299 615 67.36 0.000 0.000
2000 L 656 302
W 302 657 68.58 0.000 0.000
2001 L 678 333
W 333 678 67.06 0.000 0.000
2002 L 785 427
W 427 785 64.77 0.000 0.000
2003 L 774 406
W 406 775 65.68 0.000 0.000
2004 L 629 311
W 311 629 66.91 0.000 0.000
2005 L 632 317
W 317 633 66.70 0.000 0.000
2006 L 839 394
W 394 840 68.13 0.000 0.000
2007 L 712 363
W 363 713 66.33 0.000 0.000
2008 L 539 316
W 316 539 63.04 0.000 0.000
2009 L 560 350
W 350 560 61.54 0.000 0.000
2010 L 683 337
W 337 684 67.06 0.000 0.000
2011 L 565 303
W 303 566 65.21 0.000 0.000
2012 L 428 294
W 294 428 59.28 0.000 0.000
2013 L 470 238
W 238 470 66.38 0.000 0.000
Average 65.38
1. H0: the relative proportions of Y eart are independent of Y eart+1.
2. Fisher’s exact test is a statistical significance test used in the analysis of contingency tables. With large samples,
a Pearson’s chi-squared test can be used.
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Table A15: Four-year Spearman Rank Correlations
Y eart Y eart+1 N Spearman’s ρ p-Value
1996-1999 2000-2003 774 0.64 0.000
1997-2000 2001-2004 762 0.65 0.000
1998-2001 2002-2005 732 0.63 0.000
1999-2002 2003-2006 746 0.59 0.000
2000-2003 2004-2007 815 0.56 0.000
2001-2004 2005-2008 808 0.56 0.000
2002-2005 2006-2009 804 0.54 0.000
2003-2006 2007-2010 824 0.55 0.000
2004-2007 2008-2011 813 0.58 0.000
2005-2008 2009-2012 723 0.55 0.000
2006-2009 2010-2013 752 0.55 0.000
2007-2010 2011-2014 733 0.55 0.000
Average 774 0.58 −
H0: αt and αt+1 are independent.
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Table A16: Four-year Contingency Table
Y eart+1 Percentage p-Value for p-Value for
of Repeated Fisher’s Exact Pearson’s
Winners(%) Test χ2 Test
Y eart L W
1996-1999 L 279 108
W 108 279 72.09 0.000 0.000
1997-2000 L 283 98
W 98 283 74.28 0.000 0.000
1998-2001 L 272 94
W 94 272 74.32 0.000 0.000
1999-2002 L 265 108
W 108 265 71.05 0.000 0.000
2000-2003 L 291 116
W 116 292 71.74 0.000 0.000
2001-2004 L 287 117
W 117 287 71.04 0.000 0.000
2002-2005 L 291 111
W 111 291 72.39 0.000 0.000
2003-2006 L 291 121
W 121 291 70.63 0.000 0.000
2004-2007 L 297 109
W 109 298 73.40 0.000 0.000
2005-2008 L 254 107
W 107 255 70.64 0.000 0.000
2006-2009 L 270 106
W 106 270 71.81 0.000 0.000
2007-2010 L 265 101
W 101 266 72.68 0.000 0.000
Average 72.17
1. H0: the relative proportions of Y eart are independent of Y eart+1.
2. Fisher’s exact test is a statistical significance test used in the analysis of contingency tables. With large samples,
a Pearson’s chi-squared test can be used.
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Return On Farm Assets
The Return On Farm Assets is used in the following regression:
ROAit −ROAjt = αi + βZit + µit,
Table A17: One-year Spearman Rank Correlations
Year N Spearman’s ρ p-Value
2003-2004 405 0.42 0.000
2004-2005 325 0.47 0.000
2005-2006 327 0.36 0.000
2006-2007 472 0.60 0.000
2007-2008 428 0.63 0.000
2008-2009 297 0.27 0.000
2009-2010 280 0.26 0.000
2010-2011 361 0.56 0.000
2011-2012 330 0.53 0.000
2012-2013 284 0.29 0.000
2013-2014 269 0.45 0.000
Average 343 0.42 −
H0: αt and αt+1 are independent.
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Table A18: One-year Contingency Table
Y eart+1 Percentage p-Value for p-Value for
of Repeated Fisher’s Exact Pearson’s
Winners (%) Test χ2 Test
Y eart L W
2003 L 136 66
W 66 137 67.49 0.000 0.000
2004 L 109 53
W 53 110 67.49 0.000 0.000
2005 L 103 60
W 60 104 63.42 0.000 0.000
2006 L 171 65
W 65 171 72.46 0.000 0.000
2007 L 150 64
W 64 150 70.10 0.000 0.000
2008 L 85 63
W 63 86 57.72 0.000 0.000
2009 L 81 59
W 59 81 57.85 0.000 0.000
2010 L 126 54
W 54 127 70.17 0.000 0.000
2011 L 117 48
W 48 117 70.91 0.000 0.000
2012 L 87 55
W 55 87 61.27 0.000 0.000
2013 L 82 52
W 52 83 61.49 0.000 0.000
Average 65.59
1. H0: the relative proportions of Y eart are independent of Y eart+1.
2. Fisher’s exact test is a statistical significance test used in the analysis of contingency tables. With large samples,
a Pearson’s chi-squared test can be used.
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Table A19: Four-year Spearman Rank Correlations
Y eart Y eart+1 N Spearman’s ρ p-Value
2003-2006 2007-2010 75 0.59 0.000
2004-2007 2008-2011 75 0.64 0.000
2005-2008 2009-2012 63 0.69 0.000
2006-2009 2010-2013 69 0.70 0.000
2007-2010 2011-2014 66 0.51 0.000
Average 69 0.63 −
H0: αt and αt+1 are independent.
Table A20: Four-year Contingency Table
Y eart+1 Percentage p-Value for p-Value for
of Repeated Fisher’s Exact Pearson’s
Winners(%) Test χ2 Test
Y eart L W
2003-2006 L 29 8
W 8 30 78.94 0.000 0.000
2004-2007 L 25 12
W 9 29 76.31 0.000 0.000
2005-2008 L 23 8
W 8 24 75.00 0.000 0.000
2006-2009 L 27 7
W 6 29 82.85 0.000 0.000
2007-2010 L 21 12
W 12 21 63.63 0.000 0.000
Average 75.34
1. H0: the relative proportions of Y eart are independent of Y eart+1.
2. Fisher’s exact test is a statistical significance test used in the analysis of contingency tables. With large samples,
a Pearson’s chi-squared test can be used.
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Appendix B
Variables and Management Measures
Item Definition
Variable
Y ieldCorn Corn Yield
PriceCorn Corn Price
Y ieldBean Soybean Yield
PriceBean Soybean Price
cstTotal Total Cost
lanTotal Land Cost
lanRent Rental Cost
lanLease Crop Share Cost
acrT il Total Farm Size
acrCash Cash Rented Land Size
acrShare Share Leased Land Size
acrOwn Owned Land Size
spr Soil Productivity Rate
Profitability
MgtRet Management Return
OpRet Operator and Land Return
Solvency
WorkingCapital Working Capital
CurrentRatio Current Ratio
Liability
D/E Debt-equity Rate
D/A Debt-asset Rate
Efficiency
AssetTurnoverRatio Asset Turnover Ratio
OperatingExpenseRatio Operating Expense Ratio
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Appendix C
Definitions
Crop Returns – The sum of grain, seed, and feed sales; the value of homegrown seed used; the
value of all feed fed (except milk) and pasture; government farm program crop subsidy payments
received and accrued, including marketing loan gains, countercyclical payments, and loan defi-
ciency payments; crop insurance proceeds received and accrued; and the change in feed and grain
inventories less value of purchased feed.
Net Farm Income – The sum of all gross sales plus net change in inventory and capital accounts
less all expenses for items purchased, including interest paid and annual depreciation. This is the
accrual earnings available to pay living expenses, pay income and social security taxes, and make
principal on term debt.
Management Return – The wage (salary or residual return) for all operators of this farm, whether
tenant-, part-owner-, or owner-operator, earned for labor and management efforts. It is determined
by: (1) total net farm income, (2) less the value of family labor, (3) minus interest on equity capital-
including net rent-charged on all capital invested. This figure, as the residual return to all unpaid
operators’ labor and management efforts, is divided by the months of unpaid operator labor and
multiply by 12 to reflect income for one operator on multiple-operator farms. Management return
is the residual surplus after a charge for unpaid labor and interest or land charge on capital are
deducted from net farm income.
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Interest on Equity Capital – 4.0 percent interest on non-land inventory plus 2.10 percent in-
terest on current indexed value of bare land (to reflect a normalized annual net rent) minus the
accrual interest expense.
Grain Farms – Farms on which the value of the feed fed to livestock was less than 40 percent
of the crop returns and where the value of feed fed to diary or poultry was not more than one-sixth
of the crop returns.
163
Appendix D
The Change of Land Tenure
Table D1: Growth Rates of Land Control Means, 1996
through 2014
Total Land Size Cash Rented Size Owned Size
Year Growth N N N
1997 >=5% 445 398 277
(0,5%) 466 180 166
0 531 499 839
(-5%,0) 512 192 135
<=-5% 273 295 152
1998 >=5% 439 429 295
(0,5%) 484 173 130
0 624 555 888
(-5%,0) 456 169 148
<=-5% 264 312 160
1999 >=5% 504 474 281
(0,5%) 468 164 142
0 575 532 885
(-5%,0) 455 193 166
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Table D1: (cont.)
Total Land Size Cash Rented Size Owned Size
Year Growth N N N
<=-5% 284 301 169
2000 >=5% 505 501 304
(0,5%) 453 175 122
0 615 553 894
(-5%,0) 477 197 153
<=-5% 314 337 202
2001 >=5% 491 509 302
(0,5%) 433 174 134
0 626 581 906
(-5%,0) 490 208 155
<=-5% 280 319 178
2002 >=5% 611 652 440
(0,5%) 559 211 185
0 722 684 1074
(-5%,0) 523 225 152
<=-5% 413 418 222
2003 >=5% 598 725 386
(0,5%) 621 236 211
0 760 721 1208
(-5%,0) 570 235 154
<=-5% 369 382 201
2004 >=5% 520 657 328
(0,5%) 579 250 173
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Table D1: (cont.)
Total Land Size Cash Rented Size Owned Size
Year Growth N N N
0 729 670 1178
(-5%,0) 558 246 162
<=-5% 377 372 198
2005 >=5% 377 488 293
(0,5%) 469 225 139
0 611 583 924
(-5%,0) 491 224 139
<=-5% 264 292 169
2006 >=5% 536 691 371
(0,5%) 671 306 253
0 586 589 1112
(-5%,0) 641 303 189
<=-5% 432 435 242
2007 >=5% 519 615 373
(0,5%) 711 361 220
0 666 678 1209
(-5%,0) 659 319 200
<=-5% 397 446 227
2008 >=5% 406 424 312
(0,5%) 527 254 149
0 574 588 1032
(-5%,0) 562 324 137
<=-5% 333 418 162
166
Table D1: (cont.)
Total Land Size Cash Rented Size Owned Size
Year Growth N N N
2009 >=5% 375 412 323
(0,5%) 505 260 116
0 521 514 866
(-5%,0) 450 239 136
<=-5% 295 380 168
2010 >=5% 466 537 370
(0,5%) 570 284 155
0 586 594 1052
(-5%,0) 563 302 149
<=-5% 395 450 237
2011 >=5% 434 454 419
(0,5%) 594 315 146
0 596 607 1043
(-5%,0) 557 307 133
<=-5% 324 428 162
2012 >=5% 360 384 336
(0,5%) 533 273 153
0 524 548 902
(-5%,0) 484 257 115
<=-5% 285 372 144
2013 >=5% 422 445 345
(0,5%) 424 232 140
0 461 455 794
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Table D1: (cont.)
Total Land Size Cash Rented Size Owned Size
Year Growth N N N
(-5%,0) 400 227 97
<=-5% 302 387 151
2014 >=5% 389 406 314
(0,5%) 470 252 139
0 450 492 831
(-5%,0) 467 267 114
<=-5% 297 372 165
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Figure D.1: Total Land Size Growth Rates, 1996-2014
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Figure D.2: Total Cash Rented Land Size Growth Rates, 1996-2014
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Figure D.3: Total Owned Land Size Growth Rates, 1996-2014
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